9th ROYAL TANK REGIMENT
WAR DIARY JUNE 1944 to JUNE 1945
Function of a War Diary
The War Diary of an
army unit records details of its activities while in a theatre of war. It is
primarily an historical record, and can later be used to trace what happened in
an action or campaign. The Diary may be supplemented by Intelligence Summaries,
kept either together with the Diary or as a separate set of documents.
Information to be recorded includes, but is not limited to:
·
Changes in assignment: some units, and 9 RTR
was one, came under command of different formations at various times during the
campaign. The Diary should show the time, date, and place of such transfers,
giving map references of the significant places.
·
Changes in command, establishment, equipment,
or organization. These changes should also show time, date, and place. From
time to time the Diary should list the names of key personnel in the unit.
·
Before an action, the Diary should record: the
intention of the action; any information that could assist the unit commander
to achieve his part of the plan, eg strength and disposition of enemy forces
and own troops, including support forces such as Air Force, ground and weather
conditions etc; plan to achieve the intention, which will include the plan of the
unit’s parent formation, and the plan for the unit itself; the unit’s plan will
be the basis for issuing orders to subunits; logistical arrangements.
·
At the end of the day’s activities, which could
include movement, training, preparation for activities, combat etc: summary of
activities during the day, including that of subunits down to appropriate
level; preparation of defensive works, including laying of mines; weather and ground conditions, where they
were of significance.
·
Changes to the state of men and equipment,
which can include: casualties, including prisoners-of-war taken by the enemy;
this will be in summary only, the details being recorded by the Orderly Room;
changes to weapons could include loss by enemy action or mechanical failure, or
gain by repair or replenishment.
·
Information on the effect of the operations on
the enemy: casualties inflicted, prisoners taken, damage to equipment;
identification of formations in immediate opposition; any other information
gained likely to be of value.
·
If appropriate, care should be taken to provide
relevant copies of maps, aerial photographs, and of radio logs if maintained.
Each month, or at the
end of a significant operation, the unit commander should write a brief
analytical summary based on what has been recorded. Comments by the commander
should include the reasons for success or failure, the lessons learned, and
what can be done to improve future operations.
War Diary of 9 RTR
The person with direct
responsibility for the War Diary in 9 RTR was the Intelligence Officer (IO). He
had many other duties, including the collection, analysis, and onward
transmission of intelligence, particularly as it could help the CO in making
decisions. The IO was also responsible for the provision of appropriate maps to
all subordinate commanders, ensuring where possible that the maps had defence
overprints.
In action he was the commander of one of the four RHQ tanks. Thus at the
times when the items of greatest significance for the Diary were happening, the
IO was subject to the hazards of battle and the jolting rides of cross-country
movement. The IO in June 1944 was Lt Frank Haydon. He was promoted to captain
and the command of the Recce Troop in September 1944, and Lt Laurie Le Brun,
always known as Bruno and previously 13 Troop Leader, was appointed IO.
The War Diary as it appears here was transcribed from the copy of the
Diary in possession of the war-time Adjutant, Capt AEW (John) Hodges. There are
some differences between that copy of the Diary and what follows. The main
differences are:
1. The text has been edited by spelling out in full many of the words
recorded as abbreviations, and by some minor re-writing to make the sense
clearer.
2. The original war-time maps with their grids are no longer available.
Most, but not all, of the map references have therefore been deleted. The maps
provided show most of the locations referred to in the text.
3. Some illustrations are included to show people, places, and equipment.
It must be stressed that although most of the entries in the Diary are
factual and correct, there are occasions when what is recorded is contradicted
by other records or personal recollections. If any reader wants to use entries
in the Diary for research or other purposes, it is strongly recommended that
they cross-check the information with other sources.
Battalion or Regiment?
In talking or writing about the British Army there can be confusion
between the words ‘battalion’ and ‘regiment’. A battalion of either infantry or
armour is a unit of some 700 soldiers, generally consisting of a Unit HQ, from
where all activities of the unit are controlled and co-ordinated, an
Administrative or Headquarters sub-unit, and three combat or front-line
sub-units. The sub-units are companies in the infantry, batteries in the
artillery, and squadrons in the tanks.
The term ‘regiment’ formally stands for an administrative rather than a
tactical grouping. For example, the Dorsetshire Regiment comprised several
battalions, of which the 4th and 5th were in 43 Infantry
Division. Their abbreviated titles were 4 DORSETS and 5 DORSETS respectively.
The Royal Tank Regiment during World War II consisted of eight regular
battalions, four wartime only battalions, and
twelve Territorial battalions. In the deception operation ‘Fortitude’
there were also seven dummy RTR battalions. The 9th was
one of the wartime only battalions.
The history of nomenclature of what started in 1917 as the Tank Corps,
became the Royal Tank Corps in 1923, and then became the Royal Tank Regiment as
part of the Royal Armoured Corps when that was created shortly before World War
II, is
a bit more complicated.
There were battalions in the Tank Corps and the Royal Tank Corps, and
they remained battalions in the Royal Tank Regiment. On 1 January 1945 the
battalions of the RTR were renamed as regiments, becoming for example: 1st
Royal Tank Regiment, 9th Royal Regiment, 48th Royal Tank
Regiment. Thus the 9th is referred to in the War Diary as sometimes
a battalion
and sometimes as a regiment; abbreviations used include: 9th
R Tanks, 9th RTR, and 9 RTR.
3. Epsom 1
4. Epsom 2
5. Epsom 3
8. Breakout
9. Bridges
10. To Le Havre
11.
Le
Havre
12.
To
Holland
13. Raids in Holland
14. Clarkeforce
15.
Roosendaal
1
16.
Roosendaal
2
17. Movements
Nov 44 to Mar 45
18. Geilenkirchen
19. Reichswald plan
21. After Reichswald
22. Broedersbosch
WAR DIARY
11
June to 23 June 1944
Refer Map 1
On June 11, the Advance Party left Aldershot for
France and the following day the battalion moved by train and road to the
Marshalling Area near Gosport.
After the first week, when
everyone had been busy sealing, and the tanks undergoing wading trials, life at
Aldershot had been leisurely only to be distributed with excitement as the odd
assortment of kit, which included a pamphlet on France and a number of French
phrases, “Not to be shown in public”, were distributed.
The Marshalling Area provided less excitement but
more entertainment for the final stage of sealing was completed within a few
hours of arrival, and departure delayed by heavy seas in the Channel. During
the period waiting, every available penny was raked together but, owing to the
tax on beer, was soon again in the hands of the Government.
By 18 June the weather was
considered sufficiently settled to allow further embarkation, and Battalion
Headquarters, A Squadron and part of B Squadron were loaded on L.C.T’s. There
were not, however, sufficient of these craft for the whole Battalion, due to
the number smashed on the Normandy coast by the rough seas, and the remainder
of the Battalion were allotted L.S.T’s, one of which was American – those who
were lucky enough to cross on this ship not only had a pleasant journey across,
lasting four days, but also enjoyed the pleasant experience of American food.
The Channel, however, had not calmed to the extent presumed by the embarkation
authorities and neither craft nor ship was able to land until June 21, except
for the Echelons which got ashore on June 19. Each craft had a different
experience to tell; anchors and kedges had been lost; tanks had broken from
their chains and bulged the sides of the craft, causing certain alarm; balloons
had broken loose and torn away rigging; and a high percentage of the Battalion
experienced the agony of being sea-sick.
The whole Battalion
nevertheless had disembarked on Juno Beach by June 22 and concentrated in the
area St. Gabriel .
The enemy had remained exceedingly quiet – no
aircraft were seen nor did shelling disturb the quiet of those hot summer days.
On the coast, except for the broken and damaged craft on the beach, there were
none of the ravages of war that later controlled every landscape.
Under the command of viii Corps, the Battalion awaited orders for the first
action.
BAPTISM AT
CHEUX
24 June to 2
July 1944
June 24 On the night of 24 June, the Battalion did a road march
to area Secqueville en Bessin and there spent the day resting and preparing for
battle. The following night the Battalion left for the forming up point, line
of railway 9171 – 9271, and arrived
there at 0200 hrs.
Using the Caen-Bayeux railway as a start
line, the intention was to attack with two Infantry Brigades up supported by a
Tank Brigade, and having made a hole in the enemy defences, to pass elements of
an Armoured Division through and thus establish a break-out from the original
bridgehead.
9
RTR were under command 15 (S) Division.
The
general plan was as follows:-
Phase I:
Right – 7 RTR (less 1 Squadron) in support one
Brigade, to cut Tilley-Caen Road and secure high ground Haut du Bosq.
Left
– 9 RTR (less C Squadron) to attack St. Manvieu – La Gaule.
Phase II:
With
Left flank secured by 15 Recce (1) C Squadron supporting Gordons to capture
Colleville and Montrainville, and if possible secure bridgehead over River Orne;
(2) one Squadron 7 RTR with one Battalion 227 Bde to capture Grainville sur
Odon .
Elements
of 11 Armoured Division to pass through, seize bridges and then occupy high
ground pt 112 and pt 113. RAF support and artillery barrage of about 600 field
and heavy guns was to precede the attack.
June 26 The battalion attacking with A and B Squadrons, crossed
the start line at 0730 hours, following closely behind the barrage. By 0815
hours the River Mue had been crossed. No strong opposition had yet been met but
the infantry found it difficult to clear the enemy from the high crops which
provided cover for snipers who were also in the trees. At 0940 hours,
house-clearing on the objectives had begun. Armour had been reported in the
area South of Cheux, but by 1125 hours objectives were clear, except for one
strongpoint in St. Manvieu, which was finally destroyed by CROCS. The infantry
dug in and the tanks remained in support to assist in beating off
counter-attacks which were made on a small scale south of La Gaule and East of
St. Manvieu. No heavy anti-tank guns had been encountered but one tank
commander had been killed during the barrage and three tanks damaged. It was
estimated that at least two companies of enemy had been killed.
At 1515 hours, a regiment of 11 Armoured
Division with Recce elements passed through and established themselves on the
high ground north of Cheux. The threat of an armoured counter-attack had not
yet developed.
At 1915 hours, without
artillery support and the expected air attack on Grainville and Colleville, C
Squadron began their advance in heavy rain. They pushed across the Tilly-Caen
Road and had great difficulty in getting through the sunken narrow roads of
Cheux. They eventually got on to the 100 ring contour South of Cheux and moved
forward down the slope to support the infantry into Colleville, through the
high corn. Heavy anti-tank fire, which included S.P. 88mm’s and Panthers, was
encountered on the left flank (supposed to be held by 15 Recce) and to the
front.
Continual rain made it
difficult to locate the targets and gradually one tank after the other became a
casualty. By splitting the Squadron so that half engaged the enemy tanks and
SPs, while the remainder pushed on to help the infantry, who were in trouble
with mortars and snipers at the approaches to Colleville, there were further
casualties. The Gordons actually got to Colleville but not in sufficient strength
to hold it and were forced to withdraw under persistent mortar fire.
Some Shermans later moved on to the ridge, but as
they never fired a shot it is presumed that they never located a target or
conversely were a display of strength for morale purposes only.
By last night, only 6 tanks of C Squadron were still
engaged and under cover of darkness these tanks moved forward in an effort to
collect the remainder of the infantry still pinned to the ground – not more
than a company was found. In the darkness the tanks moved back into Cheux and
spent the few remaining hours of the night in a farmyard.
For his determination to achieve his objective
despite heavy opposition, Major R.E. Holden, O.C “C” Squadron, was later
awarded the M.C.
Neither A nor B Squadrons were relieved until dark
and they leaguered on their respective objectives.
The casualties of C Squadron’s action were not as
heavy as anticipated. The Churchill proved that it could take a lot of
punishment and that it was slow to burn. Three ORs were killed and about ten
wounded. Complete write-offs in tanks later proved to be five.
At first light, C Squadron moved to the battalion
area north of Cheux.
June 27 A & B Squadrons carried out mopping-up operations
south of Cheux in the area Grainville and Colleville. Here again the fighting
was fierce with Panthers infiltrating from a flank after an area had been
clear, or remaining well camouflaged in an orchard or behind a hedgerow opening
up only at point-blank range. Ten Panthers were located in this area and two of
our tanks were lost. Lieutenant Mott was severely wounded, having his legs
amputated below the knee.
By
dusk, infantry had been supported into Grainville and Colleville and were
firmly established. The tanks leagured north of the Railway.
June 28 By 0950 hours A and B Squadrons had put the Cameronians
on the X- roads but the opposition was strong with enemy tanks resisting and
counter-attacks being frequently made from the directions of Noyers and Haut de
Forges NW to Grainville and Le Valtru. Three Panthers had been destroyed,
however, during the day.
June 29 At first light, C Squadron relieved A and B Squadrons and
took up a position South of railway crossing at Colleville.
Elements
of 11 Armoured Division had now crossed River Odon and were in position on Hill
112.
C
Squadron were shelled and mortared during the day, standing at immediate notice
to support infantry should further counter-attacks develop on Grainville.
At
1800 hours a strong infantry and tank counter-attack developed; two Panthers
had infiltrated into Grainville and German infantry were attacking Le Valtru. C
Squadron deployed north-west of X-roads and gave all support possible, and it
was estimated that 600 enemy dead were left on the ground as a result. Captain
K.A. Kidd, R.O., during the action worked magnificently to maintain
co-operation between tanks and infantry, and was later awarded the M.C.
Following
this abortive attack, an armoured counter-attack was made south of Haut du Bosq
but this was also later repulsed.
C
Squadron remained in position till dark – the only casualties being through
mortaring, which had damaged two tanks; five OR’s being wounded.
June 30 11 Armoured Division withdrew during the night, as C
Squadron stood by at 0430 hours under the threat of another counter-attack, but
nothing developed till the afternoon when 60 tanks of 9 S.S. Panzer attempted
to cut off all troops south of Cheux by again attacking Haut Du Bosq – this was
also beaten off.
C
Squadron were relieved by 7 R Tanks and joined the Battalion north of Cheux in
time to watch RAF bombing enemy tank concentrations in Villers Bocage area.
This was the first time that the RAF had been seen in action and morale rose
considerably.
July 1-2 The Battalion stood by to repulse further counter-attacks
in conjunction with 43 Division. The plans made were never put into effect –
continuous failure had apparently made the Germans accept the inevitable.
3 July to 25
July
July 2-3 The general intention of the Higher Command appeared
to be the capture of Caen and the clearing of ground to the south-west between
the rivers Odon and Orne. Carpiquet 9769 had been reported clear by the
Canadians, and Verson 9665 held by 43 Division. Eterville 9864 was, however, held
by the enemy. The Battalion was still concentrated north of Cheux and a recce
was ordered in conjunction with 130 Brigade (43 Division) of the area Verson –
Eterville – Maltot.
July 10 At 0300 hours Battalion moved to Forming up Point
area Fontaine Etoupefour 9664. The move was covered by Artillery and no
difficulties were encountered.
Battalion
Headquarters was established at 944653.
At
0500, B Squadron advanced with 5 Dorsets and in fifteen minutes Les Daims
968640 had been taken and only machine gun fire had been encountered.
It
was known that elements of 10 SS Pz Division threatened left flank and 12
Panthers were reported roaming in the
area of Eterville.
A
troop of 17-pounder S.P. took up positions to guard against this threat while B
Squadron pushed on to the Chateau. Resistance was still confined to machine gun
fire and snipers, and soon 6, 7 and 8 Troops captured their objective, but one
tank had been lost on the left flank, due to anti-tank fire later discovered to
be 75/55mm.
At 0614
hours, the objective was reported secure with the infantry firmly established
on the line of the road Fontaine-Etoupefour – Maltot.
About 30 prisoners had been taken, a number killed,
and at least 6 gun positions destroyed.
By 0625, C Squadron were advancing and with Besa
fire tearing the corn, the Germans came forward with their hands up. Those that
were not killed were taken prisoner and later identified as belonging to 1 and
2 Battalions 22 PGR. As the 4 Dorsets neared Eterville, B Squadron moved up and
gave added support from the right flank, destroying 2 unidentified anti-tank
guns.
The threat from the left still remained, but a
further troop of 17-pounder S.P. and 11 Troop of C Squadron were in good
positions waiting for the first sign of enemy tanks.
By 0735 hours, Eterville had been taken and B
Squadron rallied north of Les Daims. Heavy enemy mortar fire was, however,
concentrated on Eterville while A Squadron began their advance at 0815 hours
supported by B Squadron from right flank.
Up to now, the whole attack had gone perfectly, but
at 0835 hours A Squadron was severely worried by anti-tank fire from 4 S.P’s in
the area 985629, but as soon as an artillery concentration was brought down in
this area, 3 Troop reported than ANT was firing from 970622 and that two tanks
had been knocked out.
At 0933 hours, a strong
enemy counter-attack was made on Hill 112 and 7 RTR suffered a number of
casualties, including CO and 2IC. The right flank was thretened and anti-tank
fire was also reported from the high ground dominating Maltot to west of River
Orne. The impetus of the attack was failing – 2 Tigers were in Maltot making
the advance of the infantry extremely difficult and A squadron’s movement was
hampered by a troop of Tigers dug-in on the reverse slope of Hill 112, firing
north-east.
At 1156 hours A Squadron were still struggling to
support the infantry in Maltot who were now confronted with another Tiger.
The German infantry were now counter-attacking and
only 9 tanks of A Squadron were left. Major Ballantine, OC A Squadron,
dismounted in an attempt to make contact with the Infantry Commander, but was
severely wounded by mortar fire and subsequently died.
By 1200 hours, 2i/c A Squadron (Capt. Mockford)
reported that he only had four tanks capable of fighting and further reports
stated that counter-attacks were being made with tanks and infantry from
north-east and south-west of Maltot.
The Battalion was disposed as follows:-
B Squadron and elements of A
squadron in hull-down positions on spur 975628 – 992638 with infantry and anti-tank guns dug in.
C Squadron had joined
Battalion Headquarters in forward rally after release by 4 Dorsets. Battalion
Headquarters had been mortared and shelled periodically causing severe
casualties among the wounded that had been brought in.
From 1330-1600 hours, there was a stalemate – the
enemy making no attempt to push their counter-attack any further. A new plan
was devised whereby one Squadron 7 R Tanks were to put WORCS on Hill 112 and C
Squadron to put 4 Dorsets into Maltot. B Squadron were to give support from the
right in the opening phase. 4 Armoured Brigade was waiting to go through.
The advance began at 1640 hours and, despite
anti-tank gunfire from south-west of Maltot, C Squadron had put the infantry
into the village by 1700 hours; but 10 minutes later C Squadron were being shot
at from the rear, for once again enemy tanks had infiltrated under cover of the
spur north-east of Hill 112. 8 Tigers were also moving in on the left flank,
and the infantry were pulling out of Maltot under pressure.
At 1935 hours, C Squadron was also forced to
withdraw under the cover of supporting fire from B Squadron. Mortaring and
shelling was almost continuous and at 2030 hours all tanks rallied at the
Forming up Point, and later joined A Echelon at 946659 to replenish and collect reinforcements.
Casualties suffered were:-
Major Ballantine;
2/Lt. Hendrie and 4 other ranks killed.
Capt. Kirby, Lt. Douglas, Lt. Drew, Lt. Chapman and
28 OR’s wounded; 29 OR’s missing.
16 tanks had been destroyed; 6 of which were
recoverable.
One Tiger and 1 SP had been completely destroyed and
others probably damaged. Enemy infantry casualties, including killed, wounded
and prisoners exceeded 200.
This rather costly action taught many lessons. Lack
of bedding etc. in enemy defence positions proved that at night defence
positions were held only by light patrols, and that the main force withdrew to
avoid the discomforts of continual shelling; therefore, an infantry attack at
night co-ordinated so that tanks would be available at first light would have a
greater chance of immediate success.
Enemy tanks, however, proved the greatest difficulty
– dug-in, camouflaged in orchards and usually positioned on a flank they had
every advantage including that of tank-tank fire power. To pin-point their
location in battle for use by the artillery was also difficult and, under
shellfire, enemy tanks moved to alternative positions that commanded as good a
field of fire as before. To make a direct attack on these positions would
necessitate the ignoring of the original objective and probably lead to further
engagements. For their flank positions, smoke was the only answer, but weather
conditions do not always permit a prolonged smoke screen.
Enemy counter-attacks made by infantry and tanks
were generally successful, because having released supporting tanks our own
infantry did not prepare adequate anti-tank defence – mines were never used;
PIATs, though effective, were not popular, and there was usually too great a
delay in bringing up 17-pounders, the crews of which were unfortunately very
exposed to mortar fire. 17-Pounder SP’s were not used in the counter-attack
role for they too were vulnerable to mortar and shell fire. Tanks having fought
their way to the objective rarely had sufficient ammunition to remain as
permanent anti-tank guns, a role hardly suitable for the Churchill.
July 11-12 Battalion remained in same location,
obtaining reinforcements and replacements which included 10 Mk VII’s, at the
same time standing by to assist 7 R Tanks who were still in the area Hill 112,
in a counter-attacking role.
July 13-16 Battalion moved to 901705 in order to rest and on the
night of July 16 moved to relieve 7 R Tanks in counter-attack on Chateau de
Fontaine and Hill 112. The supporting Infantry Brigade were 129 Brigade.
Battalion moved into position 952644 last light, and all crews began digging
deep holes in which to sleep.
Just
after 2300 hours, following mortar and shell fire, the harbour area was
attacked by about 6 Ju 88s, who straffed and bombed. Lt- Col. Sir Nugent
Everard Bart was wounded in the head and back, together with 7 O.Rs. 1 OR was
killed. 2 Stuarts and 2 scout-cars were also damaged. Major Warren took over
command. Shelling and mortaring continued throughout the night.
July 17 At first light, HQ, B & C Squadrons moved out
to area 955636, Squadrons deployed with 2 troops up. Mortaring continued
throughout the day and in retaliation a shoot was carried out by all 75 and
95mm guns, resulting in the silencing of an MG that had been worrying the
infantry. An SP was forced to disclose its position and infantry reported a
Panther set on fire – no confirmation available. At 1930, a further shoot was
made on the centre of St. Martin 9760, which drew heavy retaliation from enemy
mortars, resulting in 3 minor casulties.
July 18-19 Very similar to July 17 – intervals of mortar and shell
fire. Recces and plans made for counter-attack roles. Shoot carried out on Wood
9661 reported to harbour 3 Tigers. Lt. Col. P.N. Veale, M.C., assumed command
of the Battalion.
July 21 At 1430 hours, an enemy counter-attack threatened
and B Squadron moved up to crest to give moral support to infantry. Heavy
mortaring resulted in Major Warren and 2 ORs being wounded – no counter-attack
developed, but a party towed away a number of dead cows whose stench did more
to lower morale than the persistent mortaring and shelling.
7 R
Tanks brought up into area to attack Maltot to correspond with Canadian attack
on Etavaux 0062. Following the attack but corresponding with Canadian attack on
St. Andre sur Orne 0161, 9 R Tanks were ordered to be prepared to attack
Feuguerolles sur Orne 9961 and St. Martin 9760.
July 22 1815 hours. Support given to 7 R Tanks attack on
Maltot with 75 and 95mm fire aimed at Nebelwerfers in area 70 ring contour
9860, 9861. First shoot drew heavy mortaring but there was no reply to the
second shoot. During this time, Major Holden got mixed up with his Slidex and
reported “Dead”. Persisting in this report, he was advised to call skeleton “O”
Groups.
July 23-25 The intensity of mortaring and shelling decreased and a
further shoot was carried out on 88 located at 956614, but no further orders
were received concerning attack on Feuguerolles and St. Martin. On 25 July,
after watching rocket-firing Typhoons brassing up enemy positions south of
Caen, the Battalion received orders to move to Fontenay Le Pesnil 8867.
After
nine days of air attack at night and shelling and mortaring at all times during
the day and night, no-one was sorry to leave.
The
attack on Feuguerolles and St. Martin, which was to have been done down a
valley dominated on both sides by enemy positions, had not promised to be the
best of adventures either.
MINES AND THE BOCAGE
26
July to 12 August
July 26 After a night march, the
battalion concentrated at Fontenay Le Pesnil 966669, and here came under
command 59 Division. The Battalion had the task of supporting 176 Brigade in
counter-attack roles on three positions – Haut du Bosq 9066; Rauray 8865; Pt
126 and Brettevillette 8864. The country in this area had been heavily mined by
the enemy; it consisted of small fields bounded by thick hedgerows and ditches,
and was undoubtedly the most difficult tank country that the battalion had yet
encountered. The field of vision was generally less than 100 yards and in any
deployed movement there could not be any visual contact between troops; large
tree stumps, torn and gashed by shellfire, together with the deep ditches provided natural tank obstacles. It was
essential that each area was very carefully reconnoitered so that, should an
emergency arise, each tank commander would know beforehand the exact line of
advance of each tank. These areas were under constant shell and mortar fire,
which added to the difficulties, and at 1800 hours B Squadron suffered a most
unfortunate disaster. The troop leaders of this Squadron went forward for a
rendezvous with Major Reynell, who was then making his plan just north of
Brettevillette 8864. Dismounting from the track, an “S” mine was exploded,
resulting in the deaths of Lt. Wolskel, Lt. Smart and Sgt. Nichols. Lt. Beale
and Lt. Cargill were wounded and the latter died a few days later.
July 31 The
reconnaissance and forming of plans for these three counter-attack roles lasted
a couple of days, and finally, on 31 July, a demonstration was given by two
troops of “C” Squadron with a company of 7 Norfolks in the method that had been
adopted in clearing this type of country. Each hedgerow was to be considered as
an objective and artillery fire would be brought down on this line until raised
by the infantry command to the ground. Simultaneously with artillery targets I,
Targets II and III would be engaged. For the first phase, tanks would sit at
the starting line and engage hedgerows on flanks, keeping fire in front of
infantry who would advance along these hedgerows.
Phase I would be complete
when infantry reached the corner of the field and tanks would then concentrate
their fire to hedge immediately to their front which had previously been
engaged only by hull MGs.
The infantry would now use
LMGs from positions in corner of field to engage next hedge to their front and,
following a verey signal, tanks would move as fast as possible to the opposite
hedgerow and the clearing would advance a further stage.
It is necessary to point
out that as soon as artillery fire was lifted from target I it would move to
target II.
In the case of the attack
being made with 2 companies and 2 troops (which was most likely) it was
essential that closest co-operation be maintained so that no advance moved
faster than the other, otherwise casualties would be inflicted by own fire.
To ensure this
co-operation, all troops of each Squadron practiced this method with their respective
infantry; 26 Squadron Assault Regiment Royal Engineers also helped by using
petards and bulldozers to make gaps in the hedgerows.
An experiment was made with
artificial moonlight or movement light from searchlights, so that infantry
might attack at night, and having secured their objective have tanks in
position at first light to repulse any possible counter-attack. This too was
quite successful, the light provided being adequate for movement.
August 1 An
experiment was carried out to test the effectiveness of the Projectile Infantry
Anti-Tank (PIAT) against the glacis plate of a Panther; complete penetration
was not obtained and it was discovered that the cement veneer covering the Panther
did much to nullify the effect of the PIAT bomb; the substance crumbled and
prevented firm contact being made before the bomb itself exploded.
A 75mm hollow charge shell
used by the 75mm Gun, carried by Airborne troops, was also obtained and by
inserting this into the case of the 75mm tank gun, it was also possible to try
its effect on the glacis plate of the Panther. Complete penetration was not
obtained but in all cases the tank would have been knocked out.
Since 29 July 1944, 197
Brigade (59 Division) had been patrolling in strength, sometimes assisted by
tanks of 7 R Tanks, and the general impression gained from prisoners of war was
that the enemy were withdrawing under pressure of concentrated artillery fire,
together with lack of food, sleep and at times ammunition.
1700
Orders were received that 59 Division with 31 Tank Brigade in support
would capture Pt 213 on Villers Bocage – Caen Road, one mile north-east of
Villers Bocage.
Phase I: 197 Brigade with 2 Squadrons 7 R Tanks in support and 2 troops C
squadron 22 Dragoons under command, to feel forward and contact enemy.
Phase II: On contact, attack to be
made with 2 Brigades up:-
Right – 176 Brigade with 9 R
Tanks in support.
Left – 177 Brigade with one
Squadron 7 R Tanks in support.
26 Squadron ARE; 2 troops 22
Dgns, and 304 Anti-tank SPRA under
command Division Boundary: Right – Main Road Villy Bocage 0259 – Les Fains 6361
– Juvigny 8466.
Left – line of 87 Easting.
9 R Tanks plan was as
follows:-
To attack with 2 squadrons
up supporting 2 Battalions.
Right – C Squadron in
support 7 Norfolks with Flail and AVRE support.
Left – A Squadron in support
7 S. Staffs with Flail and AVRE support.
B Squadron with 6 N. Staffs
to give right flank protection while one Squadron 7 R Tanks secured the left
flank by attacking the area Pt. 142.
Boundaries:
Right – Main road Villy
Bocage – Les Fains.
Left – Road-rail crossing
849590 – X- roads Monts 8561 – road-track junction 864639.
Probable start line – Rd
835625 – Monts 8561.
2/3 August During
August 2 and 3, 197 Brigade continued to patrol forward, meeting little
opposition but encountering large quantities of mines, both anti-tank and “S”.
At 1700 hours August 3, pt. 142 and Villy Bocage had been secured and leading
infantry were held up 500 yards short of pt. 213.
1900
Battalion less B Squadron move to forward assembly area, 851646 where
they were joined by B Squadron the following morning. No specific orders to
attack had yet been received, though the C.O. went to attend an “O” Group at
0100 hours only to find it had been cancelled without him being informed.
4 August By 1200
hours, 197 Brigade reported that they had crossed Villers Bocage – Caen Road
and that no firm contact had been made with the enemy. Two hours later, 176
Brigade and 9 R Tanks were informed that they were now at 30 minutes notice to
move, and at an “O” held at 835588, the following orders were given:-
9 R Tanks supporting 176
Brigade were to secure high ground formed by pts 158 (852562), 185 (861548) and
192 (817556).
Method: A Squadron with 7 S. Staffs to pt 158.
C Squadron
with 7 N. Staffs to pt 185.
B Squadron
with 6 N. Staffs to pt 192.
Battalion Headquarters to
be established at Le Mesnil Hervieu 9455 and 176 Headquarters Epinay sur Odon.
1500
Battalion begins to move. Orders were received from a divisional source
that main road could be used only as far as Les Fains owing to mines and that
from then on a cross-country route, which had been beaten by FLAILS, would be
used. The main road was, however, subsequently cleared and the Squadrons
ferrying their infantry as far as Villers Bocage, pushed onto their objectives,
which they reached by nightfall.
This being the first
occasion on which it had been possible to make any substantial advance, the
road became blocked with traffic, so Headquarters moved along the cross-country
route and waited at 837591 to allow Villers Bocage which was a veritable
“bottle-neck” to clear.
Here, further orders were
given by Commander 176 Brigade for the following day. The intention of the
Brigade was to make a thrust to contact, and, if possible, gain a bridgehead
across River Orne. An advance was to be made on two-thrust lines:-
Right – C Squadron with 7
Norfolks.
Route:- pt 200 – Courvadon –
Nidalos – Montigny – La Canie Goupillieres.
L – A squadron with 7 S.
Staffs.
Route:- Landes – Banneville
sur Ajon – Gournay – Le Mont – Le Mesnil – Preaux Bocage – trois Monts – Goupillieres.
B Squadron with 6 N. Staffs
to remain in reserve with 271 Anti-tank Battery. Reserve to be called forward
by bounds.
Vanguard on each route to be
as follows:-
2 troops tanks – 2 sections
carriers - (tactical gap) – troop AVRE and foot sappers – 2 sections carriers.
Remainder to form main body.
H – 0615
Start line: junction 86569 –
junction 857541.
At 2230 hours, however,
information received that as from 0600 hours 5 Aug, 31 Tank Brigade to come
under command I Corps, and that present role should be handed over to 107 RAC.
When the difficulty of
handing over the role at such short notice had been explained, an attempt was
made to delay the transfer to I Corps, with the result that the Battalion was
first continuing to support 59 Division and then moving to I Corps. After five
various reports in a couple of hours, higher command ordered that the transfer
would take place as ordered.
Squadrons now had to
concentrate in Battalion Headquarters area using routes that would not
interfere with the advance of 176 Brigade. This resulted in Capt.J.M. Paterson,
who was guiding a replenishment packet, being blown up in his Scout Car. He was
wounded, as were Tpr G. Stubbs and Tpr Clifford Smale; Smale subsequently died
of his wounds.
The Battalion did not leave
the location till 6 August. The day’s rest was hardly necessary, because being
able to measure an advance in miles a day without suffering heavy casualties
had proved a great tonic for everyone after the grimness of the battles of
Cheux and Maltot, where movement was restricted to a couple of thousand yards.
‘EGG’ and ‘TEMPEST’ WITH THE POLAR BEAR
6 August to 12 August
August 6 Now under command 1st Canadian Army, Battalion
arrived, after a long and dusty road march, at 094715 in the I Corps area, and when darkness had fallen at 2230 hours,
moved to Forward Assembly Area at 103666 in order to support 70 Brigade (49
Division) in a counter-attack role.
The areas were:-
1.
Le
Prieure 1165
2. Cagny 1164
2.
Lepoirier
– Prenouville 1163.
These
defensive areas were linked up with Operation “Totalise”, which was to be
carried out by II Canadian Corps and which had Falaise as its objective.
The defensive area was
planned to give protection to Lines of Communication for Totalise from left
flank attack, as well as forming a strong defensive base should Totalise not go
according to plan resulting in the necessity of withdrawal.
1800
A warning order was received that 31 Tank Brigade with 146 Infantry
Brigade may be required for further flank protection roles during Op
“Totalise”.
8 August 9 R Tanks
ordered to close gap on left flank from Frenouville to
1130
Bellengreville (1361) to allow 153 Brigade (51 Division) to attack
wooded area north-west Secqueville La Campagne 0959. C Squadron now moved to
area FOUR 0962 and A Squadron to area Bourgebus.
Battalion Headquarters with B Squadron in
reserve was established at 079628. There was spasmodic shelling and mortaring
during the day, some of our medium 5.5 falling in the area of B Squadron, but
there were no casualties.
1915
Battalion moved to rear rally area Grentheville 0864 and at a
conference with Commander 146 Brigade Op Egg was outlined.
Aug 9 Orders received as follows:-
31 Tank Brigade supporting
49 Division to secure left flank area Brentheville – Vimont – Chicheboville.
7 R Tanks to support 147
Brigade from Frenouville south-east to Vimont 1561.
9 R Tanks to support 146
Brigade from wooded area 1160 to Vimont.
Plan: Operation
“Egg”
Phase 1: (“Compo”) A Squadron 9 R Tanks to support 4
Lincs to Star Wood 1261 – 2 Battalions and 2 Squadrons up.
Phase II: (“Bully”)
7 R Tanks to support 147 Brigade to line 129625 – 125621 – 2 Battalions and 2
Squadrons up.
Left
– DWR; Right 1 Leics.
Phase III:
C
Squadron 7 r Tanks to support 1
Battalion 147 to Vimont.
A
squadron 9 R Tanks to support
Lincs to Bellengreville.
C
Squadron 9 R Tanks to support Hallams to Chicheboville.
At the time that this plan
was made the situation was very fluid and obscure with the infantry fighting
local actions with the general belief that the enemy were withdrawing.
Op EGG was never given a
definite H-hour, and was to be put into operation only if a definite defence
centre round Vimont was encountered. Consequently, various phases of Op EGG
were completed by troops other than those given the task and there appeared to
be no co-ordination at all.
1700
Reports issued as follows:-
147 Brigade to send patrols
to Vimont and 4 Lincs (146 Brigade) were to take over from 1 Lincs.
1905
Battalion moved from Grentheville to area X-roads 098611 north of La
Hogue and almost immediately two troops of C Squadron were asked for to support
the Hallamshires, who were making for Chicheboville.
Situation as follows:-
Lincs area wood 105605 with
intention of taking over Star Wood.
Two troops C Squadron at
130599 supporting Hallams to Chicheboville – no serious enemy opposition being
encountered, the Hallams dug in on outskirts of Chicheboville and 2 troops c Squadron rejoined Battalion, having
destroyed snipers and mortar positions area wood 1459. 7 R Tanks had got no
further than line “Bully” having been held up by mines, which lined most tracks
and verges in this area.
Aug 10 At
first light A Squadron moved to area Star Wood with the intention of linking up
with Koyli and supporting them to
Bellengreville. However, they remained in that area all day as the infantry
walked into their objective and decided to go no further.
C Squadron first supported
the Hallams with two troops in consolidating Chicheboville and later, as
resistance stiffened, with the whole Squadron in an attempt to clear wood 145596.
At 1040 this wood was clear but heavy mortaring forced the Hallams to draw back
to Chicheboville at midday.
49 Recce during its patrols
met no serious opposition that required the support of tanks, so B Squadron
remained with Battalion Headquarters, which had moved to area 113618 and it was
there that 2 ORs were killed and 3 wounded by shelling.
Enemy strongpoints seemed
to be centred around Benceauville, 40 contour 1559 and 50 contour 1658 and the
Commander 146 Brigade considered clearing this area, but at 1600 hours the
inter-brigade boundary line was changed and the task of clearing Bencauville
passed to 147 Brigade.
C Squadron stayed with
Hallams till 2000 hours and then joined the Battalion, claiming the destruction
of 3 Spandaus in wood 143595 as well as several mortar positions. Shelling was
fairly persistent in this area and A Echelon suffered 2 ORs killed while at
Cagny.
August 12 No call
was made on Battalion by 146 Brigade as they apparently had no immediate task
at hand, but at 1200 hours information was received that owing to a further
change of inter-brigade boundary the tasks of clearing Bencauville now passed
to 146 Brigade and 9 R Tanks. The change-over was to come into effect at 1800
hours and Op Tempest was planned.
51 Highland Division had
captured woods 1553 and were pushing up line of road Danneville – Bray La
Campagne, to establish positions on high ground 1856.
Troops in support –
Division Artillery and 51 Division Artillery – B Squadron 141 RAC – 4 AGRA – 2
Kensingtons.
Plan:-
Battalion
to support 146 Brigade in clearing east edge of wood 147596 – 146603 –
Bencauville – Contour 40.
Method: C Squadron
supporting KOYLI to attack in two phases.
Phase
I: Clearing of wood with infantry 2 copy up, supported by C Squadron and B
Squadron 141 RAC.
Phase II: Prospero:- 1
Company to consolidate in wood; one company to attack Bencauville and third
company to attack 40 Contour.
C Squadron to support from
right flank. H-Hour was again undecided and as far as the 9 R Tanks was
concerned never really mattered, for the attack never developed. The battalion
left the area to join II Canadian Corps for Operation Tractable. Before
leaving, however, 2 ORs of C Squadron were wounded by further shelling.
K.B.O. TO FALAISE
13
August to 26 August
(K.B.O. stands for: Keep bashing on)
Refer Maps 9 and 10
August 13 At 1700 hours, the C.O. was
called to Brigade Headquarters and the Commander of 31 Tank Brigade outlined
the plan for Op Tractable. The role allotted to the Brigade, however, was no
more exciting than being Corps Reserves, which meant that 9 R Tanks was to take
up a defensive position in the area Estrees la Campagne 1249, ostensibly to
prevent any counter-attack being made from area Wood 1249, in an attempt to cut
II Corps L of C during the thrust for Falaise.
Urville 0750. The Battalion
was neither shelled nor mortared in this new area, which was a welcome change,
and on the following day the C.O. And Squadron Leaders reccied their defence
areas which had been allotted as follows:-
August 14 A Squadron – Area 122498; B Squadron area tracks
115501; HQ with C Squadron in reserve area 112508.
1200
Battalion moved to Starting Point – 088524 – which it crossed an hour
later. At 1346 the Regiment was in position and also on the edge of the Safety
Line for the heavy bombing that was to be administered by the RAF at 1400
hours. For the first hour the bombing seemed to be very accurate and the wood
that the Battalion was watching was ripped and battered on the northern edges.
But heavy explosions and huge columns of smoke to the rear proved that one wave
of bombers had lost their target and were dropping bombs on the area Hautmesnil
where it was known that Forward Artillery and the Polish Armoured Division were
concentrated. As this exhibition lasted for about half an hour, the morale as
well as the Battalion’s opinion of the RAF dropped considerably – most of the
supplies of yellow smoke were used up and even the white “ground to air”
signals were unearthed and displayed but without any apparent effect.
1625 One
Mk V and 2 Mk IV were located in area 103492 out of effective75 mm range.
Strict observation proved, however, that most of their fire was directed north
along the line of the main Caen-Falaise road.
1640 Two Shermans belonging to
the Canadian Armoured Brigade came into the Regimental area with casualties,
and the C.O. of an R.A. formation declared that these two vehicles were the
only survivors of the Brigade HQ, and that the wounded were unattended.
Capt the Rev McMahon and the R.A. Colonel
took out a half-track ambulance, but within ten minutes of its leaving it was
observed to be in flames, hit by an unlocated anti-tank gun. A party later sent
out on foot returned with the news that
the Rev McMahon had been killed and almost unrecognizably burned.
In co-operation with Shelldrake, the enemy
tanks on the edge of the wood were periodically stonked, and by 1815 the Mk V
showed no signs of life.
1900
Orders were received that Royal Regina Rifles in the village of Estrees
La Campange were now under command and with their co-operation a defensive
locality was planned for the night which brought shelling, but there were no
casualties.
All Prisoners of War confirmed that their
forces were withdrawing and that 85 Division had only been rushed into the line
after a 3-day forced march with vague orders to defend Falaise.
The original plan of II Canadian Corps was now
changed and the Regiment was ordered to support 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade of
3 Canadian Infantry Division, under whose command the Battalion now came, in a
thrust to Falaise with the main road as Centre Line.
The first order received was than the Regiment was
to give support in establishing a firm base area Potigny – Aisy – Pt 195 –
Bonstassily.
1400
Regiment left area and moved to 097442. Reports proved that the Boche
were withdrawing as quickly as possible and orders were no more than “K.B.O. to
Falaise”.
2000
To comply with this terse and elegant order B Squadron was to support
the Scottish Essex to form a vanguard. A Squadron was allotted to RHLI and C Squadron to RRC should these
battalions need tank support.
B Squadron start with Scottish Essex at TORPS 1041, with
the intention of joining Falaise Road at Villers Canivet. One mile south of the
village light infantry opposition and MG fire was met but quickly cleared. A
series of short sharp actions were fought, one resulting in the capture of an
88mm gun. Heavier opposition was met in the area Bois du Roi 1138, but this was
effectively dealt with. Failing light resulted in the infantry taking the lead
with two companies up.
2300
The high ground north-west of Falaise had been reached and B Squadron
spent the night in close leaguer, enduring heavy shelling and mortaring, but
suffered no casualties. B Squadron had made an advance of 3˝ miles and taken
approximately 100 prisoners. The Regiment, less B Squadron, was at 088423. The
traffic problem was acute for only one road was usable, due to the previous
day’s bombing and ruined verges and fields.
The Commander of 4 Brigade gave orders that the
Regiment was to remain in its present location for the night but was to join B
Squadron at first light.
Returning to the Regiment from this “O” Group, which
had been held at Villers Canivet, the C.O. and I.O. had the later amusing, but
at the time rather tedious experience of being forced, due to traffic jams, to
use the roads so badly damaged by bombing. In rain and mud and darkness they
guided their scout car through the craters and across fields, using pieces of
luminous bark that had fortuitously been picked up on the road side. About
midnight they were greatly relieved, having requested a red verey to be fired,
to see it appear from their anticipated goal.
August 16 By 0830, the Battalion was
deployed, Right – A squadron; Left – C Squadron, in support of B Squadron, but
no further orders had been received, not was any information available. The
Bois du Roi to the rear was being shelled by our own artillery as well as being
mortared by the enemy and now and again it produced some M.G. fire.
Following a quest for information, each of the
three infantry brigades had no clear idea as to the intention of the other, or
for that matter, of their respective dispositions, but orders were finally
received that 6 Brigade would clear Falaise and that Battalion should form a
firm base with 4 Canadian Brigade in their present locality.
1400
Orders received that battalion to move by Squadrons across country to
harbour in area 1160.
C Squadron moved first and the shelling and
mortaring increased and later one B Squadron tank was hit and set on fire by
88mm, but there were no casualties.
No one in the Regiment appreciated being robbed of
entering Falaise but were glad of the rest the following day, having covered
over 40 miles in 30 hours.
August 17 Orders were received that 9
R Tanks were again under command 49
1600
Division and that they should move to 212571 and take over from 7 R
Tanks by 108600 hours.
It was known that the 10 DLI had
a small bridgehead over the River Dives at Mezidon 2456, and that enemy were
holding pt 66 in some strength – all other bridges had been blown. The task
given to the Regiment was to support 49 Division in widening and strengthening
the bridgehead when Royal Engineer’s had built bridges at 253588 and 251608.
August 18 At a conference held at 49
Division Headquarters, the Division Commander stated that the opposition of
East of River Dives was not sufficient to justify the use of tanks in support
of infantry, and to ease traffic problems across bridge at Mezidon 251562 – the
only one complete – no tanks should move, but that 9 R Tanks should carry out
recce to see whether it was possible to use the “Jumbo” Churchill at 296585 and
293596, so that River Vie could be crossed as soon as possible when necessary.
Regiment Headquarters, B and C Squadrons were allotted to support 146 Brigade
and A Squadron to support 70 Brigade.
1400
Major Holden and Capt. Kidd (C Squadron) carrying out recce for Brigade
crossing 296585 had scout car destroyed by 50mm anti-tank fire – information
brought back was that JUMBO would not span river at this point.
August 19 At 0630
hours, Battalion passed through Mezidon and concentrated
0708 at 268566. Capt. Brewer, reconnoitering bridge at 293596 was
badly wounded in the stomach by Spandau fire, but brought back information that
tanks could not be used at this point either.
0740 49
Division issued orders that as no effective infantry crossing had been made
across River Vie and tanks would not yet be required. During the day
information was received that the first bridge available for 49 Divison forward
elements would probably be that built at 322564 by 51 Highland Division and
that Regiment should be prepared to cross there with A Squadron supporting 49
Divison Recce, B Squadron supporting 147 Brigade, and C Squadron 146 Brigade.
August 20 A Squadron
move to area 323565 to be on call to support 49 Division Recce forward in
bounds to road excl Les Trois Rois 3262 to inclusive 443880.
1130
B Squadron cross bridge and assemble area 3233567 to support 147
Brigade.
1325
C Squadron leave harbour area in order to contact Hallams (146 Brigade)
at 299593 in order to support them to higher ground 3161.
1430
B Squadron prepare to attack 40 ring contour, 3158, supporting RSF and
thence to river line 317595.
B Squadron pushed on in front,
clearing the way for infantry and had reached their first objective by 1515
hours.
At 1600 hours, RSF began
taking over and at 1725 B Squadron pushed on again. No serious resistance was
encountered; light anti-tank gun fire and MG fire was met but quickly dealt
with so that by 1912 hours they dominated the area of the bridge, and the
infantry arrived half an hour later to begin securing the position covered by the
tanks.
C Squadron met with many
delays in their effort to contact the Hallams. In avoiding mines and keeping
clear of the main roads, an occasional tank became temporarily ditched, and the
leading troop hit mines in a defile which caused further difficulties. But by
1710 hours contact with the Hallams had been made and a plan was made to attack
St. Pair du Mont 3161; the attack to start at 1830 hours. Civilians reported
that main enemy forces had already retreated North to high ground.
C Squadron attack started at
1630 hours but he advance was slow due to difficult going which included the
pushing down of houses to get through. At 1915 hours the tanks began climbing
the high ground which had an incline of about 1 in 4 with a field of view at
times limited to less than 50 yards, due to foliage. Nevertheless, the tanks
were on their objective at 1940, ahead of the infantry, and had destroyed 1
75mm anti-tank gun and 1 50mm Field gun. One tank had been knocked out
resulting in injuries to Lt. A.C.W. Moore and one OR killed. 3 OR’s had also
been wounded and three tanks ditched.
B Squadron suffered no
casualties at all.
A Squadron was never
required to support 49 Division Recce but Capt P.M. Myatt was accidentally shot
in the leg. C Squadron harboured at 305613 and B at 406856. A report received
at 1945 stated that a bridge at 297587 had been completed to class 40.
August 21 The tanks
for the day were as follows:-
C Squadron to support KOYLI
in an attack on St. Laurent du Mont 3162 and then to secure road incl Carrefour
St. Jean 2852 to road track junction 306626. B Squadron were to move to
Crevecoeur en Auge 3060 and then north-east to Cambremer 4090.
The nature of the ground,
hilly and wooded, made it quite impossible for the tanks to attack in a deployed
formation. So it was decided, as enemy opposition was expected to be light,
that the infantry would attack in an orthodox manner, but that the tanks would
move behind along roads where possible and either take over the ground from the
infantry or be brought up to destroy any strong point encountered.
The KOYLI had little
difficulty in securing their objectives and by 1200 hours C Squadron had
assembled in area Carrefour St Jean. B Squadron were at Crevecoeur with the DWR
exploiting to Cambremer. By 1300 hours it was realised that this type of attack
against a retreating enemy was no good at all and far too slow, so it was
decided to advance on two thrust lines so that contact was maintained with the
enemy and he was allowed no respite.
C Squadron in support 146
Brigade to advance Carrefour St Jean 2862 – Bonnebosq 4395 – Le Tourquesne 4996
– bridge 533972. B Squadron in support 147 Brigade – Le Cadran 415887 – X roads
and tracks 474923 – road Junc 438934 – X- roads 505935 – bridge 530942. Brigade
Group leading advance was to be composed as follows:-
3 sec carriers; Troop
tanks; lorried infantry; Squadron Tanks; sec Mortars; Sec REC.
1830
C Squadron were approaching Bonnebosq which was offering resistance and
it was apparent that an attack would have to be put into clear it. The Squadron
deployed to cover the village and sealed the exits while KOYLI attacked.
2015
Bonnebosq clear and infantry established themselves for the night. C
Squadron harbouring at 422948. By 1800 hours B Squadron were at X- roads 419914
and by 2100 hours had reached Baignard 4492. They had been held up by poor
roads, mines and anti-tank fire. One 75mm anti-tank gun had been captured at
446926. During the afternoon the Recce Troop had been patrolling bridge and
roads and at 2230 hours killed 30 German infantry in area woods 4390 and 4491.
August 22 The
advance on thrust lines continued but A Squadron replaced C Squadron and joined
up with 4 Lincs, while B Squadron continued on their route with RSF. Little
offensive opposition was met. A Squadron reached bridge 530940 at 1400 and B
Squadron reached bridge 525917 and hour and a half later. Both bridges had been
blown,
but RSF found a footbridge
which they crossed, supported by tanks, but heavy mortaring resulted in 1 OR
being killed and 12 ORs wounded. Capt. F. Drew of A Squadron was also wounded
in the head as a result of mortaring.
As the tanks had no field
of fire in the low ground by the river and no alternative positions were
possible. B Squadron joined HQ at 2030
hours and A Squadron harboured at 508965.
August 24 It was not
till about 0900 hours that class 40 bridges had been made across River Touques
but two thrust lines had been planned to converge on Cormeilles 6598.
Owing to the short time
available for maintenance and the little rest that the tank crews were getting,
144 RAC came under command 49 Division and were allotted southern route. A
Squadron supporting 56 Brigade were to advance on line S.P 475965 – bridge
532972 – road junc 567985 – road junc 579985- Cormeilles 6598. Steady progress
was made throughout the day and at 2115 hours A squadron was supporting 2 Essex
into Cormeilles. Only pockets of MG fire and a small number of tank obstacles
and mines had been encountered. Battalion Headquarters established itself
during the day at 628979 where it was joined by C Squadron at 2015 hours. B
Squadron remained at its old location.
August 25 The
advance was delayed awaiting completion of class 40 bridge at Cormeilles but at
0830 C Squadron crossed River Calonne supporting Glos in advance of Brigade Group. The route was to be as follows:-
Epaignes 7101 – road junct 755990 – road and track junc 787016 – track and road
junc 789023 – road and track junc 789037, via tracks north-east to bridges
810065 an d799068.
Enemy defences were soon
found to be centred round Epaignes, La Houssaye 7002, and La Heberdiere 7102. C
Squadron quickly surrounded Epaignes but infantry insisted on putting in a
number of small attacks which were all abortive.
Later, however, it dawned
upon the infantry commander that a co-ordinated attack had to be made in some
strength – this was put in at 2100 hours and Epaignes fell within an hour.
C Squadron during the day
had destroyed 2 75mm anti-tank guns; killed about 100 infantry and captured
Adjutant of Battalion Schleue (346 Division). One tank had been hit by a
faustapatrone which penetrated the turret and killed 1 OR. It seemed that
Epaignes had been the centre of resistance guarding Pont Audemer and if the
infantry had not delayed so long it might have been possible to have got to
Pont Audemer before dark. This would no doubt have resulted in the capture of a
considerable amount of equipment and personnel.
A Squadron had remained in
reserve at Cormeilles, much to the delight of the inhabitants. Major. Mockford
took the salute in the square during a march past of the Forces Francaises de
L’Interieur and placed a wreath on the cenotaph. Later there was a celebration
with champagne in the Town Hall and the whole Squadron had been promised sheets
and beds in the village.
But at about 1800 hours
Cormeilles was heavily shelled and one tank was put out of action by a 150mm
shell. This put an end to the celebrations and A Squadron joined Battalion
Headquarters. There were, however, no casualties as a result of the shelling.
The Brigadier, 56 Brigade,
expected a further advance to Pont Audemer to be strongly opposed and decided
that
a thrust should be made on
two lines – a battalion and a squadron moving on each.
Left – B Squadron with SWB on
route road junction 679021 north-east
to high ground point 128 7207.
Right – A squadron with Essex on
route Epaignes – St Laurent 7306.
Starting Line – road junction
679021 – Epaignes. Start Time 0815.
August 26 A
and B Squadrons crossed Start Line and by 0950 the objectives had 0815 been reached – no opposition had
been encountered at all.
1130
Battalion Headquarters at 774073.
Bridges across River Risle at Pont Audemer were blown
and the unit again became static, moving across the river the following day. By
now the whole area South of the Seine except for the Foret de Brotonne had been
cleared.
56 Brigade were finally
given the job of clearing the forest but did not require tank support. The
Battalion remained concentrated at Fourmetot le Crosiet 8111, in division
reserve, realising that though at least 60 miles had been covered the advance
had not been spectacular, but flowers, cheers, hand-clapping and waves from
civilians were a pleasant change after the grim days of breaking out of
bridgehead, but nevertheless regretting that whenever impetus to advance had
been gained it had been already cheated by yet another blown bridge.
August 27 to 9
September
Our copy of the War Diary contains no entries for the days 27 August to
9 September. This is unusual, because even when there was no combat, as was the
case during these days, the Diary recorded the unit’s movements. However, the
movements have been identified from personal recollections and other sources,
and were: from the outskirts of Pont Audemer to a crossing of the Seine at Pont
de L’Arche, then to the outskirts of Le Havre via Rouen, Yvetot, and Bolbec.
The route taken to Le Havre is shown in Map 10.
BATTLE
OF LE HAVRE
Operation
Astonia, 10-12 September
1.
General.
The original task for 9 R Tanks was to
support 146 Infantry Brigade in mopping up area East of River Lezarde, forcing
a crossing of river and entering Le Havre.
2.
Plan
Phase 1:
A Squadron to support 1st/4th
KOYLI, having under command B Squadron 22 Dragoons less one troop; Sec 294
Field Coy; Medium and Field Artillery.
Task:
To clear localities 562289, 563283, 561279,
making two gaps through minefields.
Method:
(a)
A
Squadron deployed in area track 574295 to 575287 to support B Company with MG
and HE fire in clearing locality 563283.
(b)
C
Squadron to support C Company attacking north to locality 562283 from high
ground area 571303.
(c)
Two
troops and Headquarters to support D Company in attacking area 563279.
(d)
A
Company to exploit forward to line of 20 Contour and clear locality 560279.
Time: D + 1.
Phase 2:
B Squadron supporting 4 Lincs, other
supporting arms – 222 Squadron
ARE: Sec 294 Company, Medium and Field
Artillery.
Task:
To force crossing River Lezarde at Harfleur
and secure railway bridges at 545276 for advance on main road West to Le Havre.
Method:
To advance on thrust line track 564288 west
to 558286 across country to join main road at 556286, thence south to Harfleur
and on to Le Havre.
Plan:
Column to be composed as follows:-
One platoon infantry; one troop tanks;
Flails; ˝ troop Assault Regiment Royal Engineers; Troop Tanks – Headquarters
Company Infantry, Forward Observation Officer (Royal Artillery): Wasps; Sec
Royal Engineers; Sec Mortars; Sec Anti-tank; Jumbo bridge; Company Infantry and
two troops tanks.
Reserve:- one troop tanks and one company
infantry.
One company to give right flank protection as
far as Harfleur.
Time:
Dependent on Phase 1.
C Squadron was allotted the
following tasks:-
1.
From
1815 to 1915 hours on D Day to engage targets 557292, 545282; 545286, to simulate
attacks from east, working on a prearranged plan with artillery and mortar fire
ordered by 49 Division.
2.
To
assist A Squadron in supporting 1st/4th KOYLI in Phase
1(b).
3.
To
stand by in reserve to support Hallams to push through B Squadron and 4 Lincs
into Le Havre should resistance be determined and formidable.
4.
Action by Times:
10
September: 1815 – 1915
According to plan, following
RAF bombardment area plateau 5428 (Bentley), C Squadron deployed on spur 5730,
engaged and observed targets in wood 562288 (Oscar),
and pillboxes on eastern slopes of plateau 5428. Both the HE and MG fire was
accurate, heavy and well-controlled, and did much to soften and harass the
defences for the attack on the following day.
11 September: 0530
Phase 1(a) starts. Owing to
poor visibility, tanks had to fire on fixed lines using MG only. Nevertheless,
the attack looked as if it would be successful, but the enemy withheld their
fire until infantry were within 30 yards of Objective (OSWALD) – the infantry
had also got on to an unlocated “S” minefield and this with the sudden heavy MG
fire caused heavy casualties.
11 September: 0559
Phase 1(b) starts but “S”
minefield pinned infantry to ground – tanks could now see to fire and went
forward to cover infantry while flails were brought up to make gaps.
0908:
Gaps to objective had been made by flails supported by tanks and with the wood
563283 (OSWALD) being smoked by tanks and two troops supporting from the left
flank, the infantry had captured their first objective by 0925 hours. While the
KOYLI re-organised themselves A Squadron engaged locality 563283 (OSWALD) with
well directed fire so that by 1030 hours white flags were flown by the enemy.
An interpreter was sent
forward, but the enemy declared that they had no wish to surrender and wanted
only an hour to bury their dead. During this lull a troop of Crocodiles was
brought up for extra support and at 1230 hours the second attack started. A
Squadron had taken up excellent positions around the wood and maintained
well-controlled fire while the flails made two gaps for the Crocodiles. These
were completed by 1305 hours and the Crocodiles moved forward with the infantry
following. With the flames on the right flank and heavy MG fire on the left,
the KOYLI walked into the objective and all the occupants had surrendered by
1325 hours.
The defences east of River
Lezarde had been smashed – the strongpoint area 563279 (KIM) flew its white
flag at 1340 hours and about 30 prisoners of war were marches out. The estimated damage to the enemy in this
phase of the attack was: - about 100 prisoners of war; 1/75mm gun; 1/50mm
anti-tank gun; 1 Heavy MG and 6 MGs.
1540:
A Squadron had moved in Forward Rally at 577278, having suffered no casualties
– damage had been sustained by the RO’s Recce tank by tellermine.
1545:
B Squadron started their advance but were delayed by mines and difficult
cratered ground. While mines were cleared the tanks engaged enemy MG positions
on eastern slopes of plateau 5428 which were troubling the Lincs. While on
right flank on main road, 7 Troop in support of D Company destroyed pillbox
positions with intense fire, and allowed the main body of the infantry to get
forward.
1930:
Bridges at 553282 (RANDOLPH) and 551280 (RONALD) had been crossed and Harfleur
cleared. B Squadron now caused about 130 enemy to surrender to the Lincs
because of the intense fire that had been directed on any point that offered
resistance.
2004:
B Squadron had reached bridge 545276 (ROBIN) but were unable to pass because of
road blocks, craters and other obstacles.
2045:
B Squadron was released and the Regiment was concentrated area Gainneville 5828
by 2200 hours, with Headquarters at 586299.
12 September:
Owing to the unforeseen
developments in the north of Le Havre, the task of 9 R Tanks was to support 146
Infantry Brigade in clearing area bounded by – North, Canal Vauban; South,
Canal de Tancarville.
Left - B Squadron with Lincs
Centre Line - Boulevard D’Harfleur
Start Line - Cross roads 549279
Right - C Squadron with Hallams
Centre Line - Boulevard Sadi Carnot – Boulevard Amiral
Mouchez
Start Line - Road bend 660276
Squadron Leaders concerned had received their orders to rendezvous with
respective infantry CO’s at 0800 hours.
C Squadron crossed SP at 0835 hours and leading troop with OC C Squadron
first came under enemy fire (Anti-tank) at 532268. Infantry were also harassed
by MG and 88mm HE and fire from high ground to North. 14 Troop was called up
with 2IC and took charge of the battle while forward tanks pushed on supported
by 15 Troop. 14 Troop with 2IC finally put out one 88mm and 5 MG positions.
Demolitions and craters in the area of bridge 546275 prevented B Squadron from
reaching Boulevard D’Harfleur and they finally passed through C Squadron to go
on to their Centre Line via Boulevard
de Graville.
C
Squadron forced the various strongpoints to surrender; Telephone Exchange
511266; blockhouses at 506261; 502262; 502260; 501263 and brewery 499263, and
had completed their task by 1300 hours. All opposition had been quickly engaged
with accurate fire and at least 200 prisoners of war had been taken, most of
whom were passed onto the enthusiastic
Forces Françaises de L’Interieur. Two 50mm anti-tank guns; five 20cm and
a number of MG positions had been overrun besides a large number of riflemen
sniping from windows. B Squadron met little organised resistance and had
cleared their area by 1330 hours, overrunning two 50mm anti-tank guns and MG
positions, 30-40 prisoners of war being taken.
1430:
Regiment released by 146 Infantry
Brigade, except for Recce Troop which had been doing very useful work all day
in clearing and patrolling side roads. From 1600 hours to 2100 hours, the Recce
Troop under Sgt. Findlay gave invaluable assistance to Hallams in clearing
their dock area south-west of bridge 502259.
Manoeuvring up to strongpoints and covering them with accurate fire
they were instrumental in supplying the Hallams with about 250 prisoners of
war. Released at 2130 hours, they joined the Battalion which had now
concentrated at 570312.
Throughout Operation “ASTONIA” the Battalion suffered no battle
casualties.
References: Battle of Le Havre
OSCAR Wood 562288. Sheet 123,
1/25,000
OSWALD Wood 563283
KIM Strongpoint 563279
RANDOLPH Strongpoint 553282
RONALD Strongpoint 551280
ROBIN Strongpoint 545276
REST
AND TRAVEL
13
September to 7 October
Following
the Battle of Le Havre, the Battalion was informed that a fortnight’s rest was
anticipated and that billets could be found in the area south of Dieppe.
On
September 17th, the Regiment was disposed as follows:-
Headquarters,
A1 and A2 Echelons – Binville La Baignard, 1845; A Squadron in Brennetuit,
2146; B Squadron Gonneville; C Squadron in St Genevieve, 1748.
Billets
were found for all personnel, and certain comfort and rest was enhanced by the
attitude of the villagers, who were kind enough to entertain by providing meals
and wine – this was greatly appreciated for with petrol “frozen” it was not
possible to send “passion” trucks to the larger towns.
Being
the first time that we had been given a
definite rest period since landing, maintenance was carried out on an extensive
scale; each vehicle was given a thorough inspection and a number of engine
changes were made.
It
was not, however, possible to ignore the hospitality of the villagers, and at
the request of various “Maires” certain ceremonies were gladly endured.
Major
Reynell, OC B Squadron, was presented with a bouquet of flowers by his admiring
villagers and in a gesture of respect and also to avoid his own embarrassment,
laid this quickly at the foot of the local cenotaph.
On
Sunday, 25 September 1944, Headquarters and C Squadrons held similar but more
elaborate functions to further the cause of Allied unity.
At
Biville, Headquarters Squadron scrubbed their belts, cleaned their brasses and
paraded with a guard of honour that appeared to have little acquaintance with
rifles, while the Colonel and “Le Maire” laid wreaths on the cenotaph and
exchanged speeches. The Colonel, speaking in French, expressed his admiration
for the Forces Françaises de L’Interieur and thanked the villagers for their
kind welcome, while the “Maire”, with appropriate gesture, re-affirmed the bond
that existed between the French and English in their love of freedom. No
ceremony, however, is complete without flags and music, and the local band was
there to express its personality – it struggled valiantly through the
Marseilles and God Save the King, but produced such confusion during the March
Past that it was only possible to maintain a marching step away from its
influence. The “Maire” of St. Genevieve was less ambitious in his arrangements,
but C Squadron’s parade was no less impressive and the speeches no less
suitable.
The
football match between the Battalion and a team from the local villagers was
played in the afternoon and, despite heavy showers of rain, attracted a reasonable audience. The standard of football was not high, but the French side was
not outclassed as a victory of 6-0 might suggest. The most entertaining part of
the afternoon was provided by the ceremonial prelude to the game, with which
the Regimental side had not been acquainted.
They
strolled out nonchalantly on to the field, while the French side trotted out
one behind the other and lined up in the middle of the field. One by one the Regimental
side realized that perhaps they too should follow this example and began to
sort themselves out but were not quick enough. An almost unrecognizable God
Save the King was being played. The band was here again. During the Marseillaise,
the French turned about but this time theRegiment made no response and were
finally embarrassed by the presentation of another large bouquet of flowers.
As
the days passed further amusements were found. A dinner party was given for Lt.
Col. Leakey, 7 R Tanks, where he was presented with the model of Churchill
derelict upon a minefield in recognition of his leadership in discovering more
minefields in France than any other unit. The present was accepted with grave
and dubious laughter, but as the table was supplied with certain luxuries
including Champagne, Vin Blanc and Benedictine, nothing rude was said at the
time.
C
Squadron indulged in the traditional taste for dramatics and produced a noisy
but amusing variety. B Squadron followed suit and no critic would hazard an
opinion on the higher state of excellence.
A Squadron organised a dance and were kindly supplied with a bar by a
local Aubergiste. It is rather obvious to state that everyone thoroughly enjoyed
themselves and sobriety was hardly the order of the day.
The
Battalion moved again on 29 September. The first complete rest had been
thoroughly enjoyed – many had made pleasant friendships, among these were such
notable personalities as the 2IC who bade a tender farewell to a group of fair
young ladies at five o’clock in the morning, and Major Mockford, whom it was
rumoured, had acquired an affection for a certain doctor’s wife.
By
the first of October the Regiment had reached Henneveux – a distance of 123
miles. During a short rest there, an impressive Service was held in memory of
those who had been killed in fighting with the Battalion. As the sun set behind
a curtain of trees, the Regiment formed up on a sloping field facing two
Churchills, in front of which stood the Padre, who conducted a simple service,
the message of which was that however difficult it was to understand, no death
was in vain.
The
following day the Regiment moved to Renescures H 2250 and there awaited
transporters in the final stage to join I Corps, who were now protecting the
south-western flank of the Arnhem salient. Whilst loading on 6 October, Lt.
Wintle of A Squadron fell as he attempted to climb on to a moving transporter
and was crushed to death. An unfortunate end to an excellent troop leader who
had fought so well from the very start.
By
October 8th, Headquarters, A and C Squadrons had crossed into
Holland and came under command 51(H) Division – B Squadron and the Recce Troop
remained at Renescures awaiting further transporters. A further 100 miles had
been covered on tracks, and the welcome by the Dutch was the most effusive that
the Battalion had encountered, even surpassing that of the Belgians, who had
done everything to satisfy the general wish for comfort and wartime luxury.
Major
Massy, who had done excellent work in securing billets, was awarded a special
medal of recognition by the Regiment – the recommendation coming via the Adjutant,
who generally had a doubtful residence.
RAIDS IN
HOLLAND
With
51 Highland Division
8
October to 16 October
October 8 Arriving in Holland, the
Battalion came under command 51 Division and were given the task of preparing
to meet any counter-attack from the north-west against Eindhoven and also to
worry the enemy by carrying out repeated raids.
B Squadron and Recce Troop were still
awaiting transporters in france;
meanwhile, C Squadron established themselves at Zonsche 3726 and A Squadron at
Acht (3922); Headquarters at 4210.
October 9 The first two raids by C
Squadron were carried out in support of 152 Brigade, operating in the area of
Best. Capt. Link and 11 Troop supporting 5 Camerons advanced in north-west
direction east of road Eindhoven – Boxtel and combed woods area 3629.
Major Holden with two tanks supported 2
Seaforths in an advance west, crossing the road/rail junction 371262 and
shooting up suspected Company Headquarters in area 369264.
October 10 A Squadron was now given the
role of supporting 153 brigade and moved to St. Oedenrode 4232 where
Headquarters also established itself.
1330
13 and 15 Troops under OC “C” Squadron supporting an assault troop of
Derby Yeo (51 Recce Regiment) carried out a very successful raid on wood west
of Dorendork, running approximately 382297 – 377296. Fire support was given by
artillery, 4.2 mortar and MMGs. Three Spandaus were silenced before the beating
of the wood began and finally one Sgt. and 33 ORs from 6 Coy. 1034 were taken
prisoner. The ground was exceedingly soft and intersected by ditches and
considerable skill was shown by tank commanders in completing the operation
without any vehicle being bogged. It is said some tanks came out like speed
boats with noses well up in the air. There were no casualties among our troops.
October 11 Was a complete day of
maintenance and rest, but 12 October found C Squadron busy again.
October 12 OC “C” Squadron with 14
Troop carried out a raid on houses area 371260 and generally shot up line of
railway tracks 374255. During the afternoon B Squadron and Recce Troop arrived
and were allotted a reserve role and during the evening St. Oedenrode was
shelled, resulting in 3 ORs, who were relaxing in a pub, being wounded.
Shelling continued throughout the night and though a number of houses were
destroyed there were no further casualties.
October 13 C Squadron still busy.
Another raid with 5 Camerons and Lifebuoys reached 362283. Enemy withdrew
hurriedly but 8 of them were killed, and one prisoner of war taken, whose
identity proved to be 5 Coy 1036 GR.
A day of rest followed and then A Squadron
did their first raid which had as an objective the collecting of prisoners for
identifications. The area chosen was enemy positions west of Donderdonk. The
first phase was concentrations by Brigade artillery and heavy mortars and also
MMG fire. This was followed by about 30 minutes of tank movement and then a
broadcast was made on the lines that the enemy faced a considerable force and
would thus show discretion by deserting, and a smoke screen was laid to give
cover to our lines. 15-20 Germans were seen to move towards the lines of 5/7
Gordons. Two prisoners were brought back on the tanks and three Spandaus were
destroyed in the area 382302.
October 16 Information was now received
that the Brigade role was to be handed over to 33 Armoured Brigade and the
necessary arrangements were made. This week of harassing raids had proved quite
enjoyable for every night the troops returned to the comfort of billets and
were spared the discomfort of living in open fields. It is perhaps worthwhile
noting that at no time during these raids did the enemy infantry make use of
any anti-tank weapon.
“REBOUND” AND “THRUSTER”
with 49 (WR)
Infantry Division and Clarkeforce – 19 – 30 October 1944
Task: (a) 9 R Tanks in support 56
Brigade to recce area 8513 – Woods 8413, clearing enemy from area as far as
east road Oosterbrecht 8811 – road junction 869142 and as far west as gen line
incl Beekhoven 8810 – including Koningsven 8413; (b) to relieve Clarkeforce in
Loenhout.
Plan:
Right - C Squadron with 2 Glos. B Squadron in
reserve.
Left - A Squadron with 2 Essex.
Supporting Arms- 3 Medium Regiment, 4 Field
Regiment – C Squadron FF Yeo less one troop; C Squadron 22 Dragoons less one
troop; D Heavy Mortar Company 2 Kens less one Platoon.
October 20 No rain; dull; ground soft after heavy rain.
0730 Start Line crossed. Attacks
began well – within 20 minutes C Squadron had advanced 800 yards. Prisoners
coming in – no serious opposition. By 0830 C Squadron outpaced infantry and
found a number of Germans in area wood 871122 and there had to wait for
infantry.
A Squadron advanced slower. By 0805 had reached
850118, while two troops were busily engaged in Stapelheide 8411 where an
anti-gun an numerous infantry were causing trouble. One tank out of action.
Prisoners had, however, been taken.
By 0845, C Squadron had
reached area wood 865125, having captured 88mm and crew. At 0910 were joined by
infantry and clearing up began – more prisoners taken and position clear by
0945.
Meanwhile, Stapelheide was
still being cleared but the rear of A Squadron had got to area woods 850125.
1100
C Squadron with infantry established on ridge 8513 (final objective) –
more prisoners had been taken and suspected enemy position north engaged –
enemy artillery located 864145 and dealt with.
1116
A Squadron established area Stapelheide 8413 where 75mm and dummy
anti-tank guns were captured with 10 prisoners. Fighting Stapelheide finished
but other enemy posts to south still to be cleared. By 1330 only occasional
opposition was found in the area, which was systematically cleared. 276
prisoners taken during the whole operation.
1445
C Squadron for rally wood area 865125, leaving 1 troop for eyes on
final objective.
Personnel Lt. Smythe wounded -
1 OR wounded
1430
B Squadron move forward to follow up Clarkeforce. It was however nearly
dark before B Squadron and Essex were able to move into Leonhout 8415 and as
Clarkeforce had not entered the village, B Squadron and Essex sat south of the
village during the night.
C Squadron
leaguered with the 2 Glos. in general area 8612 while A and Headquarters
leaguered area Het Kloester, supplying own patrols from personnel of A Echelon.
Recce Troop was posted at
Chateau de Yeuse 8810. The night was generally quiet with occasional shelling
of heavy calibre.
October 21 B Squadron and Essex moved
into Leonhout and found little opposition – one anti-tank gun was encountered
east of village. A couple of abandoned 88mms were discovered by C Squadron in
area north-west of Kloester and there was sufficient evidence to presume that
they were the guns during the night. No further orders. Meanwhile squadrons to
form defensive positions.
October 22 Raid by 2 troops C Squadron
and Recce troop to harass enemy positions on right flank. C using 870129 as
starting point move east, shoot wood 900144 and shoot up houses in Steenhoven
8615 and Hiebart 8713, retiring south to original area. 21 enemy killed; 2
prisoners taken; 1 ˝ track; 1/75mm; 1/50mm; 1/20mm destroyed.
Recce troop carrying out patrol on road St.
Leonard 8809 – Hoogstraten 2215 lost two tanks at 890115 – as the tanks
approached the mines were pulled across road by infantry hiding in ditch. 1
German killed – own casualties 3 Ors
wounded. Report of 15 armed vehicles and infantry forming up area Kruisweig
8116 – no serious developments.
October 23 Regiment concentrated area
8113 for purpose of moving north to support 56 Brigade in taking over Esschen
7323 from 6 Canadian Brigade.
October 24 Arrive Wildert 7319;
dispersed as follows in support 56 Brigade: A Squadron in support SWB 724235; B
Squadron in support Essex 728229; C Squadron in reserve with Headquarters at
Wildert.
October 25 C Squadron and Headquarters
move to area 722223 in preparation for Operation “Thruster” – the capture of
Nispen 7225.
Plan:
Phase 1: Capture by SWB of area wood
719249, to take place during dark, 25/26 October. A Squadron 9 R Tanks to stand
by and be prepared to support at first light.
Phase II: B Squadron to support 2
Essex in capture of woods 7125 – 1 troop FF Yeo (Crocs) in support.
Phase III: C Squadron to support 2
Glos in capture of Nispen, attacking from west to east. One troop FF Yeo under
command. During Phase I, 2 troops A Squadron to support 1st/4th
KOYLI’s (146 Brigade) in capture of wood 7324. Attack to have artillery support
and at the conclusion of Phase II, Clarkeforce to pass through having as its
objective WOUW 6730.
Starting Line – road/rail junction 718240 to
cross roads 725241.
H – 0730 hours for Phase II.
October 26 By first light, 2 SWB had
gained objective and there was no call for A Squadron to support. The two
troops with KOYLI’s on the right, under command Capt. Kidd, experienced 88 HE
fire and Capt. Kidd was wounded in the head when his cupola was blown off.
KOYLI’s had little difficulty in reaching objective, but the two troops remained
in support throughout the day.
730
B Squadron crossed Start Line and a quarter of an hour later had passed
through positions previously captured by SWB. Visibility bad owing to mist and
maximum shooting range 500 yards.
800
Supported by tank fire and Crocs, infantry had secured left flank of
objective; on right the infantry were consolidating area wood 719258.
Resistance had only been spasmodic and about 40 prisoners had been taken –
identification 857 GR.
As soon as objective had
been taken, the area was continually mortared and shelled. 1 OR wounded. One
88mm SP and 75mm anti-tank gun worrying the right flank were knocked out.
Infantry and tanks cleared area north of road to allow clarkeforce to pass through.
C Squadron suffered two
Officers casualties (Capt. A.J. Morgan; Lt. A.P. Boden) in the forming up point
as a result of mortaring and shelling.
1120
C Squadron cross start line and very shortly had the outskirts of
Nispen under fire. The enemy appeared to have evacuated the village but
securing it was delayed as infantry had some difficulty in getting up. Shelling
still continued and 3 SPs were reported north-east of village on far side of
the Molenbeek.
1225
Infantry clear houses supported by tanks from east – a few prisoners
and considerable defensive mortaring.
1330 Firmly established in village –
targets to east and north-east stonked by Shelldrake.
1550
Half of B and C Squadrons withdraw for replenishment.
1615
Shelling more intense and SP engaging tanks from well-concealed
positions. Two tanks damaged and 2 Ors
wounded. This skirmish was no doubt a diversion to cover engineer party who
blew bridge at 729268 at 1630. One SP
and 75mm anti-tank gun abandoned by enemy under fire.
1635
Essex and Glos defensive positions complete. B and C Squadrons released
and join Headquarters at 7192656, where the night was spent in leaguer.
October 27 From first light two troops
of each Squadron move forward in support of infantry – remainder of Regiment
stand down.
1530
Following orders from 34 Tank Brigade, b Squadron with one Coy. DWR, previously
established in area Brembosch 7026 with Clarkeforce, move forward and take over
Rietgoor 7128. No opposition encountered. DWR establish themselves in village,
B Squadron RR Brembosch 7026. C Squadron now responsible for giving support to
Essex and Glosters.
October 28 A Squadron move to area
woods 7126 to be on call by 2 SWB who had overnight established themselves area
east of railway and west of Molenbeek with forward Coy. Area woods 721282.
1700
Two troops B Squadron with Coy DWR clearing area north-east
railway/road junction 718290. Shot at by 2 SPs firing down line of road; 1 tank
hit; no casualties. Bad light prevented pin-pointing its position – not
destroyed but later put out of action by Medium Regiment RA.
1730
Regiment less B Squadron who remain with DWR move to area Wouwsche Hill
6827 with intention of supporting 146 Brigade. Plan made for occupation of
Boeink 6930 and Vinkenbroek 6929, preparatory to an attack on Roosendaal 7231.
Attack to be supported by 2 Medium Regiment and 4 Field Regiment RA.
Phase I: C Squadron with A Company
Hallams to capture vinkenbroek.
Phase II: A Squadron with B Company
Hallams to capture Boeink
H: 1200 hrs 29 October
Start line: track 690291 –
700292
October 29 C Squadron cross start line
and have little difficulty in overcoming obstacle of railway. By 1225 forward
infantry in village but 4 tanks were already bogged. AP fire from SP in area
Boeink knocked out two tanks. Infantry had no trouble at all and collected
about 40 prisoners.
1248
A Squadron began to move up and anti-tank fire was fairly heavy from
area Boeink. SP very active but infantry again met with little resistance, and
soon reached the village and the SPs withdrew north under cover of a gentle
slope.
1355
While infantry mopping up village, A Squadron steadily losing tanks –
one SP and 75mm anti-tank gun knocked out in area Boeink. Tanks had to push on
despite losses to ensure infantry took over their objective.
1410
Fairly quiet – third company established itself in area houses 689305
but A Squadron had now only 3 tanks left from the eleven that started. More
prisoners had been taken and the total count by infantry was over a hundred.
1520
Squadron rear rally 693293.
Casualties:
A Squadron – Killed, 1
Officer (Lt. R. Clarkeson); 3 ORs Missing believed killed; 4 ORs killed; 6 ORs
wounded.
C
Squadron – 1 OR Killed; 5 ORs wounded.
Tanks:- C Squadron – 2; A
Squadron – 6.
This was purely
tank versus anti-tank and SP battle and it was obvious that the Germans were
using their SPs in force as a last defence to cover a general withdrawal north
and to prevent any armoured thrust from disorganizing their retreat.
As a result of the battle, it must be emphasised
that the infantry must release the supporting tanks far quicker in open flat
country; otherwise unnecessary and expensive casualties are suffered.
1545
B Squadron supporting Leics in area north of Tolberg 7128 having as a
task the enlarging of the small bridgehead made by DWR across anti-tank ditch
713295. Operation completely successful despite soft ground – no casualties and
some prisoners taken.
October 30 B
Squadron cross anti-tank ditch which had been made passable by
0530 bulldozing and established themselves during darkness in area
Hulsdonk 7130.
The tanks were heavily
camouflaged in defensive positions to break up any counter-attack that may have
been made against the bridgehead. 1 troop AVRE and 1 troop Flails were under
command. To ensure perfect liaison, 2IC B Squadron was in W/T command with 147
Brigade and RO was with the Leics, the most forward Battalion.
The further
task of B Squadron was to support 147 Brigade in clearing Roosendaal south of
Bredaschebaan but recce
reported
that that part of the town was clear.
930
C Squadron supporting KOYLI (146 Brigade) passed through but the
Churchill bridge had to be used to cross at 721312. Tanks and infantry moved
down the streets but no enemy was found. The battle for Roosendaal had
obviously been fought the previous day.
Various orders followed
which included the change of command to 56 Brigade and the movement to a
Battalion area in Oudgastel 7336 for which recces were carried out but later
instructions followed that Battalion was to remain in Roosendaal which was to
be concentration area for 34 tank
Brigade. Since 20 October 9 R Tanks with 49 Division had advanced 12 ˝ miles
against many obstacles and a determined enemy.
October 31 9
R Tanks remain in Roosendaal under orders of 34 Tank Brigade.
NOVEMBER IN ROOSENDAAL
1 November to 30 November
Following
the entry into Roosendaal, it was uncertain what the future would bring, and
the first few days were spent in very active maintenance and re-organisation;
new tanks and fresh crews were wanted from the Forward Delivery Squadron, and
the welders were busy again filling in unpleasant looking holes in both C and A
Squadron’s tanks; Major Holden being especially delighted that “Incredible” was
battle-worthy again and Eb Wood was seen proudly watching the six-inch hole in
his turret gradually decreasing.
The days passed with general routine, broken only by
the excitement of an outbreak of fire in the school used by Headquarters and C
Squadrons. It turned out that there was more smoke than fire, but before this
was discovered, unfortunately, four ORs of C Squadron were injured jumping from
the roof into an improvised sheet held by a rescue party organised by RSM
Palmer. The local Fire Brigade got the fire under control and though one of the
lower rooms was gutted, no kit was lost except for the odd articles that disappeared.
News finally came that the stay in Roosendaal, where
the Battalion was still considered as liberators, was likely to be prolonged
and, consequently, organised trips were made into Antwerp where for the first
time it was possible for the troops to spend money – Xmas shopping and eating
ice-creams were only the lesser indulgences, and stories of seductions were
overheard as soon as forty-eight hours leave was instituted.
By November 14, however, it seemed as if the
pleasant period of relaxation had come to an end for a warning order was
received to stand by ready to move. Within forty-eight hours, however, the
order had been cancelled and it was now rumoured that the Brigade would be left
stranded in the area for the rest of the war; certain personalities now became
worried and the Intelligence Staff were constantly asked if they thought the
armistice would be delayed another nine months. No reassurance was given.
Nevertheless, a long static period was prepared for.
First, a series of trade tests were started following a Brigade order to test
in an orthodox manner those who had been mustered in the field as tradesmen.
Later, D & M, Wireless and Gunnery courses were started to improve the
technical training of those recently absorbed from the Forward Delivery
Squadron and a range was made in the area of Willemstad where all gunners were
to fire a series of practices to ensure that their efficiency did not decrease.
Major-General G.W. Richards, DSO, MC, visited the
Battalion and was spectator at a demonstration given to prove the limitations
of 6-pdr DS ammunition. Accuracy could not be claimed above 800 yards and a
system of ranging could not be laid down as it was affected by the jump of each
individual gun.
Organisation of the fighting Squadron was also
discussed following a further suggestion by the Brigade Commander. There was
talk of squadrons being limited to four troops each of four tanks, but the
final decision was made whereby the troop should remain three tanks but in
planning only four troops should be considered, the fifth being L.O.B.
Many points were brought out for the adoption of the
four-troop Squadron and it was voted an excellent and necessary
re-organisation. The four-tank troop got no supporters but one or two points
were brought out in favour. They were (i) the fourth tank doesn’t actually go
into action but is a “tracker” or “swinger”. Thus, if it is commanded by the
Troop Sgt he is in position to take over control of the troop immediately
should the Troop Leader become a casualty. (ii) A four-tank troop can take a
harder knock without requiring reorganisation. (iii) the fourth tank is in a
good position to paint the picture, thus leaving the Troop Leader free to
concentrate on manoeuvre and control.
Against the four-tank troop the “tracker” was not
liked because it put on the battlefield odd tanks which were uncontrollable
(ii) four tanks made troop leader’s job more difficult (iii) unwieldy, (iv)
communications over “B” get more difficult; (v) it meant more goods in the shop-window
and less depth to the attack.
It was decided to keep five troops in the Squadron
but the fifth troop is not to be reckoned with in planning and is to be a
Squadron reserve. The advantages were that: (i) the fifth troop keeps its
identity (ii) it can be relieved and changed about; (iii) the fifth troop can
become the forward repair group and receive replacement tanks and make them
battleworthy away from the battlefield; (iv) automatically it is an ideal
proportion for L.O.B.
If these activities and problems occupied everyone
by day, another type of relaxation was found for the evenings. Squadron dances
became a local feature at the village hall where beer and cognac were sold in
increasing quantities, reaching a climax on Cambrai Day which, though celebrated
in style on the twentieth, spread its influence over nearly a week. No hall
could be found large enough for a Regimental Dance, so each Squadron held a
dance in succession and competition was strong to see who could provide the
greatest orgy and the most surprises, which included among other novelties free
ice-cream and A.T.S. from Antwerp.
During the morning of Cambrai Day a 40-a-side
football match occupied everyone’s attention. Officers and men were seen
grovelling in the mud; at times chasing the ball, at others pursuing personal
vendettas while smoke screens were laid and goals barricaded. A Squadron have
to be congratulated as victors and they carried away their barrel of beer
chanting some hoodoo that is believed to have been a ritualistic thanksgiving
to the mystic goddess of Wine and Women.
The afternoon passed with entertainment given by
“Four Smart Girls” and though the show was pleasant enough “smart” was an
exaggeration and “girls” an understatement. Nevertheless, the tradition of the
day was kept – the meals were abundant and served in Cambrai style and there is
still no doubt that everyone enjoyed themselves.
To overcome whatever effects these gaieties might
have there was a certain amount of sporting activity. The football field was occupied
most afternoons, and each troop produced a seven-a-side team, and after a lot
of excitement and many struggles C Squadron Headquarters (F) were hailed the
victors. An exhibition rugby match was held in aid of the Red Cross and hockey
matches were arranged against local teams, but no amount of physical exercise
could repair the damage caused by C Squadron’s notorious “spigot support” which
was given to unsuspecting visitors with the result that they departed in rather
a too hilarious mood.
As the month drew to an end, it became clear that
the Regiment would definitely not be the guests of Roosendaal for Xmas. On 26
November all courses were cancelled and by the 29th the Squadrons
were lined up in the Wildert area ready for the transporters which were to take
the Regiment to XXX Corps area, established on the left flank of the 9th
U.S. Army.
DECEMBER NOMADS
1 December to 28 December
By 1 December half the journey to XXX Corps had been
completed and once again the Battalion were in Belgium, receiving the
traditional Flemish hospitality.
The wheel column spent one night at Opglabeek about
fifteen miles north-west of Maastricht. It was believed that a couple of days
would be spent there awaiting the arrival of the tanks which were travelling on
transporters via Brussels, but orders were received that the journey would
continue the following night. This was to ease the traffic problems over the
American bridge that was now carrying all traffic west due to the other bridges
further north being destroyed by the rising river.
The tank column remained at Waterscheide and finally
followed 24 hours later, also travelling by night over minor roads which in no
way corresponded with those shown on the map. Though no tanks were lost, there were
a number of stragglers who had thrown tracks on the bad, narrow roads.
By midday 8 December, however, the Regiment had
concentrated in Brunssum under 34 Tank Brigade, which now formed the nucleus of
XXX Corps reserve, which was to be prepared to take up defensive positions on
the right flank to hold bank any enemy penentrations down the Wurm Valley – the
Corps front being held by 43 Division on the right with 8 Armoured Brigade
under command and the Guards Armoured Division on the left.
The first few days passed without any excitement,
though each day new billeting arrangements were made due to the constant
changing of Regimental areas. This discomfort was, however, in part compensated
for by being able to indulge in the luxury of hot baths and shower made
available at a nearby pit-head.
This was also a favourable opportunity to put the
finishing touches to the formation of the “Qui s’y Frotte” Association, which
had been formed to provide help and give assistance to next-of-kin of members
of the regiment who are killed in action, and the first copies of the Regimental
newsletter were circulated.
147 RAC relieved a regiment of the 8 Armoured
Brigade after a couple of days and on the eighth the Battalion moved forward
into Germany to take their place, while 156 Brigade came under command 43
Division and relieved 129 Brigade.
The German villages had been badly damaged and one
remembered the Normandy villages of the past. The mud was thick, which
necessitated a universal issue of gumboots and as the change-over took place
the tanks nosed their way into damaged houses and prepared positions.
Reconstruction of living was necessary – cellars and houses were made habitable
and in the forward areas the most common sign of life was a thin trail of smoke
rising from a rusty pipe that protruded from a cellar.
At the same time that the Regiment took over from
147 RAC, 156 Brigade, which had come under command 43 Division, relieved 124
Brigade. A Squadron moved two troops into Hockheide 873667 in support of 6
Cameronians, and held two troops in reserve at Bauchem 8564. B Squadron also
had two troops forward in Rischden 8666 in support of 4/5 RSF with the
remainder of the Squadron at Neiderheide 8665. C Squadron remained in reserve
in the Headquarters area which had been established in Gillrath 828662.
The front remained quiet though there was a certain
amount of activity in preparation for future operations.
During this lull further experiments were carried
out with BEME concerning the device to be fitted to Churchills for clearing
paths through Schu minefields in order to assist the infantry in attack against
prepared positions. On 9 December a demonstration was given attended by the
Division Commander and was considered successful. Though various experiments
had been carried out the device finally approved consisted of a steel bar at
the end of which were welded steel plates drilled so that they could be
attached to the edge of the hollycone drawbar. On the bar were threaded two
sets of manganese track plates separated by a distance piece.
Each set of plates had the spuds facing forward and
consisted of a total of seven plates, the sixth being specially adapted by
welding to its spud three carrier universal track plates. The wheel guides of
the carrier track plates acted as combs on the ground and as the plates were
welded so that on the side of the tank track itself there was an overlap of
four inches it was possible to clear two lanes approximately 5 feet in width
with an uncleared gap in the centre of approximately 1 foot.
On December 10th, the CO attended an “O”
Group at 214 Brigade, 43 Division. Operation “Shears” was outlined whereby the
enemy divisions disposed west of the River Roer between Roermond K 7990 and
Gilenkerchen K 8664 were to be destroyed. 34 Tank Brigade with 43 Division were
to do the break-out and 52 Division with 8 Armoured Brigade and Guards Armoured
Division the mopping up. 9 R Tanks in support 214 Brigade were to complete the
first phase of the break-out.
Following heavy and continual rain the ground
provided poor tank going and frequent reports showed no improvements.
Nevertheless, thousands of air photos and maps were issued and every plan was
complete when the news came that the operation was cancelled.
The Regiment remained in its position with its role
unchanged. On December 16th news was received of the German
counter-offensive against the American First Army front, attacking with the 6th
and 5th Panzer Armies.
Owing to the dropping of parachutists the guards
were far more alert and even those supplied by “A” Echelon were known to be
aggressive. Enemy air activity increased both during the day and night, and
shelling became more frequent. Finally, orders were received that 34 Tank
brigade with 43 Division were to be withdrawn and go to the area Tilburg to
undergo special training for future operations. On 19 December the Regiment’s
role was handed over to 2 Squadron Grenadier Guards and the tanks set off on a
road march to Waterscheide where they were to be picked up by transporters. RHQ
moved back to brunssum, complete
with new furniture, to join the wheels column which was to leave at 0630 hours
the following morning.
The road march was made in thick fog and a number of
wheels of the leading regiments were passed ditched by the side of the road.
After a few miles, the column was stopped and
informed that the Brigade would now concentrate in the area Asch and there
await further orders. It was appreciated that the German counter-offensive
might develop unpleasantly. XXX Corps moved south and established itself on the
west of the River Meuse in mobile reserve. The task given to 34 Tank Brigade
and 43 Division was to destroy any bridgeheads made by the enemy between Huy
and Liege. The Battalion was to support 214 Brigade in these possible
operations.
By the night of 20 December the Battalion had
established itself in Bilsen (K 4355) and it was there, a day later, that
confirmation had been received that the awards of M.C. had been granted to Lt.
T. Fawcett and Lt. F. Critchley for personal bravery and devotion to duty
during operations around Boeink and Nispen. 13 Troop were proud to claim three
MMs awarded to Sgt. Tomney, Tpr. Rees and Tpr. Lowe during the same series of
operations.
The possibility of Xmas celebrations seemed remote
though various greetings were received from old friends of the Regiment, the
most subtle and attractive being from our original Brigade Headquarters, 31
Tank Brigade.
On December 23, the German offensive looked less
dangerous and the Regiment was placed at 3 hours’ notice – there were also
rumours that Xmas would be celebrated and these were proved true the following
day. In consequence the Regiment decided to move to more comfortable billets
but owing to unforeseen difficulties and a number of false starts, the move was
not completed until midday of Xmas Day. Nevertheless, there was time to lay on
the traditional meal by the evening.
But, during the afternoon, a warning order had been
received whereby the Regiment would be ready to move by 0700 hours the next day
and the C.O. was informed that he would report to 51 (H) Division at Tilff (K
4921) that night – a poor sequel to the cancellation of his special leave that
was to cover the Xmas period. A Christmas meal was thus the only celebration
and the only amusement was caused by Capt. Lord appearing with a broken nose
after he had lost a wheel from his Scout car. This was considered amusing only
as a sequel to his summer escapade when he had tried to drive across a bridge
that the retreating Germans had unkindly blown.
On Boxing Day the Regiment detached from 34 Tank
Brigade came under command 51 (H) Division in reserve to the First American
Army and after another difficult road march in thick fog concentrated in
Ougree, south of Liege. It was here that the Regiment had its first experience
of flying bombs. They were heard
chugging in the skies at frequent intervals and though some fell unpleasantly
close, destroying billets, there were no casualties.
Here the Division Commander visited the Regiment and
suggested an alternative concentration area be found.
On 28 December the Regiment moved again and
established itself in the small village of Villers aux Tours and there saw out
the last day of 1944 surrounded by ice-frozen roads and snow-white fields. The
inhabitants were glad to see British troops again and were generous in their
welcome, while the Regiment waited to strike against any enemy penetrations
that might be made from the east or south. Meanwhile, A Echelon remained at
Seraing, a southern suburb of Liege, somewhat piqued it is said at being
likened to the processionary caterpillars, which the French Naturalist, Fabre,
claimed marched in a continuous circle in a head-to-tail snake-like string for
a week around the edge of a large vase despite the tempting offers of food. In
fairness, however, it must be stated that in road marches alone they had
covered about 150 miles during the month.
SNOW
AND THE ARDENNES
29
December 1944 to 7 February 1945
The
New Year arrived and it is believed that a few got drunk but other than that
there were no changes.
It
was obvious now that the German counter-offensive had lost the initiative and
it would only be a question of weeks before they would be retreating once again
behind the Siegfried Line. The operational role of the Regiment with 51 (H)
Division began to lose its significance. The days when maps had been studied
and routes reccied had passed and the concern now was to frustrate boredom that
might have threatened the Regiment isolated in this small but hospitable
village.
Some
began tobogganing and others, with the guidance of local gamekeepers, ploughed
through the snow and forests in search of the renowned boar. No one, however, proved themselves expert at
this kind of hunting and the Recce Troop were no more successful when they went
off one night in search of two Germans in American uniform reported by
civilians to be roaming the wood and having in their possession a map of Liege.
On
the seventh of January, 51 (H) Division began to move South into the area of
Rochefort – the Regiment, however, remained where it was to come under command
of 53 (W) Division with whom touch had been lost since training days in
England.
On
8 January, XII Corps, who had taken over the previous role of XXX Corps, began
their attack designed to clear the enemy bridgehead over River Roer between
Roermond and Gilenkirchen. It was appreciated that Rundstedt might make a
spoiling attack with the Volksgrenadier divisions opposite the 9 US Army in
order to prevent the straightening of the Allied line. Nothing serious was
expected but as 10 SS Panzer Division had not been located for some time it was
thought that this division might be used to give weight and support to the
Infantry Divisions. Possible axis of the enemy counter-attack in order of
probability were:-
1.
Julich
– Aachen
2.
Linnich
– Aachen
3.
Duren
– Eschweiler
4.
Rotgen
– Aachen
5.
Geilenkirchen
– Aachen
53
(W) Division with 9 R Tanks in support and 5 US Armoured Division were given
the task of dealing with this possible counter-attack should it succeed in
breaking through 9 US Army positions.
Support from Groups of P47 was to be expected and the general principles
as laid down by Commander 53 (W) Division to fulfil task were as follows:-
1.
Immediate
occupation of a firm base position by one Brigade Group.
2.
Remainder
of Division to assemble in an area in rear of firm base preparatory to:-
3.
Operating
about firm base with object of striking the enemy in the flank of his
penetration.
9 R
Tanks was to be prepared to move to Divisional area where they would
concentrate and be prepared to support either of the two attacking brigades.
The
Regiment remained at 24 hours’ notice and were still responsible with 53 (W)
Division for the defence of Leige. However, the XII Corps attack progressed
slowly and there was no indication that the enemy would make any spoiling
counter move. Life once again became sedentary and the Regiment were
entertained at intervals by film shows, concert parties and pantomimes -–the
latter introducing two charming Belgian girls who declared that they like
entertaining British soldiers – no-one however, discovered whether
entertainment meant more than singing or dancing.
On
January 29, 53 (W) Division moved and the Regiment reverted to the control of
34 Armoured Brigade. Mol was expected to be the next concentration area and
though A and B Echelons moved there they were eventually sent on to Eindhoven.
Getting
the tanks from Villers-aux-Tours along the ice- and snow-bound roads to Leige,
where transporters were to be found, was no easy task, but by the 25th
concentration was complete and two days later the Commander of 34 Armoured
Brigade issued a Special Order of the Day congratulating the Regiment on the
efficiency of their move.
At
Eindhoven, old friends were contacted and though it might have appeared that
the Regiment was resting, it was, in fact, preparing for its next action – the
breaking of the Siegfried Line. By 3 February plans were complete; the hundreds
of maps and aerial photographs had been studied and all commanders and tank
drivers had had experience of driving through woods and using the tank compass
at night. On 4 February, the Regiment moved north to Malden where 34 Armoured
Brigade had concentrated preparatory to Operation “Veritable”. All formation
signs had been painted out and cap badges removed in the interests of security,
but captured documents show that German intelligence had placed the Brigade in
the area of Helmond and later announced it as taking part in the First Canadian Army’s offensive.
OPERATION
“VERITABLE”
8 February to
12 March, 1945
On the morning of 8 February 1945, the
Regiment left Malden and by 0930 were beginning to move into the Assembly Area
in the woods west of Groesbeek. The artillery barrage, which had begun before
daybreak, continued the noise of war which had started the previous evening
with the RAF bombing of Cleve and Goch.
It
was known that the chief difficulty of this operation would be supplies. Tracks
were in bad condition; roads were flooded and the Regiment moved forward towing
supplies of petrol and ammunition on sledges; carrying themselves seven days’
rations and water, the latter was to be used only for cooking and drinking.
Operation
“Veritable” under the control of the First Canadian Army involved two Corps, II
Canadian and XXX British, and by
pivoting on the River Maas was intended to turn the Siegfried Line from the
north.
Holding
the northern end of the Siegfried Line were two German infantry divisions, 84
and 180, both of not more than average fighting ability, and 2 Para Regiment
reputed to be well-trained and to consist of good fighting troops.
The
Canadian Army during the first stage were to attack with II Canadian Corps in
the north and XXX British Corps in the south with Right 51(H) Division and 107
RAC; Centre 53 (W) Division with 9 R Tanks and 147 RAC in support; Left 15 (S)
Division and 6 Guards Armoured Brigade.
Tasks:
(a)
51
(H) Division to act as pivot for the swing from the north and clear southern
edge of Reichswald Forest.
(b)
53
(W) Division and 34 Armoured Brigade to clear remainder of Reichswald Forest.
(c)
15
(S) Division attack a line Kranenburg – Cleve.
9 R
Tanks were in support of 160 Brigade and were (1) to seize and hold northern
and eastern parts of Reichswald Forest; (2) to establish contact with and
support with fire if necessary 15 (S) Division on the left. (1 E Lancs
Regiment, under command 160 Brigade, to make up 4 regiments for this
operation).
General
plan was to advance behind 71 Infantry Brigade, who were to capture west of
forest and attack in four phases: Phase One with two Battalions supported by
squadrons on narrow fronts to final objectives.
Phase One:
Grouping: Right: Squadron
147 RAC in support 1 E Lancs.
2 AVRE
and one troop Crocs.
One
platoon 555 Field Company
Detachment
202 Field Ambulance
4 AVRE
and one troop Crocs
1˝ platoons 282 Field
Company
Detachment 212 Field
Ambulance
Forming
Up: (a) Squadron
147 RAC and 1 E Lancs.
Track
Nergena – 822582 – X tracks 815526.
(b)
C
Squadron 9 R Tanks and 6 RWF north of track junction 822528. Track from
road and track junction 819531 – track
junction 814528.
S.L: Track from road and track junction
819531 – track junction 814524.
Axis: 500 yards inside north edge of
forest.
Objectives: (a) Squadron
147 RAC and 1 E Lancs, track junction 824520 – clearing. 825519 – track
junction 828517 – track junction 835523.
(b)
C
Squadron 9 R Tanks and 6 RWF. Track junction 833525 – 834531 – 832531.
Method of
Attack: 4 troops up with tanks line ahead
supporting 2 company’s.
PhaseTwo:
4 AVRE +
one troop Crocs
One
platoon 282 Field Coy.
One troop
56 (Canadian) anti-tank battery
Detachment
212 Field Ambulance
Forming up: Area of C Squadron and 6
RWF.
S.L: Track – X
tracks 833527 – X tracks 832521.
C.L: 500 yards
inside northern edge of wood.
Objectives: Track junction 851544 – X
tracks 851540 – 848536 – track junction 844535.
Method of
Attack: 4 troops up with tanks
line ahead supporting 2 coys.
Action on
Objective: Support infantry in
consolidating and guarding approaches from north-west.
Phase Three:
2 AVRE + one troop Crocs
Half platoon 282 Field Coy
56 (Canadian) anti-tank Battery
less one troop
Detachment 212 Field Ambulance
Forming Up: Area of A squadron and 4
WELCH
S.L: track 853544 – 849534
Objectives: Area of clearing 855536 –
857533 – 853534
Method of Attack: 4 troops up, tanks line ahead,
supporting 2 coys.
Action on Objective: Support infantry in consolidating and
guard track approaches from south.
Phase
Four:
4 AVREs + one troop Crocs.
Half platoon 282 Field Coy
Detachment 212 Field Ambulance
S.L: track 853544 – 851541
C.L: X-tracks 861544 – 864543 – pt 815,
864538 – X-tracks 862536 –858542.
Method of Attack: 4 troops up, tanks line ahead,
supporting 2 coys.
Action on Objective: Guard east flank.
Each
Squadron joined the infantry s group in the Assembly Area and Regimental Headquarters joined 160 brigade Headquarters
at 738548.
By
1540 hours it was reported that 71 Infantry Brigade had secured their
objectives in the western edge of the forest and at 1645 C Squadron were
ordered to move forward towards the forest followed an hour later by RHQ, A and
B Squadrons. The move up was extremely difficult as the main road could not be
used by tanks. The C.O. led the RHQ group on foot through fields and gardens
bordering the road. A minefield was
encountered at 761547 and one Stuart and a Sherman tank belonging to 19 (SP)
25-pdr battery RCA, under Regimental command, struck mines; the remaining seven
Honeys, which were intended to be used as a link in supplies, were completely
bogged. By 1815 hours C Squadron had entered the forest and were moving up to
their Start Line under heavy shelling. The tanks avoided the rides and broke
their way through the trees guided by Troop Leaders on foot. This move up took
some considerable time as it was already dark, raining hard and frequent detours
had to be made to avoid infantry of 71 Infantry Brigade who were digging in.
RHQ remained with 160 Brigade HQ just short of the edge of the forest in 7953
during the first phase.
There
was some delay for C Squadron and 6 RWF on their Start Line because 1 E Lancs
were unable to contact squadron of 147 RAC which was to support them.
Eventually, I E Lancs decided to push on without tank support and the Start
Line was crossed at 2300 hours. Squadron advanced with all 4 troops in line,
meeting no opposition on the Right – on the Left some Spandau teams were mopped
up.
By
0005 hours 9 February, C Squadron were in position and meanwhile A and B
Squadrons had been moving up behind C Squadron. Movement through the forest in
the intense darkness and at the same time pushing down the trees was well-nigh
impossible, so it was decided to delay the next phase until first light when A
Squadron began their advance. Opposition only slight – B Squadron following
behind were shelled by 2 field guns (105mm) at 842544 which were engaged at
2200 yards: hits were observed and the guns silenced. A Squadron on objective
encountered a minefield and lost one tank.
At
1015 hours, B Squadron crossed the Start Line. No opposition – objectives
secured by 1100 hours. C Squadron now passed through A and B Squadrons,
crossing Start Line at 1200 hours. Again only slight opposition was encountered
and objectives were secure two hours later. Sorties were made into the thick
plantation in front of position and 52 prisoners of war taken. Enemy transport
and men were engaged with HE in the area 8753 – 8853 with good results and 4 MG
positions holding up advance of 15 (S) Division on left were knocked out by
artillery directed by OC C Squadron.
At
1530, RHQ moved to 816534. Tank going throughout the day had been appalling but
all troops had eventually reached their objectives.
Rain
continued throughout the day and night; the forest was gloomy and echoed with
bursts of MG fire. Most of February 10 was spent waiting for petrol,, oil and
water, but owing to the bad state of the roads it was 1830 before the RASC
column reached RHQ. All supplies were then loaded on the four tanks and a “milk
round” was made to the Squadrons in a blinding snow-storm.
The
plan was now to move southwards along the edge of the forest to support 43
Division advancing south-east from 8853. Accordingly, A Squadron and 4 WELCH
moved through B Squadron and by 2200 hours were astride the road Materborn – Hekkens in general area 8752.
On 11 February, B Squadron and 2 MONS continued
the advance. The Regiment had now only twenty-nine battleworthy tanks of which
eleven were with B Squadron. At 0900 hours the Start Line, road and track
junction 874526, was crossed under heavy mortar fire. Almost immediately they
were engaged by MG and Panzerfaust. One tank was bogged but a strongpoint at
876525 was overcome. One tank of 10 Troop was attacked by Panzerfaust and being
unable to depress its gun or turn on the soft ground the Squadron Commander
advanced and destroyed the enemy group with 95mm HE at point blank range. As a
result, a German major and 20 men surrendered. The advance continued without
further incident and by 1000 hours B Squadron was established in area 880529 –
876526 – 880523. A Jadgpanther, which opened fire and advanced towards position
was engaged by M 10s and forced to retire.
At
1100 hours, C Squadron advanced with 6 RWF and after crossing concrete road
destroyed MG positions with HE fire. By 1500 hours they were firmly established
in area 877516. A squadron now passed through B and C Squadrons and occupied
farm at 885520 by 1630 hours. A Jadgpanther sighted in farmyard was knocked out
by 3 Troop, two shots destroying suspension. The crew baled out and took refuge
in farm but were later captured by Lt. Fawcett. Soon afterwards another SP was
heard firing in C Squadron area. Major Holden and two Troop Leaders went out on
foot with a PIAT team to stalk it but SP moved off under cover of smoke before
it was possible to close with it.
C
Squadron now continued advance to track junction 891510 which was reached by
2000 hours. During the night enemy patrols were active in C Squadron area. One
tank was struck by a Panzerfaust and Sgt. Mead was shot through the head by
small arms fire. The Squadron “Stood to” until 0800 hours when 14 Troop located
and dealt with a MG position. RHQ had harboured at 867528.
On
the twelfth at 0750 hours, B Squadron and 2 MONS advanced again against heavy
opposition. Trooper Hands was injured clearing a Besa stoppage and Panzerfaust
were being used in large numbers by the enemy. 15 prisoners of war were taken
and many killed. By 1130 hours the objective, 903519, had been reached and 30
more prisoners of war taken.
During
the advance a mortar shell had burst on the turret of the tank commanded by Major
Reynell and, receiving severe wounds in the head and chest, he died during the
evening at the CCP. Capt. R.E. Long took over command.
At
1500 hours there were signs of an enemy counter-attack from south-east towards
A Squadron area, who had moved forward to area 911498 – 905504, losing a troop
on the way due to mechanical faults. 15 enemy, however, surrendered to A
Squadron and C Squadron, who were doing tank maintenance, moved in five minutes
and killed the first German five minutes later. The Squadron, however, was
heavily shelled and one OR was wounded. The counter-attack was quickly
dispersed but though now dark there was still more to be done. A tank of B
Squadron went out to secure any enemy position at 910509 and en route 7
prisoners of war were taken and other MG positions were destroyed. On the
objective a fierce action took place and 40 more prisoners of war were taken.
The
remaining enemy in the wood appeared to be losing morale and at 0930 hours on
13 February, 1 Officer and 3 ORs walked in and gave themselves up to B
Squadron. By midday, 71 Infantry Brigade had drawn level with 160 Infantry
Brigade on their right, and the whole area was solidly held. RHQ moved to
877525 where it was joined at 1800 hours by B and C Squadrons.
A
Squadron joined the remainder of the Regiment on 14 February and the greater
part of the day was spent in maintenance and salvaging bogged tanks. At 1730
hours, the Regiment began to move back to groesbeek
for rest and maintenance. Everyone was tired but morale was high and washing
and shaving became a delight.
On
15 February the Regiment was briefed for operations south of gennep 787437.
It
was known that 2 Para Regiment originally holding line of Maas had to swing
right to meet the threat from the North flank and were holding line running
approximately south-west to north-east from just north of Afferden with 2
Battalion right – 1 Battalion left. Between 2/2 Para Regiment and 20 Para
Regiment, who were holding the area south of Hassum 8843, is Battalion Reigels,
a rather nondescript GAF Battle Group. All these Battalions had suffered
heavily in the last week. Six Jagdpanthers had been encountered south of
Heijen, probably elements of 685 anti-tank Battalion and a few SP guns.
Own
Troops: 51
(H) Division, established general line:-
(i)
786420
– 822440 – 871446.
(ii)
32
Guards Brigade, established between right and Centre brigades to attack high
ground area Mull 8243 to 1350 hours 16 February.
(iii)
52
(L) Division to pass through 51 (H) Division to seize:-
(a)
wooded
area 8140 – 8240 – 8340.
(b)
High
ground about Grootehorst 8639.
(c)
Weeze
9537.
(iv)
155
Brigade to carry out task (b) morning of 17 February.
(v)
52
Recce Regiment likely to operate along road Gennep 7746 – X roads 831353.
(vi)
Additional
troops:- A Squadron 141 RAC; C Squadron W Dgns under command 9 R Tanks.
The
intention of 9 R Tanks, less A Squadron, was to support 157 Brigade in passing
through 153 Brigade and capture wooded area 8140 – 8240 – 8340; destroying all
enemy and exploiting to line of road Afferden 8038 – Rempeld 8238 – Kasteel
Blijenbeek 8338, and the general plan was to attack in two phases:-
Phase
I: capture wooded area 8140 – 8240 –
8340.
Phase
II: capture of Afferden.
PhaseI:
Grouping: Right
B
Squadron 9 R Tanks in support 5 KOSB with under command One platoon C Coy
7 Manch
One platoon A Coy 7 Manch
One troop (SP) 214 Anti-tank Battery
Left
C Squadron 9 RTR in support
of 5 HLI with under command
One platoon C Coy 7 Manch
One troop (SP) 214 Anti-tank battery
Start Line: Track 800415 – 809421
Centre Line: Track junction
805419 south-east to 825398.
Objectives:
B Squadron – south-east corner of wood incl. Pt 339,
818401 – 819395 – track 825401 – track junction
822405.
C Squadron – north-east corner of wood – area track
821414 – pt 151, 829411 – track junction 825405 – pt 162, 821407.
Having seized the objectives, the Regiment was to
support infantry in consolidation and if necessary in exploitation south-east.
Method of Attack: Each Squadron three troops up, each troop one up
Reserves: i. A Squadron 141 RAC:
ii. C Squadron W Dgns to be used at
C.O’s discretion.
Artillery: In close support 2 Field Regiment
Additional troops available:-
5 Field Regiment – 80 rounds per gun
Med. Regiments 3, 4, 9 AGRA – 40 rounds per gun
5 Batteries 7.2, 3,4, 9 AGRA – 40 rounds per gun
One HAA Regiment – 40 rounds per gun
Assembly Area 787437 at 1000
hours; each Squadron having eleven battleworthy tanks.
At 0600 hours, 16 February,
9 R Tanks, less A Squadron, left Groesbeek, and passing through Mook and Gennep
arrived in the assembly area 787437 at 1000 hrs, each squadron having eleven
battle-worthy tanks.
1500 hours: Squadrons
crossed Start Line in support of infantry. On the right there was only slight opposition. One strongpoint,
however, at 806408 had to be reduced with a combined assault with close
artillery support – 30 prisoners of 2 Para Regiment were taken and many killed.
From the left, HVHE fire was reported from the direction of Neiuw farm 814419
and OC C Squadron lost his tank on a mine. Resistance was stiffer on this flank
and a pocket of enemy at 818413, which had been left by the infantry, fought
strongly using a considerable number of Panzerfaust which, fortunately, fell
short or wide of the two troops who had become involved in this little battle.
Short range HE and MG fire eventually broke resistance and by 1615 hours the
tanks had joined up again with the infantry who, though fighting well in the
open, appeared to lack confidence in wood clearing and tank co-operation. By
1700 hours, 2 troops on the right and one on the left had reached their
objectives and fifteen minutes later another troop on the left reported in
position. In centre of the left section infantry were held up 30 yards short of
objective in area 825407 by heavy Spandau fire and the troop in support was
threatened by frequent Panzerfaust. This enemy position took some time to
destroy as concentrated and accurate fire from the tanks was not possible owing
to damaged traverse systems. One tank was hit by a Panzerfaust and brewed up.
The crew were badly burnt and one OR
had his leg crushed as he fainted in front of a neighbouring tank. By 1830
hours, all objectives had been secured but between 1900 and 1940 the artillery
had to be called twice to break up the enemy forming up for a counter-attack.
At 2300 hours, SPs and
anti-tank guns had been moved up to position and the Squadrons were released
and joined RHQ at 803421, where it had been established for the battle During
the day’s fighting 2 Officers and 73 ORs had been taken prisoner all belonging
to 2 Para Regiment.
17 February:9 R Tanks continued to
support 52 (L) Division in carrying out their original intention, which
resulted in a series of local and somewhat abortive actions. The plan of Phase
I, the capture of Afferden, had been changed. It had been intended that B
Squadron should support 1 Glas H in this task, but as they had not been
released till late the previous evening, the Glas H were given the support of
the Crocs which were not used. Afferden fell quickly after an early attack.
At 0700, B Squadron with eleven tanks reported to 52
Division Recce, and remained at 30 minutes’ notice for a combined attack in
clearing (i) down to anti-tank obstacle between Afferden 8038 and Grootehorst
8639; (ii) triangle Afferden – Grootehorst – X roads 8323353.
At 0900, C Squadron were sent to rest at 784437 but
at 1100 hours, following a “O” Group held at 155 Infantry Brigade Headquarters,
it was decided that A Squadron, still resting and refitting at Groesbeek, would
support 7/9 RS in (i) attacking farm 837396 and pt 22.7 at 837398; (ii) support
infantry by fire from high ground to anti-tank ditch and ARE in placing
fascines in ditch at three places. The first phase was to be carried out with 2
coys and 2 troops up – Start Line: 820396 – 824404. H – 1600 hours.
At 1530, B Squadron moved in support Recce Regiment
to clear road Afferden – Grootehorst. Opposition light – enemy in houses
engaged with HE. At 815387, however, large craters and very soft ground to the
north and south delayed a further advance, though 52 Recce succeeded in
clearing wood 817385. B Squadron later pushed on to Rempeld and there formed a
firm base. Meanwhile, A Squadron had
been summoned from groesbeek but
owing to the roads being blocked with traffic their attack did not start
according to plan.
Reinforced by two tanks from RHQ, the Squadron had
mustered two troops and a command tank, and though Troop Leaders were only
given hasty orders, they did not succeed in crossing the Start Line until H +
20. 7/9 RS had already moved forward and B Coy was contacted at 828398 – no
contact was made with the other coy, visibility being poor among the 3ft – 4ft
trees in the thick young fir wood. The tanks got to within 300 yards of farm
but no infantry could be seen. Enemy were now using panzerfaust in large
numbers, most of which however, exploded against the trees. One Commander,
however, was injured. Eventually, one infantry platoon was found in a small
clearing digging in under heavy mortar fire. One mortar position destroyed by 95mm
HE. At 1800 hours, the infantry command was at last contacted and being
released half-an-hour later move to join RHQ at 825398.
At 1830, B Squadron was contacted by a patrol from 5
KOSB and then withdrew to Afferden for the night. RHQ and A Squadron moved to
harbour area at 822403 at 2040 hours.
18 February:7/9 RS occupied objectives
that had not been captured the previous day during the night and at 0600 hours
an “O” Group was held and A Squadron was ordered to support 4 KOSB in Phase One
(a) crossing anti-tank ditch at 828385; (b) assist ARE in placing fascines at
crossing; (c) silence strongpoint at sluice 835388; Phase Two (a) support 2
coys infantry in attack on woods 836385 – 834379; (b) silence enemy position at
298, 827382 if not already captured by 52 Division Recce.
A Squadron had only six tanks available, two of
which had only recently been delivered and these not thoroughly checked. Organized
in two troops of two tanks each, supported by a C.S. 95mm, A Squadron left
their harbour at 0730 hrs and crossed the Start Line road 827388 one hour
later. One troop was to support the crossing of the anti-tank ditch and the
other to attack the strongpoint. Both troops, however, were soon engaged by SPs
situated to the south of the ditch and as the infantry came under heavy fire
success looked doubtful from the first. One of the tanks, attacking the
strongpoint, had three bogies shot away and the main armament was jammed. The
other tank advanced firing 86 6-pdr rounds at the concrete defences at 50 yard
range and then was hit, becoming immovable. On the right the situation was no
better. Anti-tank fire had brewed one Churchill and the other was pinned – the
AVRE was also hit and the CO 4 KOSB reported the operation not possible. At
0910 tanks and infantry rallied at 825392 and at 1220 A Squadron was released
and returned to RHQ area.
B Squadron operating with 52 Recce Regt. had moved
back to Rempeld at first light and with eight tanks straffed known enemy
positions south of River Beck. It was soon appreciated, however, that no
further advance could be made under existing conditions and the Squadron
returned to Afferden in counter-attack role. In these actions, clearing
difficult wooded country stubbornly defended, the Regiment lost three tanks by
enemy action and suffered six casualties among tank crews.
The poor nature of the ground with so many obstacles
did not allow constant use of tanks, and February 19 was a quiet day though
there was heavy mortaring during the night. Tank replacements had begun to
arrive and refitting was begun on the next day when the Regiment concentrated
at 784437. The main task had been achieved and a congratulatory message was
received from the Corps Commander.
Six days in tents and bivouacs passed with the
Regiment either leisurely doing maintenance or resting, and then on 27 February
the Regiment moved to area of wood 4439 in counter-attack role with 156
Brigade, 52 (L) Division, who were relieving 51 (H) Division on the night 27/28
February.
C Squadron situated at 490440 were to support either
7 CAM or 4 RSF in the area of Hulm and Boyenhoff 8839, while A Squadron were to
be prepared to move south in support of 7/9 RS area 868413 or 6 CAM at 8740. B
Squadron were to remain in reserve.
On 1 March, the Regiment moved forward to support
infantry of 56 Brigade who had now extended positions to include Grootehorst
8630, a bridgehead over anti-tank ditch from 869389 to 890376 and Neider Helsun
9038.
Enemy resistance on the right was believed to be
slackening but 53 Division were fighting hard in Weeze 9337, which was believed
to be a hinge for the enemy withdrawal to a bridgehead round Wesel A2240.
C Squadron in direct support to 156 Brigade were
situated at Hulm 4090 with A Squadron in reserve at 885440. B Squadron moved to
878392 in support 155 Brigade. RHQ established itself in a broken-down
farmhouse 879430.
C and B Squadrons experienced some shelling,
resulting in damage to two vehicles and Lt. A.P. Beale was wounded slightly
below the right eye.
On 2 March snow made life less comfortable and the
day looked as if it would be quiet but now the Division front was gradually
moving forward, ground being taken over as it was vacated by the enemy.
As a result of a Division conference, C Squadron
were given the task of supporting 156 Brigade in clearing Hess wood 9034 in
order to open roads Hess – 890335 and Hess – Wemb 9133.
The Regiment, less c
Squadron, was to support 157 Brigade now concentrated south of Goch 9144 and be
prepared to pass through 53 (W) Division and 8 Armoured Brigade if necessary on
axis Kevelaer 9632 – Geldern. The Regiment was placed at 2 hours’ notice and at
1000 hours on 3 March A Squadron moved across country to area of 1 Glas H who
had already concentrated. The roads, however, were frozen by Corps to allow the
Guards Armoured Division to move south. B Squadron did not move.
C Squadron had been unable to move south as there
was no way across anti-tank ditch owing to demolitions – one Stuart was lost on
a mine in an endeavour to find a route. 156 Brigade, however, carried out its
task and took fifteen stragglers, one of whom was drunk.
The Regiment was now dispersed as follows: RHQ
879431; A Squadron 918416; B Squadron 879404; C Squadron 902401.
53 Division and 8 Armoured Brigade had meanwhile
contacted the Americans and the bridgehead was slowly being squeezed. It was
still possible, however, that 52 Division and 34 Armoured Brigade would be
needed and orders were issued to concentrate at Walbeck 9622.
On 4 March the Regiment began to move but having
reached the area of Langstraat 839340 were then ordered to move no further.
It was thought that 53 (W) Division and the 8
Armoured Brigade would be pinched out by the Americans and Guards Armoured
Division but on 6 March they were still in the line regretting, it is reported,
that they did not have the support of 9 R Tanks.
Again it was possible that 52 Division and 34
Armoured Brigade would pass through and the Brigade groups – 147 RAC in support
155 Brigade and 9 R Tanks in support 156 Brigade – were warned to stand by. The
following day, however, 34 Armoured Brigade ceased to be under command 52 (L)
Division and the Regiment remained in the area of Langstraat, having baths and
doing washing, awaiting its next orders.
The Regiment was warned of a possible short rest but
suddenly, at 1900 hrs on the evening of 8 March, a warning order was received
whereby the Regiment would be moving at 0600 the next morning. During the last
24 hours enemy resistance around the Wesel bridgehead was as determined as
ever; reports indicated the Para Regiments holding the line were being
reinforced and the appreciation was that there would be some tough fighting
before the german positions were
destroyed. II Canadian Corps took over the whole front and the plan was 52 (L)
Division with 34 Armoured Brigade in support would relieve 53 (W) Division and
the 8 Armoured Brigade who had not yet been pinched out by the 35 US Infantry
Division of 9 US Army.
At 2300 hours on 8 March, the CO was still trying to
get definite orders which had already been changed twice. Eventually, however,
it was decided that the Regiment would move at 0700 hours on 9 March and take
over that day from 13/18 Hussars, who were in the line on the northern edge of
the wood 1430. 9 R Tanks were to support 155 and 156 Brigades while 147 RAC
supported 157 Brigade, whereupon A Squadron were allotted to 7/9 RS (155
Brigade) and C Squadron 4/5 RSF (156 Brigade). Both concentrated in the area of
the clearing 3430 and RHQ was established at 133292 with B Squadron in reserve
at 095296.
The enemy bridgehead was still thought to consist of
2,000 fighting troops, elements of 6, 7 and 8 Para Divisions, and 180 and 190
Infantry Divisions. 24 Para Regiment was believed to be facing 52 (L) Division.
Small local attacks gradually nibbling away the
enemy positions were considered a waste of time and the intentions for 10
March, properly planned and laid on, were to be as follows:-
II Canadian Corps.
52 (L) Division.
(a) 147 RAC in support 157
Brigade to capture Menzelen 1636.
A Squadron 9 R Tanks in
support 7/9 RS to capture area X-roads 169326 – 170345 –railway 161351.
(b) C Squadron 9 R Tanks to
support 4/5 RSF in firm base area Alpon 1531.
XIX US Corps 35
US Infantry Division to capture
(a)
Borth
1833
(b)
Wallach
1933
(c)
Factory
1735
In the early morning, with heavy artillery fire, the
attacks began, but there was no resistance and only enemy stragglers were
picked up; one, a GAF NCO, stated that all possible equipment had been
evacuated across the Wesel railway bridge by 0500 hrs and the bridge itself had
been blown two hours later.
Word came that there might be the inevitable gallop
but as there was now no further need for tank support, the infantry gradually
took over the ground up to the Rhine. The Wesel bridgehead petered out without
even a whimper, though the BBC reported that same night that enemy resistance
was slackening.
The Regiment journeyed back on 12 March over the
Maas, and with the Brigade, prepared to rleax in the area of Deurne, some
fifteen miles west of Eindhoven.
THE ANTI-CLIMAX ACROSS THE
RHINE
13 March to 30 May 1945
On arriving at Deurne, the Regiment immediately
began overhauling the tanks – changing engines, tracks, sprockets and doing
less strenuous maintenance, while the BTA sorted out the more war-weary tanks
and began to back-load those that had travelled well over a thousand miles.
These battered old warriors disappeared and replacements arrived to refit the
regiment for what was believed to be its last battles across the Rhine. On 14
March, General Sir Miles Dempsey, KCB, DSO, visited the Regiment and on leaving
was heard to say that he had been most favourably impressed by what he had
seen. The same day, the Brigadier passed more bouquets declaring that during
the period which the Regiment had served under XXX Corps, the Corps and
Divisional Commanders had nothing but praise to offer for the Regiment’s
efficiency and fighting spirit. Major
R.E. Holden was awarded the D.S.O. for his outstanding ability as Squadron
Leader and the morale of the Regiment bean to mount to such as extent that it
accepted without protest the demands of “Bullshit” and undertook with
enthusiasm the working out of a new method of night attack that would exploit
to the full the element of surprise.
Faced with a clearly defined objective, unprotected
by natural or artificial tank obstacles, it was proposed to allow the tanks to
cross the Start Line and move in second gear as slowly as possible to within
300 yards of the objective – the noise of the approach being covered by Bofors
firing on fixed lines and an aeroplane flying overhead. With the tanks in
position, maximum fire power would be brought down on the objective (target
selection being aided by spotlights) for about five minutes and then the
infantry would attack. Carefully planned and with complete cooperation, success
seemed assured, provided the attack was so timed that no enemy counter-attack
was possible before first light. All demonstrations were impressive and it was
hoped that the time would come when the theory would be tested under battle
conditions, but the part that the Brigade would play in the future operations
remained a mystery until the C.O. and Squadron Leaders were ordered to contact
the 9 Infantry Brigade of the 3rd (Brit.) Division. This was the only
Infantry Division that the Regiment had not at one time or another supported –
it was a pleasing prospect as they were known to have a good reputation.
The role, however, proved disappointed for it
depended on whether the Germans would be able to contain the assault forces in
a small bridgehead over the Rhine and thus prevent an early break-out.
Intelligence thought this unlikely and the Germans seemed to agree for, while
the Regiment languished at Deurne in the sun, the assault started. One watched
the gliders and aircraft passing overhead with certain impatience and
frustration.
The news was good; ground was gained; the expected
defence line didn’t hold and daily it was becoming obvious that the Regiment
would not be needed. Finally, on 1st April, a move was made to
Sevenum, preparatory to crossing the Rhine, but now everyone was bored and
impatient and a little irritated by the publicity given to the 6 Guards
Armoured Brigade who had been so carefully nursed since their tardy landing in
Normandy.
The Brigade now came under the control of I British
Corps, and on 6 April the Regiment crossed the Rhine to take over military
control of Gelderland and a small area of Germany surrounding Bocholt. Here the
Regiment was given the unattractive job of acquiring information about German
war materials left behind in their retreat; of reconnoitering routes and
ensuring that no subversive activities were carried out by the populace. Each
squadron was given an area to clear up and the Regiment was dispersed with RHQ
at Aalten A.2070; A Squadron at Groenlo A.2383; B Squadron at Lichtenvoorde
A.1977 and C Squadron at Winterswijk A.3075.
Recce parties reported the states of road, blown
bridges and minefields, while salvage parties collected into dumps the
miscellaneous ammunition lying about the area. Nothing really interesting was
found and everyone was glad to hand over the area to the 3 Heavy Regiment RA of
9 AGRA.
On 14 April, the whole Brigade moved into Germany
and 9 R Tanks became responsible for part of Kreis Bentheim and Ahaus with the
same responsibilities of battlefield clearance, route reconnaissance and
security.
RHQ established itself in the fifty-year old castle
at Bentheim V.6012 with A Squadron at Emsburen 6921; B Squadron at Gronau 5002;
C Squadron at Schuttorf V.6513.
As the days passed the Squadron ammunition dumps
became larger and the maps heavily marked with chinagraph; patrols roamed the
area in an attempt to control the numerous D.Ps which had now become the
vagabonds of Germany, eating, sleeping and take revenge as they wished. In an
effort to control this gypsy life, the Ems River was made a stop line where all
DPs attempting to cross were diverted to proper reception camps and
preparations were made to seal off Germany by closing the Dutch/German
frontier.
B Squadron was made responsible for the twenty-five
miles of frontier in the Regimental area and work was begun on marking the
frontier and carrying out reccies preparatory to setting up an evacuated
frontier zone. Meanwhile, by house searches and enquiries, the area was cleared
of all firearms and German deserters. Houses were searched for food hoarding,
wireless transmitters and Nazi documents, and the list of Nazi officials who
were to be arrested, grew longer. All ideas of fighting another battle had been
abandoned but those of the past were recalled when the Brigadier decorated the
Colonel with the D.S.O. and confirmation of other awards was received as
follows:-
Military Cross to Lieut. W.J. Waters (A Squadron)
Croix de Guerre with Silver Star to Lieut. A.P. Boden (C
Squadron)
Military Medal to L/Cpl. A.J. Towlson (C Squadron)
Croix de Guerra with Bronze Star to Cpl. F.D. Horner (C
Squadron)
On 28 April, as their area was now clear it was
decided to move A Squadron to Lingen where they were to help control the D.P.
camp which was now responsible for some thousands of Russians and other
nationalities but, before leaving, an ammunition clearance party of RASC and
Pioneers exploded an “R” mine which resulted in the whole dump at Emsburen
blowing up. As a result, vehicles were destroyed and houses collapsed, and
though the clearing party suffered casualties, no member of A Squadron was
injured.
By 8 May, despite the difficulty of liaison with
Field Security and Military Government, the frontier zone had been evacuated
and marked with warning notices, roads had been closed and frontier control
posts established at three points (i) on the Oldenzaal/Bentheim Rd; (ii)
Enschede/Gronau Rd and (iii) Enschede/Ahaus Rd. B Squadron were now the busiest
of all squadrons, coping with hundreds of Dutch returning to Holland and
preventing the use of unauthorised vehicles. The impounded vehicle park
harboured all types of civilian cars and many unfortunate people were faced
with a long hitch-hike back to their units. On 18 May, C Squadron took over the
northern part of the frontier and, in consequence, moved to Bentheim where,
since the Regiment’s arrival, numbers of the population had sought out RHQ in
order to tell of their troubles and the “I” office added to its list of
miscellaneous jobs that of a Civil Affairs Dept.
With the war in north-west Europe now over and the
celebrations of “V.E” Day but a memory, news of the Regiment’s future began to
be disclosed. The Regiment was to become an Armoured Regiment of Occupation,
with the establishment of a few soft vehicles and other odds and ends.
All but six Churchills and six Stuarts were handed
over to 267 Forward Delivery Squadron for disposal, and on 30 May the Regiment
moved, being given Kreis Tecklenburg as the area of responsibility.
RHQ established itself at Ibbenburen V.9808; A
Squadron at Westerkeppeln, W.0913; B Squadron at Mettingen W.0313; C Squadron
at Lengerich W.0898.
There the Regiment, occupied by guarding a few
V.P’s, mainly hospitals, awaited the arrival of the 4 R Tanks who were to be
made up to strength by an exchange of Age and Service Groups and then train
with Churchills preparatory to embarkation for S.E.A.C. The 9 R Tanks were to
be partly responsible for the training, but before the end of June the Regiment
would not be recognizable as the one that had fought for ten months in
north-western Europe.
