OPERATION “VERITABLE”, XXX CORPS

REPORT ON 34 ARMOURED BRIGADE OPERATIONS

The Reichswald Forest Phase, 8 to 17 February 1945

After ten days fighting in the Reichswald the Commander of 34 Armoured Brigade, Brigadier W.S. Clarke, decided to review the conduct of the battle, and to record the experiences and conclusions of the senior officers of the Brigade. He asked the Commanding Officer of 9 RTR, Lt-Col P.N. Veale, MC, to prepare an initial report which was to be studied and then discussed by the group of senior officers. The lessons learnt were thus to be made available to armoured units who might have to fight in forests in the future.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Preamble and notes on planning

2. Operational plan, 34 Armoured Brigade

3. Narrative account of fighting

4. 9 RTR Report on aspects of forest fighting

5. Minutes of a Conference held to examine lessons learnt

Appendices

A. Topographical Report

B. 9 RTR and 147 RAC Operational Instructions

C. Claims, casualties, and notes on difficulties in keeping tanks battle-worthy

PREAMBLE, and NOTES ON PLANNING

Operation Veritable, the elimination of German troops west of the River Rhine, was completely disrupted by the German attack in the Ardennes on 16 December 1944, which developed into the Battle of the Bulge. When the German thrusts had been held and thrown back, the plan for Veritable was re-activated.

By 24 January 1945 34 Armoured Brigade was concentrated in the area Eindhoven, thus leaving more than two weeks to prepare and move forward for Operation Veritable.

On 26 January the Corps Commander opened a briefing conference for commanders and staff officers to brigade level by illustrating how the scope and importance of the operation had increased during the month’s postponement, both by reason of the Russian successes in the East and Rundstedt’s costly expenditure of his strategic reserve in the West.

First Canadian Army was to control the offensive, using XXX British and II Canadian Corps. The initial phases were to be carried out by XXX Corps, which had the task of breaking through the Siegfried Line in the area of the Reichswald Forest, then exploiting to the line Geldern – Wesel. XXX Corps, consisting of six infantry divisions, one armoured division, resources of 79 Armoured Division and three armoured brigades, would be supported by five Army Groups Royal Artillery (AGsRA), and the entire air resources of 21 Army Group.

The tactics of the offensive had changed little from the plan of December. The attack, timed for 1030 hrs 8 February, would be preceded by five hours intensive artillery bombardment. Five infantry divisions, with tank, flail, crocodile, and AVRE support, were to attack a sector held by little more than one enemy division.

From the right, i.e. from south to north, those divisions were: 51 Highland, 53 Welsh, 15 Scottish, 2 Canadian, 3 Canadian. The two Canadian divisions were to revert to the command of II Canadian Corps after the first phase.

The first objectives for 51, 53, and 15 Divisions were to be taken by first light on D+1. Exploitation was to be done by 43 Wessex Division and the Guards Armoured Division, the former driving on Goch from the north with the Guards pushing through Udem towards the line Geldern – Wesel.

For the Operation 34 Armoured Brigade, less 107 RAC, was put under command 53 Div, and 107 RAC was put under command 51 Div. The following units were placed under 34 Armoured Brigade:

Under command:

Westminster Dragoons less one squadron (flails)

A Squadron 141 RAC (Crocodiles)

82 Assault Squadron RE

In support

19 Canadian Field Regiment (Self-propelled 25-pounders)

PLANNING

Note on security: An exceptionally high standard of security was demanded and maintained. This prohibited even the area of attack being made known to troop leaders until a few days before the attack, and consequently some time was lost to them for planning and study of air photographs etc. Great benefit was, however, derived from the Brigade’s early move (night of 3/4 February) to the assembly area; the troop and tank commanders, now briefed, were able to observe and study the actual ground despite the poor visibility prevailing at the time.

Major concerns in planning

GOC 53 Div laid down primarily that armour would predominate in the attack over the open ground from the start line to the forest, and would put the infantry into the Reichswald. After this point it was not known what the going would be like.

A good supply of defence overprints and excellent air photographs was available, and a Planning Room was established at Brigade HQ. A number of Brigade conferences were held to determine means of overcoming the several problems presented by the circumstances of the attack. The main points causing concern were:

1. State of ground west of the forest

At the time of planning there was a severe frost and the ‘going’ was hard, but it was obvious that should there be a sudden thaw the low-lying ground would rapidly become a morass of mud. Planning had thus to allow for either contingency.

a. Frost conditions: great difficulty and much labour had been occasioned in the Ardennes by the lack of ice-bar tracks, but a supply was made available in Eindhoven and the fitting of them was put on high priority. Unfortunately, they were delivered without pins and the resultant improvisation caused a delay, which in turn restricted the amount of training done with the infantry. Tests showed the ice-bars to be very satisfactory, and anxiety regarding the mobility of the Churchills was allayed.

The flail problem remained, however. Lt-Col Blair Oliphant, 30 Armoured Brigade representative, considered that on favourable ground seven troops would be needed to clear the number of lanes required by the Divisional plan. As only six troops had been allotted it would necessary to use at least one troop for two tasks.

This situation was liable to be aggravated because on a frost-hardened surface flail chains are effective for 400 yards only, and from close study of the defence overprints enemy mines were shown to a depth of 1,000 to 1,200 yards. Although each flail tank carries one spare set of chains it was apparent that flail resources would have to be carefully husbanded. Brigadier Clarke therefore decided to accept tank casualties by leading with Churchills until a definite minefield was established, and by resuming the lead whenever there appeared to be unmined gaps of any size.

b. Thaw conditions: Serious consideration was given to the possibility of a general thaw. Track and cross-country movement would obviously be difficult even for Churchill tanks if rain should accompany a thaw.

With this in mind two special routes from the assembly area to battle assembly areas were reconnoitred, one for each regiment, and engineer assistance was obtained to improve them where it was considered necessary. These routes had to avoid roads to be used later as main supply routes.

The flails and AVsRE presented a still more serious problem. The minefield and anti-tank ditch were located between Groesbeek and the Reichswald in low-lying ground with peat sub-soil that a thaw would reduce to a quagmire. Tracks were forbidden to use the main divisional axis, but Brigadier Clarke obtained permission from General Ross to flail and use this axis if flails should be incapable of operating across country; it was to be used by armour only as a last resort.

If flails should prove completely incapable Brigadier Clarke determined to expend one squadron of Churchills in an endeavour to get through the mud and mines before giving up the attempt to lead the infantry onto their first objective.

2. Minefields

Ground condition was the main anxiety in regard to the gapping of the minefields, and this, with action decided upon, has already been outlined in paragraph 1.

3. Anti-tank ditch bridging

The ground condition was again the pertinent factor. It was required to make six crossings, and the leading squadron of 147 RAC was to take forward four fascine AVsRE and two Churchill bridgelayers. To get these forward it was felt that it might be necessary to build a causeway with rubble and bricks to be taken from the houses built along the main axis.

4. Entry into the Reichswald

From maps and air photos it was not possible to decide whether tanks would be able to get into the forest without engineer assistance. GOC 53 Div therefore decided that the attack should be based on armour only to the forest, and that the tanks would then stand back and support the infantry in. One troop was to remain on immediate call to each forward battalion should tanks be needed to help the infantry to reach their first objectives within the forest.

5. Close support to infantry in the Reichswald

General Ross decided that to fulfil the Corps plan, i.e. to traverse the whole length of the northern edge of the Reichswald in the first 24 hours, he must have close tank support to the infantry inside the forest, both by day and night.

In the Ardennes 53 Div had formed a high regard for the capacity of tanks to demoralise the enemy by crashing through trees by night. It was realised that little or no observed fire would be possible, but it was felt that the tanks would be amply justified merely by their presence and speculative fire.

9 RTR, whose task lay solely in the forest, did intensive training with 160 Infantry Brigade in woods in the Eindhoven area. As a result of this training Lt-Col Veale was full of confidence in his ability to remain with the infantry throughout the advance.

Maintenance of direction by night was the problem that caused Lt-Col Veale most deliberation. Eventually the Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) agreed to shine two vertical pilot lights. These were to be set about 3,000 yards apart, and to make it easier to recognize them one was to flash the letter ‘O’ and the other the letter ‘H’ throughout the night. It was hoped that tank commanders would be able to check their position by taking readings on the lights with hand compasses. It was ensured that spotlights were fitted to tanks for these night operations.

6. Training with infantry

Training was restricted by availability of tanks. In addition to the fitting of ice-bar tracks, a great deal of maintenance was needed after the Brigade’s arduous journeyings in the Ardennes. Training concentrated on:

a. Close support to infantry through woods

b. Teamwork in liquidating pillboxes

As indicated in paragraph 3 it was found that the Churchill could push through trees, and the results of the training were most heartening.

For training pillbox teams it was necessary to find a place where live ammunition could be fired, and this was not easy in the populated Eindhoven – Helmond area. A suitable wood was eventually found, and 53 Div Engineers built canvas bunkers to the same scale as those found in the Siegfried Line.

The principle was to flush the enemy from the shelter of the pillbox into the open where they could be dealt with by our infantry. It was assumed that an infantry battalion would be supported by one squadron of tanks and one troop of AVsRE, and that the battalion would advance on a two-company front, each with two platoons forward. It was decided that each forward platoon should be supported by one troop of tanks, but that the AVsRE should be held centrally. The following is a description of an attack carried out during this training.

The troop of tanks advance in line ahead, led by the troop leader and protected on each flank by the infantry. The first information was normally brought back by infantry scouts. The platoon and troop commanders then made their plan, and decided whether it was necessary to use smoke as protection against support pillboxes.

The tanks then advanced and heavily engaged the pillbox frontally with all types of ammunition, aiming particularly at the weapon slits to keep the enemy subdued. Meanwhile a bren gun team worked round to the rear of the pillbox. When this team had been allowed time to get into position the remainder of the platoon and the troop demonstrated frontally, with the idea of flushing out the enemy. On occasions the tanks, by shooting at one mark, first broke the concrete and then switched to HE. This encouraged the enemy to withdraw from the pillbox, whereupon they were met by the bren team.

When the position was cleared the pillbox was blown by sappers to prevent the enemy infiltrating and re-occupying.

It was decided that it would be preferable to hold the troop of AVsRE at Battalion HQ rather than keep one AVRE forward with each team. Should AVRE assistance be needed to break a hole in the concrete they could easily be called forward if they were on the tank squadron commander’s frequency.

7. Roads available for maintenance

The divisional front, at the start line little more than 1,000 yards wide, contained only one road running parallel to the attack. Even this road was only 14 feet wide with very little metalling, and as the whole impetus of the advance was to depend on it, all rearward movement was forbidden.

Refilling had therefore to be done forward, but it was felt that wheeled columns could not be relied on to reach the tanks. To overcome these maintenance problems Brigade applied for 20 gutted carriers and 10 sledges. The carriers were not forthcoming, but 10 sledges were obtained on D minus 1.

These were loaded with petrol and ammunition, and to avoid embarrassment to 147 RAC during the first phase of the attack 9 RTR was detailed to tow all sledges forward. A percentage were to be jettisoned in the Plak area west of the forest for 147 RAC. Stuart tanks were to be filled with petrol, each tank capable of carrying approximately 160 gallons. 147 RAC also had two turretless Churchills which Lt-Col Blain stocked with ammunition.

OPERATIONAL PLAN

34 Armoured Brigade (less 107 RAC)

INFORMATION

1. Enemy

(a) Order of Battle

The sector between the Rhine and the Maas is known to be under the control of 84 Division, with under command Kampfgruppe Katzmann and III Battalion 2 Para Regiment, and is divided into eight battalion localities. The only immediate tactical res available to 84 Div are 2-3 battalions. The enemy is unlikely to leave that vital sector so weakly defended and the presence of a reserve infantry div in the Cleve-Goch area must be accepted.

In spite of move Eastwards, the enemy by virtue of his withdrawal to the Siegfried Line in the Ardennes and his abandoning of the offensive and subsequent withdrawals in Alsace, has some fifteen divisions out of contact on the Allied Front, in the proportion of two Panzer type to one infantry. Some of these could be made available to reinforce his troops in the “Reichswald Plug”.

(b) Defences

The enemy has constructed three main lines of defence on the Reichswald front: a forward line, the Siegfried Line and the Hochwald “lay-back” line.

The present enemy positions are in the nature of strong outposts to the main Siegfried defences and are being manned in strength. These outposts are organized in two lines. In the first, depth from outposts to rear companies is about 2000 yards and an average battalion front is 1500 yards. Behind this is a second line running north from the R. Maas at 7648 along the western edge of the Reichswald and then to Kranenburg.

Further west is an elaborate trench system and an A/tank ditch forming an advance position in front of the Nutterden area; this is the Siegfried Line. This trench system continues through the Forest to Hekkens 8347 and then in a SE direction.

The Hochwald “lay-back” line is a recently constructed defence line which runs from Rees 0752 to 0446, where it continues south past the Hochwald forest towards Geldern 0125.

Concrete defences appear on the Nutterden feature. West of this none are visible except for some possible concrete shelters around AA sites.

2. Own Troops

(a) 53 (W) Division is attacking to capture the Brandenberg features 8053, advance along and clear the high ground which runs through the Northern part of the Reichswald, capture the Stoppelberg features 8553, and finally concentrate in mobile reserve ready for future operations.

(b) Tps Under Comd

HQ 34 Armoured Brigade: with under command 9 R Tanks

147 RAC

W Dgns less A Squadron (Flails)

A Squadron 141 RAC (Crocs)

82 Assault Sqn RE (AvsRE)

with in support 19 Canadian Field Regiment (SP)

INTENTION

3. 34 Armd Bde will support 53 (W) Div in all phases of the operation.

Method

4. General Outline

53 (W) Div is attacking on a one brigade front with 71 Infantry Brigade leading. 71 Infantry Brigade is securing the Brandenberg features and 160 Infantry Brigade is passing through 71 Infantry Brigade and securing the Stoppelberg features. 158 Infantry Brigade is establishing itself in the area of the enemy defences 8252 and mopping up those defences within the inter-divisional boundaries. Should 160 Infantry Brigade meet with very heavy opposition 158 Infantry Brigade may pass through and capture the Stoppelberg features.

5. Grouping Infantry Brigades and elements 34 Armoured Brigade Group

	71 Infantry Bde	158 Infantry Bde	160 Infantry Bde
Under command	Coy 147 Fd Amb	Coy 202 Fd Amb	1 E Lan R Coy 212 Fd Amb
In Support RAC Tanks	147 RAC	147 RAC	9 R Tanks and A Sqn 147 RAC (+) for sp of 1E Lan R
Flails	W Dgns (less 1 Sqn)	1 sqn W Dgns (+)	1 Sqn W Dgns (+)
Crocs	½ Sqn 141 RAC	½ A Sqn 141 RAC (+)	½ A Sqn 141 RAC
ARE	1 ½ Tps 82 Aslt Sqn RE	1 ½ Tps 82 Aslt Sqn RE (+)	1 ½ Tps 82 Aslt Sqn RE
RA A/Tk:	279 A Tank Battery	Two tps 336 (SP) A Tank Battery	56 (SP) Cdn A Tank Battery
RE	244 Fwd Coy	555 Field Coy (Less 2 platoons)	282 Field Coy & 1 pl. 555 Field Coy
MG	A Coy 1 MANCH
Mor	D Coy 1 MANCH		D Coy 1 MANCH (+)
Med	147 Field Amb (less 1 Coy)	202 Field Amb (less 1 Coy)	212 Field Amb (less 1 Coy)
Assu	One Tentacle

6. Notes Elements 30 Armoured Brigade under command tank regimental Cos.

(+) = Taken over from 71 Infantry Brigade.

7. Tasks

(a) 71 Infantry Brigade with 147 RAC

71 Infantry Brigade group is advancing and securing the Brandenberg feature, exploiting to the line of the track running southwest from edge of the wood at 821530.

(b) 160 Infantry brigade with 9 R Tanks

(i) 160 Infantry Brigade group is moving in rear of 71 Infantry brigade Group, beginning to move on orders 53 (W) Division.

(ii) Once launched 160 Infantry Brigade Group is keeping in close contact with 71 Infantry Brigade Group, passing through 71 Brigade Group and breaking through the Siegfried Line in the area 8252.

(iii) One battalion (from 158 Brigade) and A Squadron 147 RAC are occupying a position in the area 825522 for right flank protection.

(iv) Having successfully broken through the enemy defences the Brigade is advancing and securing the Stoppelberg features.

8. 158 Infantry Brigade with 147 RAC

(a) 158 Infantry Brigade is at one hour’s notice from 081600 A.

(b) The Brigade Group is passing through 71 Infantry Brigade, mopping up within Division boundaries and occupying positions astride the enemy trench systems in the area 8252. The battalion temporarily under command 160 Infantry Brigade is reverting to 158 Infantry Brigade on the arrival of the Brigade in that area.

(c) Should 160 Infantry Brigade meet with very heavy opposition while breaking through the Siegfried Line defences, 158 Infantry Brigade may advance through 160 Infantry Brigade and secure the Stoppelberg features.

9. 34 Armoured Brigade

(a) 147 RAC in support 71 Infantry Brigade until Brandenberg feature has been secured when one squadron will go in support 160 Infantry Brigade for the support of the 158 Infantry brigade battalion under command 160 Infantry Brigade.

(b) 9 R Tanks in support 160 Infantry Brigade.

(c) 147 RAC in support 158 Infantry Brigade, joining that Brigade when it passes through 71 Infantry Brigade. The squadron of 147 RAC which moved in support 160 Infantry Brigade will remain with the 158 Infantry Brigade battalion, rejoining 147 RAC in support 158 Infantry Brigade.

10 Time Factor

(a) 71 Infantry Brigade Group is securing the line of the track running southwest from edge of wood at 821530 by 1600 hours D Day.

(b) 160 Infantry Brigade is securing the Stoppelberg feature by 0800 hrs

D + 1.

11. Concentrations

On completion of tasks all Brigade Groups are preparing to concentrate and move forward to carry out further operations.

12 R.A.

(a) Pre-Zero Bombardment

On D-Day 30 Corps Artillery is firing pre-zero bombardment on localities and enemy HQ (west of Reichswald), enemy batteries and movements from 0500-0920 hours (except between 0740 and 0750 hours).

(b) Barraage, Timed Concentrations and Pre-arranged Concentrations at call

Between 0920 – 1030 hours artillery preparation is being made for a barrage which will be fired by five forward regiments and four medium regiments on divisional front. The barrage has a depth of 500 yards and lifts 300 yards every 12 minutes; the first lift is at H Hour. It pauses between 1154 hours and 1227 hours and advances at the same rate to final line where it remains between 1315 and 1345 hours.

During this barrage, timed concentrations will be by pre-arranged concentrations at call.

(c) Allotment of FOOs

(i) 9 R Tanks two FOOS - 19 Cdn. Field Regiment (SP)

one FOO - 72 Med. Regiment

(ii) 147 RAC two FOOs - 19 Cdn Field Regiment (SP)

one FOO - 72 Med. Regiment

(d) Pilot Searchlights (SLs)

One sec 557 SL battery is providing “marker beacons” (flashing vertical beams) throughout the night D/D + 1 at 751545 (letter “H”) and 750577 (letter “O”).

13. Assault Regiment Royal Engineers (and Churchill bridge-layers)

(a) Two “Churchill” bridge-layers and fascine bridge-layers under command 147 RAC.

(b) Laying of assault bridges (each duplicated immediately alongside with fascine crossings suitable for light tracks and wheels) at approximate sites as follows:-

(i) Churchill bridge-layer 783535

Churchill bridge-layer 784539

(ii) SBG Assault bridge 786543

SBG Assault bridge 789544 (Not on main axis)

intercomMUnICATION

14. HQ Main HQ 30 Corps Hatert 679583

Main HQ 53 (W) Div. 717537

Main HQ 34 Armd. Brigade 700556

Tac HQ 34 Armd Brigade 752545

15. Wireless Wireless silence until 0700 hours D Day.

16. Liaison (a) Brigade LO to Main HQ 30 Corps.

(b) Brigade LO initially with 71 Infantry Brigade – later to 160 Infantry brigade.

17. H Hour and D Day 1030 hours 8 February

NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF OPERATIONS, 8 to 17 February

FINAL PREPARATIONS

A general thaw set in at the end of January, and the hard snow quickly disappeared to reveal extensive damage done to minor roads by the frost. When the Brigade moved to its assembly area south of Nijmegen on the night of 3/4 February, the tank column was routed on the main road via Nijmegen to avoid further damage to partially metalled roads. The move went exactly to time, and by first light all vehicles were as well camouflaged as netting and natural cover permitted. A total distance of 53 miles was covered by the column of 120 tanks in 9 hours.

The next few days were spent in tying up finally for the attack. Opportunity was taken to study the ground from the windmill at Groesbeek. From this vantage-point an excellent view of the enemy Forward Defence Localities and the western edge of the Reichswald could be obtained when visibility was good enough.

The fears for the effect of a thaw on the ‘going’, entertained in the earlier planning days, proved to be only too well founded. The weather had definitely broken and periodic rain made unmetalled roads almost impassable. The tank routes to the battle assembly area, previously improved by Canadian Engineers, worsened rapidly, and on D-1 the CRE of 53 Div, in response to an urgent request from Brigade, produced engineers and bulldozers to work on the worst places. Also on D-1 147 RAC sent three RHQ Churchills and one flail forward to prove the route. These tanks did valuable work in forcing fresh tracks through the forest. The route chosen for 9 RTR was in better shape, and a Churchill tank commander, sent with his tank to prove the route, reported it passable.

A Brigade co-ordinating conference, attended by the COs of 9 RTR, 147 RAC, and Westminster Dragoons, was held at 1730 hrs on 7 February. The Brigade Commander expressed his opinion that flails would be unable to operate over the ground conditions then obtaining, and repeated to 147 RAC that he was determined, if necessary, to expend a complete squadron before giving up the attempt to lead the infantry to the edge of the Reichswald. All preparations had been made.

D-DAY, 8 February

More than 1,000 guns taking part in the artillery preparation programme opened fire at 0500 hrs on 8 February. At 0630 147 RAC Group moved out of Malden and advanced to the Forward Assembly Area in the woods west of Groesbeek where squadrons married up with their infantry. By 0800 TAC 34 Armoured Brigade was established near TAC 71 Brigade on the high ground immediately west of Groesbeek. 9 RTR Group moved from Malden at 0815 to concentrate in the Forward Assembly Area at 7355 by 1030 hrs.

H hour

147 RAC

Capture of 71 Infantry Brigade first objective (line of houses north and south through 781544)

A Squadron – 4 RWF

A Squadron 147 RAC, co-operating with 4 RWF to capture the first objective had one squadron Flails under command. To assist in mopping up the line of houses along the Divisional axis as far as the objective, 4 RWF had under command one troop Flails and ½ squadron Crocs. The Squadron crossed the Start Line at 1010 hours and deployed for the attack. The leading troops moved close to the opening barrage line and halted, thus allowing 4 RWF to position themselves behind the tanks.

The advance began at 1030 hours but the ground was in a parlous state and “Flails” and “Crocs” could make no headway, the area of the Start Line was soon jammed with bogged vehicles. Ordinary Churchills however made steady, if slow, progress across the heavy fields. No opposition was met in the first 1,000 yards, but speculative Besa fire was freely used to the front and flanks. The first enemy were encountered at 775544 but they were quickly mopped up and 30 prisoners of war were taken.

All the flails were still bogged down near the Start Line but happily the defence overprints had grossly exaggerated the extent of the minefield and the tanks continued to advance. By 1155 hours, tanks and infantry, keeping well up to the barrage, were on the objective and another 30 to 40 prisoners of war had been taken.

Breaching of Anti-tank obstacle

B Squadron – 1 HLI C Squadron – 1 OXF BUCKS

As A Squadron and 4 RWF advanced to the first objective B and C Squadrons followed as closely as possible in order to make maximum use of the timed barrage. On the right B Squadron, co-operating with 1 HLI succeeded in getting all their tanks, including the two Churchill bridge-layers, to the start line at 78053. On the left, C Squadron, co-operating with 1 OXF BUCKS, moved up via the railway track but had considerable difficulty with wire.

The angle of the barrage across the obstacle permitted B Squadron to attack first and, meeting no mines, they quickly got a Churchill bridge-layer forward and established a crossing at 783535. Two troops of tanks went over at once and took up fire positions in the buildings at 786532, but the approach to the bridge worsened so quickly that the third troop was unable to cross. Some shelling and SA fire was experienced but the second bridge was also laid – unfortunately the ground at this point was too bad to permit its use. The ditch proved to be much narrower than it appeared on the air photos and certain places were found where it was possible for tanks to get across unaided, provided tanks did not attempt to move in the tracks of a previous tank. The remainder of the Squadron got across in this manner.

On the left C Squadron had to attack without flail support, relatively unimportant in view of the apparent absence of mines; and, much more serious, without their fascine AvsRE, all four having failed to get through to the Start Line. The Squadron Commander’s only hope therefore was to seize intact the bridge on the main axis, and this was accomplished by one company of infantry supported by one troop of tanks.

1 HLI and 1 OXF BUCKS having formed up east of the ditch were supported into the Forest by B and C Squadrons. Opposition was slight and objectives were taken by the infantry without great difficulty.

147 RAC less A Squadron, no longer required by 71 Infantry brigade, rallied in area Plak west of the Reichswald and restocked from Stuarts and the turretless Churchillls, and subsequently from sledges pulled up by tanks of 9 R Tanks.

Capture of Siegfried defence belt in the Reichswald

9 R Tanks

By 1540 hours 71 Infantry Brigade had reported the consolidation of their final objectives, the brandenberg features. During the morning and afternoon 9 R Tanks Group had remained in the forward assembly area but at 1645 hours C Squadron, followed by the remainder of the Group, moved forward to marry-up with 160 Infantry Brigade for the next phase of the operations. Occasional rain during the day had further worsened the ground and Lt.-Col. Veale had to walk ahead of his party to pick out the best “going”. Two tanks were put out of action by mines at 761547 and all the Stuart tanks were hopelessly bogged, as tank movement was stringently forbidden on the only road, and no flail could operate even if any could have been unbogged.

By 1815 hours C Squadron had entered the Forest and were moving up to their Start Line (track 818532 to 816526). Heavy shelling was encountered on two occasions but no casualties were sustained. The tanks avoided the tracks and broke their way through the trees, troops in line ahead and each troop leader preceding his tanks on foot. The move took a long time as it was now very dark, raining again, and frequent detours had to be made to avoid infantry who were digging in, but eventually the Squadron reached the Start Line and tied up with 6 RWF.

A Squadron 147 RAC, due to support E Lan R, were less successful – moving over the anti-tank ditch six tanks were bogged and had to be left. Owing to the tremendous traffic congestion on the one axis the infantry and tanks did not link up until 1915 hours. The Group then moved forward and the infantry passed into the wood but C Squadron were held up by the mass of vehicles jammed along the road and could not get into the forest here by any other route.

Meanwhile 1 E LAN R had reached the start line, with 6 RWF and C squadron 9 R Tanks ready on their left. It was apparent that A Squadron would be unable to get through to the Start Line to support the operation. So the attack went in at 2300 hours with only 6 RWF support by armour. C squadron advanced with all four troops in line, meeting little opposition on the right but mopping up some spandau teams on the left. Opposition was not great and the objectives were secured by 0005 hours. 9 R Tanks less C Squadron at this time moved forward to the Forest to join C Squadron.

General

The Divisional plan was behind schedule but this could not have been otherwise in view of the appalling conditions – in the circumstances the advance had progressed at a remarkable rate. Previous to the attack it was feared that the enemy may have divined our intentions and false-fronted us by pulling back to his second defence line, but his dispositions showed that this was not the case – 84 Infantry Division had been hit squarely in the localities anticipated. The enemy, stunned by the weight of the artillery bombardment to which he had been subjected, gave in quite easily when tanks and infantry appeared on the tail of the barrage. This day’s operations put 53 (W) Division across the open defended zone of 4,000 yards and into the Reichswald.

9 February

9 R Tanks

Through the Siegfried Forest Belt

RHQ, A and B Squadrons 9 R Tanks, having entered the Forest just after midnight, moved forward throughout the night. Progress was slow by reason of difficult conditions and traffic congestion, but at first light A Squadron and 4 WELCH passed through C Squadron. The group kept to the Northern edge of the Forest and met slight opposition only – by 0915 hours the objective at 8454 had been secured, an advance of some 2,000 yards.

Stoppelberg

B Squadron – 2 Mon

B Squadron, moving up with 2 MON to continue the attack, came under fire from two forward guns at 842544. These were engaged with 95mm at an approximate range of 2200 yards, hits were observed and the guns silenced.

This Squadron with infantry passed through A Squadron at 1015 hours, and, meeting no opposition, had secured the objective 8553 by 1100 hours.

C Squadron – 6 RWF

C Squadron had remained in their overnight position astride the Siegfried defences until 1200 hours when, with 6 RWF, they were relieved by 158 Infantry Brigade. They then moved forward along the routes forced through the trees by the preceding squadrons and crossed the Start Line (track 853544 to 851541) at 1200 hours. Opposition was slight and two hours later the objective, area 864543 to 865538 on the north-eastern edge of the Forest, had been captured and secured. Sorties were made into the thick plantations in front of the position and a total of 52 prisoners of war taken. Enemy transport and personnel in the area 8853 were engaged with good effect; this harassing of the enemy continued intermittently all day and four MGs at 870543, which were holding up elements of 15 (S) Division, were KO’d by an artillery concentration directed by C Squadron command.

147 RAC

Expansion from Siegfried Belt

A Squadron – 1 E LAN R

While 9 R Tanks were supporting 160 Infantry Brigade forward to the Stoppelberg feature, 147 RAC were assisting 158 Infantry brigade to expand and clean up the area of the Siegfried Belt. A Squadron, now reduced to 8 tanks, moved forward at first light and joined 1 E LAN R in the area 8151. A plan was made to clean up the general area 818518 – this was successful and resulted in the capture of 30 to 40 prisoners of war with an equivalent number killed. Many bazookas and four 10.5 cm guns were captured intact without a casualty to tanks.

C Squadron – 1/5 Welch

Throughout the morning C Squadron endeavoured to get into the forest north of the axis but the ground conditions had further deteriorated and despite extensive recce all attempts failed. At 1500 hours the Squadron entered the Forest via the axis and married up with 1/5 WELCH in area 834524. A successful attack on two enemy strongpoints was made without loss. Three 6-inch guns were destroyed and more than 70 prisoners of war taken.

B Squadron – 7 RWF

B Squadron collected itself, reorganised, repaired and as far as possible maintained its tanks until ordered forward at 1730 hours to support 7 RWF. This move, to an area near the road at 823526, was completed at 2200 hours for the loss of one tank bogged.

General

By evening a total of 2,580 prisoners of war had been taken on the “Veritable” front, and the ground conditions were still handicapping the advance more than the enemy. Movement on the divisonal axis was strictly controlled and it was necessary to close it completely from time to time in an effort to improve it. By evening 9 February, Brigade succeeded in establishing an AP and PP at Frasselt by running a column up the axis.

10 February

Road Cleves – Hekkens

Maintenance

The morning was well spent in getting “lame ducks” repaired as far as possible.

9 R Tanks

During the afternoon 160 Infantry Brigade was ordered to advance southward along the edge of the Forest in order to assist 43 Division in their advance southeast from Materborn 8853. Accordingly at 1800 hours A Squadron and 4 WELCH moved through the Stoppelberg position and by 2200 hours had secured a locality astride the main road Cleve – Hekkens in the area 8752.

147 RAC

At 1500 hours B Squadron advanced with 7 RWF and secured 8452 against opposition consisting of only a few spandau and bazooka positions.

General

The day was generally spent in expansion and consolidation within the divisional boundaries against light opposition, though 6 RWF were involved in fierce fighting which resulted in 20 enemy dead and 2 prisoners of war. A Brigade RASC column had succeeded in getting through to regimental areas and 9 R Tanks ferried the much needed POL round squadrons on RHQ tanks. 147 RAC were in a slightly better supply situation as they had been able to get some Stuart tanks forward and these had been kept busy ferrying supplies.

The advance continued on the Corps front throughout the day despite the enemy’s desperate efforts to stabilise his line by rushing up reinforcements. By evening 7 Para Division, a second regiment of 180 Division and elements of 6 Para, 15 PG and 116 Pz Division had been identified.

11 February

General

Owing to adjustments in the Corps plan 53 Division now had the task of advancing south-eastwards to clean up the Reichswald. The day saw impressive advances through the Forest, despite the stiffer resistance. One Squadron of 147 RAC fought forward more than 6 ½ miles. Almost every cross track in the Forest had its bazooka pits, although relatively few of the very large number of Panzerfaust found had been fired, for in most cases crews had not tarried long enough for even one shot.

147 RAC

A Squadron – 1 E LAN R

A Squadron 147 RAC and 1 E LAN R advanced at 0700 hours in slightly improved weather. Within half an hour two minefields had been struck, one was bypassed and the other was lifted by pioneers. There was little opposition, A KO’d 75mm anti-tank gun was found and some prisoners of war were taken at 854501. By 1500 hours the first objective, across the main road Cleve – Hekkens, had been secured and the squadron rallied in the area 850494 to re-organize. The advance was resumed along the same axis at 1430 hours. Enemy were met on the line of earthworks at 8648, one tank was KO’d by a bazooka and an anti-tank gun was destroyed after it had scored two hits on a troop leader’s tank. Thereafter the advance was slower and another tank was KO’d by a bazooka. By 1900 hours, however, the objective astride the main road at 889487 had been secured.

C Squadron – 1/5 WELCH

Meanwhile C Squadron advanced at 0900 hours and by 1015 hours had secured the road and track crossing at 869519, taking many prisoners of war.

B Squadron – 7 RWF

At 1200 hours B Squadron in support 7 rWF was ordered to advance along two parallel routes and consolidate in the area bounded by 872503 – 867504 – 864596 – 868495. The first opposition, in the form of a strongpoint of well-sited bunkers, trench systems, spandau and bazooka teams, was met at 870500. Two separate attacks failed to take this strongpoint and it was decided to make a full-scale attack at first light. The tanks and infantry leaguered a few hundred yards west of the strongpoint where they were heavily shelled and mortared throughout the night.

9 R Tanks

While 147 rAC was pushing through the heart of the Reichswald, 9 R Tanks was supporting 160 Infantry brigade down its eastern edge.

B Squadron – 2 Mon

As B Squadron and 2 MON passed their Start Line (road and track junction 874526) at 0900 hours they came under heavy mortar fire and soon afterwards MGs and bazookas were encountered. There were several skirmishes during the advance and some prisoners of war taken, but by 1000 hours the objective, area 878525, had been captured. A Jagdpanther, which opened fire and advanced towards the positions, was engaged by M10s and forced to retire.

C Squadron – 6 RWF

At 1100 hours C Squadron crossed the main road and destroyed some enemy MGs; by 1350 hours the tanks and infantry were firmly established in the area 877516.

A Squadron – 4 WELCH

At 1500 hours A Squadron and 4 WELCH passed between B and C Squadrons and occupied the farm at 885520 by 1640 hours. A Jagdpanther creeping about in the farmyard was KO’d by 75mm AP at a range of approximately 400 yards; two shots breaking the track and damaging the suspension. The crew baled out and sought refuge in the farm but were subsequently rounded up there.

General

Increased Enemy Aggressiveness

Bazooka Patrols by Night

During the night enemy patrols were active in C Squadron (9 R Tanks) area. A troop sergeant was shot through the head while on guard duty and his tank bazooka’d from a range of five yards; the bomb struck the front plate and did no more than gouge it. This incident is typical of the general stiffening of opposition and from now on the enemy tried to infiltrate whenever possible by day and night.

The Germans had blown several Rhine dykes, causing floods over a wide area. The Kranenburg road was by this time under water and it was no longer possible to get supplies forward to the AP and PP established at Frasselt. The division axis was still kept in a usable state only by continual and enormous energy and prisoner of war labour. Tanks were still forbidden the use of all roads so that the Stuarts of 9 RTR, endeavouring to get forward with the urgently required replenishments, were frozen in groesbeek where they had to remain until their unit was withdrawn from the Forest.

9 R Tanks were having considerable difficulty in maintaining communications and were in urgent need of an instrument mechanic. That it was necessary to obtain a written permit from Division to get him forward in a Jeep illustrates the stringency of road discipline.

Permission was obtained, however, to take essential supplies forward and at 2100 hours the DAA and QMG left Malden with a supply column with which he established a new AP and PP on the main road Cleve – Hekkens at 849495. This time the column went on 51 Division’s route south of the Forest as the 15 (S) Division axis, hitherto used to replenish the AP at Frasselt, had been flooded.

12 February

During the day the enemy counter-attacked all forward tanks and infantry. These attacks were repulsed with heavy losses in killed to the enemy. Further rain caused tracks in the Reichswald to deteriorate even more and in many places a Weasel was the only vehicle capable of moving.

147 RAC

B Squadron – 7 RWF

At first light the strongpoint that had resisted two attacks the previous day was assaulted again. The tanks took up fire positions and fired heavily on the position while a company of infantry attacked from the southwest. This was completely successful and several prisoners of war were taken.

The advance was continued at 1000 hours with objective of main road at 889490. As the line of trenches was crossed the leading tank struck a double box mine which pushed in the whole of the pannier by the gearbox lever. The tanks on this axis then left the track and resumed the advance through the trees. Several small skirmishes with enemy rearguards took place and the enemy made skillful use of SP guns in an effort to retain his hold on the southeast corner of the Reichswald. By 1700 hours, however, the objective had been secured and the squadron leaguered with the infantry in this area which was heavily shelled during the night.

C Squadron – 1/5 WELCH

At 1000 hours C Squadron and 1/5 WELCH advanced with the objective of securing the road Cleve – Hervorst. At 1200 hours elements of 7 Para Regiment put up very strong resistance from the area of the track triangle 873506.

A company/troop attack against this strongpoint was successful but the enemy launched an immediate counter-attack with a company supported by SP guns and our forces were compelled to withdraw with two tanks lost. It was decided to bypass this locality but again strong opposition was encountered from area of clearing 883505. Both leading company and troops had to beat off further determined counter-attacks and Squadron leaguered in this area.

A Squadron – 1 E LAN R

A Squadron had now only three battle-worthy tanks, and during the morning these supported a patrol sent forward by 1 E LAN R. Despite AP fire the patrol was accomplished without loss. Later in the day enemy efforts to infiltrate were successfully countered.

9 R Tanks

B Squadron – 2 MON

B Squadron and 2 MON resumed the advance by crossing the X-tracks at 891521 at 0730 hours. Heavy opposition was overcome and a further 30 prisoners of war were taken before the objective, 903519, was secured at 1130 hours. Major Reynell, the Squadron Commander, was fatally wounded during this advance. One troop was later sent to the edge of the wood at 910509, cleaning up some MGs and taking 7 prisoners of war en route. On reaching the objective a fierce action took place in complete darkness and pouring rain, ending in the capture of another 40 prisoners of war. This was a raid only, and the troop remained on the edge of the wood for one hour but returned to the squadron leaguer by 2100 hours, remaining there overnight.

A Squadron – 4 WELCH

In the meantime A Squadron and 4 WELCH had advanced at 1130 hours and by 1415 hours were established on the eastern edge of the forest in the area 910500. At 1500 hours there were signs of a counter-attack from the south-east and a party of 15 enemy who stumbled onto a troop, promptly surrendered. By 1515 hours the situation was well in hand and the squadron remained in the area.

Tank State

By night 12 february both regiments were very weak in tanks. Figures were:

9 R Tanks 14 battle-worthy with a further 8 capable of support to the infantry in the forest.

147 RAC 24 battle-worthy – of which several were capable of support to the infantry in the forest only.

The majority of tank casualties were caused by bogging and by conditions peculiar to forest fighting. A detailed state, together with notes on the causes, is given at Appendix C.

So far it had not been possible to get the fitters’ half-tracks forward and a number of tanks off the road needed minor repairs only. Lack of spare batteries and almost constant usage of wireless had thrown a heavy strain on the electrical systems.

General

During the day enemy opposition had increased sharply, particularly to the south of Cleve. The enemy encountered on the divisional front fought fiercely to retain their hold on the edge of the forest, doubtless to keep the road Cleve – Goch open.

The weather showed no sign of improving and the full weight of the divisional traffic, plus considerable traffic of other forms, afforded no opportunity to improve the tracks.

13 February

147 RAC

C Squadron – 1/5 WELCH

C Squadron and 1/5 WELCH advanced with the object of dominating the main road Cleve – Goch from the area 9049. One company/troop was held up by an enemy strongpoint on the road Cleve – Hervorst. The battalion and squadron commanders decided on a right flanking move and a company supported by a troop succeeded in establishing a position astride the main road at X-tracks 889499. This position was heavily counter-attacked and the tanks sustained slight damage from SP guns and bazookas; the position was held however,

It was then determined to try again further to the right as opposition appeared to be lighter on that flank and a further company and troop managed to get within 100 yards of the road at 888495. At 1400 hours 1/5 WELCH had established three company localities, each with tank support, on or near the road. At 1410 hours the enemy launched a strong counter-attack with infantry and SP guns on the northerly position and the infantry were compelled to withdraw to the area of the X-tracks 885504. Between 1430 hours and dusk the enemy launched repeated counter-attacks along the whole of the battalion position. At 1600 hours the Squadron was reinforced by A Squadron tanks that had been bogged on D Day. The tanks and infantry held on to their positions throughout the night.

B Squadron – 1 HLI

In the morning B Squadron tied up with 1 HLI with the object, like C Squadron, of clearing up to the eastern edge of the wood. Troops were in support of companies and each was given an objective, 890476 – 899478 – 902486. The squadron advanced at 1100 hours and the objectives were taken with little difficulty except that at 890476 which was found to be strongly held, but by dusk however this had been captured and secured.

A Squadron

A Squadron rallied back to RHQ, 854502, at approximately 1400 hours and no further support was given to 1 E LAN R.

9 R Tanks

By noon 71 Infantry Brigade had drawn level with 160 Infantry Brigade on their right and the area was solidly held.

RHQ moved to 877525 where it was joined at 1800 hours by B and C Squadrons. No squadron actions took place and opportunity to maintain and shave was eagerly taken.

Supplies

During the first few days shortage of washing water had been the greatest need of the tank crews – this, however, had been remedied when the AP and PP was established on the Cleve – Hekkens road, and since then all types of supplies had been readily available to regiments. To establish this water point it was necessary to scour the rear areas for water jerricans as two-wheel drive watertrucks were unable to get forward.

Fitters

Owing to the state of tanks in the units, special permission was obtained to move forward unit fitters and LADs during the night 13/14 February.

Corps Front

With the exception of one or two tracks, today saw the final clearance of the Reichswald after six days fighting.

Nothing happened during the day to change the general enemy situation on the “Veritable” front. Taking advantage of the Roer valley flooding, which secured him against a serious American thrust for at least a week, the enemy launched his two reserve armoured formations into a counter-attack for which they appeared unprepared, and which availed him no success.

14 February

9 R Tanks

A Squadron rallied with the remainder of the Regiment and at 1730 hours Regiment moved back to Groesbeek for rest and maintenance, leaving 147 RAC to support 53 (W) Division.

147 RAC

It now appeared that, for the moment, 53 Division had fulfilled its immediate task and that an opportunity for rest and maintenance would be afforded, so at first light B Squadron joined RHQ and A Squadron in the area 860588.

C Squadron – 1/5 WELCH

C Squadron and 1/5 WELCH, however, had still to clear to the Eastern edge of the Reichswald. Supported by a barrage from three field and three medium regiments, they attacked again at 1000 hours and captured the objective by 1115 hours. Over 100 prisoners of war were counted in this advance and two SP guns were destroyed (one Jagdpanther and one long 75mm Mk IV chassis).

General

The 53 (W) Division front was quiet during the day and the enemy showed no inclination to be offensive, though he reacted quickly enough to any movement on our part.

Corps Front

The main event of the day was an unsuccessful attack by 116 Pz Division and the arrival of the enemy right flank of the first elements of 346 Infantry division.

The tank attack apparently had big intentions for shortly after 0800 hours three groups, each approximately a battalion strong, were seen forming up for an attack on the low feature in Square 9350. The left and right hand attack never got properly started for the weather was good and they had the full benefit of the very considerable fighter-bomber effort available. The centre battalion, supported by approximately 20 AFVs suffered very heavily and although they captured the road junction 939503 they were later driven off.

15 February

C Squadron 147 RAC withdrew to rally in area of X-tracks 864513 and reverted to regimental control, but units of the Brigade took no part in the day’s operations.

Corps Front

On the Corps front the day saw a reappearance of enemy artillery on a big scale for the first time since its virtual annihilation on D Day. It is estimated that he had managed to muster about four divisional artilleries, a total of between 200 and 300 guns.

His infantry too showed renewed tenacity but despite this the advance continued at several chosen places along the front.

16 February

B Squadron Commander attended various “O” Groups during the day and night, the result of which was a plan to support 1 HLI in an attack from Wilhelmschof 913484 down to the escarpment south of Pfalzdorf the following day.

Corps front

The 16^th saw the advance continued along the whole corps front. The most notable advance was the cutting of the road Goch – Calcar at 945452, an effort which resulted in the capture of over 500 prisoners of war en route.

17 February

147 RAC

B Squadron – 1 HLI

147 RAC less B Squadron withdrew to Malden at first light.

At 1000 hours B Squadron, with under command ½ troop RAC (Crocs), joined up with 1 HLI at 883488. One troop of A Squadron had been placed under command of B Squadron. At 1200 hours tanks formed up with the infantry south of Wilhemschof and one company 1 HLI moved into Schotzenhof without opposition. The advance continued at 1345 hours and no opposition was met for the next 2000 yards but the trenches and defences in the area of the escarpment were found to be strongly defended. After an action lasting 2 ½ hours, and in which Crocs were used to clear houses, the objectives were taken at 1630 hours. In the action 150 prisoners of war were taken and many enemy killed for no loss to tanks or tank personnel. After this action, B Squadron, their company squadron reduced to seven battle-worthy tanks, were withdrawn to Malden where they rejoined the regiment.

Corps Front

The big success on the “Veritable” front was the advance to the escarpment overlooking Goch between the Asper bridge 8846 and the Goch – Calcar road 8344. The salient stretching northwards up the Goch – Cleve road as far as the Forest of Cleve, so bitterly contested by the enemy, had been liquidated. On the escarpment, morning found the enemy in a weakened state by reasons of his heavy losses the previous day. To gain time he sacrificed a battalion of 180 Division brought up overnight. This battalion suffered heavily but did give him a breathing space and resistance hardened later in the day.

SUMMARY

In ten days fighting 9 R Tanks and 147 RAC

co-operated with 53 (W) Division in clearing some

Seven-eights of the Reichswald

1. The numerous Brigade conferences held in the planning stage at Eindhoven were amply justified in the event. For instance, if routes to the assembly area had not been prepared as insurance against a thaw, it is likely that the majority of tanks would have failed even to reach the Start Line. In particular, had not provision for maintenance been made by using sledges, Stuarts, and turretless Churchills, it is certain that Regiments could not have been replenished in the first 36 hours of the battle. These are only two examples of the way in which the time and facilities available for planning were of benefit in practice.

2. The ability of the Churchill tank to give close support to infantry through forests of the Reichswald type, both by day and night, was proven. It is believed that no other Allied tank now in service could have done as well, or even have reached the Forest over the same country.

3. Personnel casualties were low, but it was found that this type of fighting, with necessity for constant vigilance by every man, imposed a severe strain on tank crews. This was especially the case with squadron and regimental commanders whose nights were normally spent in visiting their commands or attending “O” Groups.

4. Although few tank casualties were caused by enemy action Regiments were, at times, sadly reduced in tank strength. In view of the severe weather and ground conditions it was inevitable that many tanks should become, at least temporarily, not battle-worthy. While tank casualties were undoubtedly considerable, they were expected, and the success obtained was presumably worth the cost in loss of, and damage to, equipment. Many tanks back-loaded for complete overhaul and rebuilding were already old and due for back-loading in the near future in any case.

REPORT by 9 rtr: ASPECTS OF CLOSE SUPPORT TO INFANTRY

IN FOREST FIGHTING

After the actions in the Reichswald 34 Armoured Brigade Commander asked 9 RTR to prepare a report on the experiences they had had and the lessons they had learnt during those actions. This report, a summary of which is reproduced below, was used as the basis for a Brigade Conference on the matter of forest fighting.

General

1. An operation fought by tanks and infantry in close co-operation in forest country should not be looked upon as an entirely different type of warfare to an operation fought in normal European country.

The same principles and rules apply, though they must, in many cases, be adapted to suit the unusual conditions of limited visibility and restricted manoeuvre. These two factors, as well as imposing many restrictions and difficulties on the actual fighting troops, make it extremely difficult for a commander to influence the battle, once he has launched his troops into an attack.

Training

2. For an operation in this type of country to be successfully conducted, it is imperative that co-operative training in forest country be carried out by the troops taking part. This Regiment had approximately one week’s training in forest country prior to the action in the Reichswald. This was the absolute minimum required, and when possible a period of a fortnight should be made available.

Types of Forest

3. This Regiment has now fought in woods of many varieties. As a result of this experience it is considered that it is practicable for tanks to support infantry in forests where the trees are more than 12 feet high and 3 feet apart. It is not practicable, however, for tanks to support infantry in young plantations where visibility is nil. In such plantations it is impossible for tanks to keep touch with the infantry, except in the rides, and tanks are unable to defend themselves against bazooka teams.

4. A coniferous forest presents less difficulty to the passage of tanks than does a deciduous forest. A Churchill tank will knock down a coniferous tree of 2 feet diameter, and a “Honey” a tree of 1 foot diameter. The tree is normally broken off at the base, though sometimes, and more particularly by “Honeys” it is uprooted. The reason for this is that the “Honey” tank tends to ride up the tree before pushing it over, while the “Churchill” with a flat forward plate produces a more horizontal push. A deciduous tree is invariably uprooted, and the type of soil will have considerable effect on the size of the tree that can be pushed over. In the Reichswald it was found that a Churchill tank would push over a beech tree of 9 inches diameter but failed to push over a tree of 1 foot diameter.

Crashing through trees at high speed is not feasible, as the shock of the impact breaks off the tops of the trees which fall on the commander’s head.

Co-operation with Infantry

5. In view of the blindness of tanks in forests, it is essential that in all advances, both by day and night, deployed infantry should precede the tanks, irrespective of whether the tanks are advancing down the rides or through the forest. In order to avoid falling trees hitting the infantry, they must be approximately 30 yards ahead of the tanks. To ensure this, advances at night must be by bounds and movement light must be used. The infantry must carry some easily seen mark on their backs, and infantry and tank commanders must be close together. In one case, infantry carrying white mugs on their backs advanced 80 yards at a time, signalling back with red lights to the tanks behind them each time they halted. This system worked satisfactorily. Flank as well as frontal protection must be provided.

6. At night great difficulty was experienced by troop commanders in recognising the company which they were supporting. It is recommended that each company should wear some distinguishing mark, which would render them easily recognisable.

Tank Formations

7. The value of tanks in forest country is more moral than material. It is, therefore, essential that the element of surprise should be maintained as long as possible. To do this, formations and tactics must be varied as much as conditions allow, always remembering that close contact with the infantry must be maintained and that tanks must be in visual contact. As a generalisation it is reasonable to say that at night tanks within a troop should move in line ahead in close forest, and can only deploy in fairly open forest in daylight. Squadrons have, however, advanced successfully four troops up through the forest at night.

The following formations in the attack were adopted and proved satisfactory by one squadron:-

(a) Four troops up; tanks in line ahead, advanced through the trees

(b) A track used as a Centre Line with one troop deployed on either side. Two other troops followed after 10 minutes in same formation on a parallel ride. Deployment only possible in daylight.

(c) Two troops up; deployed in the forest, using two tracks as Centre Lines; one troop following close behind and another troop in reserve. Deployment only possible in daylight.

8. Although it is possible for tanks to deploy into and move through a forest it must be remembered that moving through this type of country imposes very severe strain on tanks and therefore, if contact is unlikely, tanks should move along tracks and rides, always ensuring that an infantry screen to front and flanks is maintained, and that on straight rides crests and crossings are carefully reconnoitred before being crossed.

Communications & Control

9. (a) The squadron commander should travel well up behind his leading troops.

(b) The Recce Officer must travel in a Churchill tank.

(c) The No. 19 set gives adequate communications within the Regiment.

(d) Close liaison between flanking sub-units, units etc. must be maintained,

or there is great danger of firing into one’s own troops.

Artillery

10. (a) SP Anti-tank artillery must be maintained well forward and be able to get

into position quickly on an objective being gained.

(b) An FOO travelling with squadrons is most valuable and should always be

provided when possible.

Night Leaguers

11. It is essential that as soon as an objective has been reached at night, tanks be withdrawn at least 20 yards from the foremost infantry positions and placed where they are adequately protected by the infantry. If possible it is highly desirable than tanks should be rallied by squadrons near the infantry battalion HQ (one squadron of tanks in support of an infantry battalion).

The tanks must also have their own guards, armed with Sten guns at the ready. No movement of any kind within company positions should be allowed, and any person walking about must be shot without being challenged. In the Reichswald a German was able to penetrate a company position, and, on being challenged by a tank commander from his turret, shot him through the head. On another occasion a tank was hit by a bazooka at night while supposedly protected by the infantry dispositions.

Firing

12. During the night advances Besas were loaded with belts cleared of tracer and fired into the tops of the trees above the heads of the advancing infantry. It is considered that this has a useful horrific value.

During the attack it is of definite value to maintain Besa fire into the forest even when no more enemy are visible as it is found that those moving back out of sight become casualties.

13. In order to avoid inflicting casualties on one’s own infantry, HE should normally be fired only in clearings.

14. The consumption of Besa ammunition is much in excess of all other types.

Recovery

15. ARVs should travel where they can give early assistance to bogged tanks. A liberal support of bulldozers well forward is most essential to clear trees off tracks and enable essential wheeled vehicles to go forward.

Supplies

16. Getting supplies forward presented great difficulty. The following methods were tried:-

(a) Churchills towing sledges.

Sledges were too heavy to tow over heavy ground. Tanks could only tow in bottom gear with difficulty and eventually got bogged, but the sledges with wheels were much more satisfactory.

(b) RHQ tanks, carrying supplies forward. A certain but slow and laborious method. As these tanks obviously cannot be made available for this duty for long periods, it can only be looked upon as an emergency measure.

(c) Using two RHQ tanks (2IC and HQ Troop Commander’s tanks) to tow forward two 3-tonners each. This is a feasible method and the majority of the supplies were taken forward in the Reichswald by this method.

(d) Recce troop tanks used to carry supplies forward. This is the quickest and most efficient method, but special racks should be fitted to the tanks to increase their carrying capacity. In the Reichswald operation Recce Troop were unfortunately frozen by Traffic Control authorities while employed on this duty.

MINUTES: 34 ARMOURED BRIGADE CONFERENCE

held at HQ 147 RAC, 1800 hours 4 March 1945

A conference was held to discuss various aspects of Forest Fighting as experienced in the Reichswald.

Present

1. Brigade HQ 147 RAC

Brig W.S. Clarke CBE, DSO Lt-Col W.B. Blain

Maj. R.C. Seed, MC Maj. G.M. Hawtrey

Maj. P.E.G. Lobb

9 R Tanks Maj. J.P. Medd

Maj. R. grantham MC

Lt.-Col P.N. Veale MC Capt. N.G. Kingsford

Maj. M.G. Mockford Lt. D. Kayall

Maj. S.B. Trezise

Maj. R.E. Holden, MC

Capt. R.E. Long

2. Brig. Clarke used the report by 9 R Tanks as a basis for discussion and the comments below refer to the equivalent headings of that report.

General

3. Agreed that once the plan had been made and the battle joined a commander could only influence the battle by committing his reserve.

Training

4. The real benefit of infantry/tank training lies in getting to know the infantry and the value of this cannot be over-emphasised. Many attacks were laid on at short notice. On one occasion a successful battalion/squadron attack was laid on in 5 minutes and it is certain that this could not have been done without previous training and practice.

5. It was agreed that infantry should generally lead through the forest but that tanks should lead across the several large clearings. This was done and it was most noticeable that infantry who had trained with tanks were happy to keep ahead throughout the fighting, while those who had not trained did not evince the same confidence.

6. It was pointed out that when the original plan envisaged a regiment changing from one brigade to another during an operation the standard of training with either would be considerably lowered. At one time it was proposed that should 160 Infantry Brigade and 9 r Tanks suffer heavy losses and be unable to make headway through the Siegfried belt with their night attack, 158 Infantry Brigade and 147 RAC would take over the attack the following morning. It was decided, however, that it would be far easier if 9 R Tanks continued the attack, and had it been necessary 9 R Tanks would have supported 158 Infantry Brigade instead of 147 RAC.

If a Regiment is changed from one command to another without previous warning it is desirable that 24 hours should be available for planning and liaison before support is needed.

Types of Forest

7. The detail given in 9 R Tanks report was confirmed. It was stated that danger to the tank commander was normally caused by the air louvres pulling trees forward onto his head. On occasions the air louvre cover was thrown forward by the tree, once hitting a tank commander severely in the back.

8. More recent experiences in the Broedersbosch, south of Gennep, were quoted to illustrate the undesirability of using tanks to support infantry in dense plantations where the infantry cannot see to protect the tanks against bazooka teams. In the Broedersbosch it was found impossible for even troop leaders to retain control of their troops and co-operation with the infantry was out of the question.

Co-operation with Infantry

9. Agreed except that tanks normally led across clearings.

10. The moving light was voted excellent and even inside the forest mess tins and mugs, carried by the infantry were easily distinguishable.

11. As protection against bazookas infantry must form a screen at least 10 yards to each flank.

Communications and Control

12. (a), (b) and (c) agreed.

(d) The danger of engaging flanking units can be lessened by constant

passage of information back to regiment and brigade; in this connection

report lines and code names are of great assistance.

Artillery

13. The FOOs allotted were frequently used to bring down fire on enemy SPs and infantry positions inside the forest. On several occasions too when tanks were operating near the northern edge of the forest they fired on targets on the 15 (S) Divisional front.

14. It was generally felt that the barrages were too accurate and that the Boche could confidently estimate the period he could man his guns with safety. It was recommended that one or two roving guns should fire in each barrage line.

Night Leaguers

15. In view of the cover and opportunities afforded to patrols by forests it is essential that tanks rally within the infantry positions. One squadron leader always ensured that each of his troops was safely in a secure position.

When operations with infantry with whom previous training has not been carried out it is normally necessary to leave tanks well forward, but when adequate training has been done, the forward infantry, knowing that the tanks are ready to support if required, are happy to see them rally further back near battalion HQ.

16. It was emphasized that leaguer discipline must be exceptionally strict and the normal challenge “Halt, who goes there?” should never be used as it begs for a bullet from enemy patrols.

Firing

17. When trees make it inadvisable to fire HE for fear of casualties to one’s own infantry, the firing of AP is most disheartening to the enemy and encourages our infantry.

Supplies

18. The wheeled sledges were more satisfactory because the wheels destroyed the suction underneath the sledges. It was confirmed, however, that sledges are not a tank requirement, even given better ground conditions.

19. Gutted carriers were not available for the operation but have been issued since and regiments were unanimous in their approval. The anchorages of the two bars are not strong enough in the present issue, however, and the rivets tore out easily. Tow chains have been fitted on those that have broken in this manner and are adequate, but stronger attachments would be more satisfactory.

20. 147 Regiment’s turretless Churchills were great value. Units would like to have two per squadron but would not be prepared to provide those from their own holding of gun tanks. Stowage of petrol is not satisfactory and they would be used solely for carriage of ammunition. Their value would not lie alone in forest fighting for they would be of great benefit for all operations where the ground conditions were difficult or where the supply routes were inadequate.

21. It was agreed that the supply problem was aggravated by the unusual clay sub-soil found in the Reichswald. The weather obtaining at the time succeeded in making the worst of the ground. In subsequent operations in the Broedersbosch the ground was sandy and therefore did not cause the same difficulty.

22. Stuart tanks can each carry 40 tins petrol; for porterage purposes it is an advantage to have turrets on as the petrol tins can then be firmly secured to their outer walls.

23. It was unanimously agreed that regimental “A” echelons must be brigaded when supply is dependent on controlled routes.

It was stated that the supply dump established in the forest was of great value and it was suggested that rations should also be delivered there. Regiments would prefer to draw all supplies from such a dump rather than have “A” echelons up. It would further assist regiments if the division of rations into prescribed portions could be less meticulous in such circumstances; issue would have been easier if items had not been divided so carefully to individual ones.

The following additional points were made

Information for Planning

24. Comment was made on the paucity of information on the Reichswald during the planning stage. The air cover was first-class but little information was forthcoming on enemy defences – in the event no concrete pillboxes or ”Dragons teeth” were met.

Bridge-layers and Fascines

25. Agreed that Churchill bridge-layers were preferred to fascine tanks. The bridge-layer was obviously more confident under fire and, with the exception of the first obstacle, all ditches were so deep as to require three fascines at the same place.

Pilot SLs

26. The pilot lights provided were not a success as their pencil beam could not be seen against the background of diffused moving light.

Direction was kept by following the infantry who used hand compasses. Tank commanders know their location at all times and in future would be quite happy to be guided by the infantry, especially if aided at night by coloured torches.

Bazookas

27. Speculative fire helped enormously to prevent bazooka casualties. It was decided that the bazooka is not a good or accurate weapon in the hands of poor quality troops but that it is very dangerous when handled by paratroopers who are prepared to hide in foxholes until the tank is well within range.

Crocodiles

28. It was stated that even had ground conditions permitted the use of Crocodiles in the forest they would not have been able to do anything more than the gun tanks towards the reduction of several strong-points encountered.

Special vehicles

29. (a) Weasels

It was recommended that Weasels on the basis of one per squadron and one for RHQ should be made available for all similar operations. They would have been invaluable for facilitating attendance at the frequent “O” groups held. Very often a Churchill tank was the only other means of getting from A to B and on one occasion at 0200 hours Lt-Col Blain had to use his commander’s tank to get to a brigade conference.

(b) ACV half-track

This operation showed again the necessity for a well lighted vehicle with enough room to hold “O” groups and the provision of a half-track for this purpose was strongly advocated.

Appendix A: Topographical report – Reichswald

Sources: 2 Canadian Corps Intelligence Summary No. 60

43 Division Intelligence Summary (Reichswald)

3 British Division Intelligence Report on Reichswald.

General:

1. The Reichswald is 9 miles long from east to west and 5 miles from north to south at its widest point. It is the main physical feature on this part of the country.

Dominating ground

2. The eastern half is about 100 feet above sea level and forms a fairly flat plateau; in the western portion a ridge some 200-250 feet above sea level runs northwest from the western tip of the forest (7750) to 8053, then turns southeast to 8251 and northwest again to Stoppelberg 8553 which is 300 feet above seal level and the highest point.

3. This ridge rising as it does some 150 to 200 feet above the surrounding country commands the area.

Timber

4. Forest is principally pine but there are areas of oak and beech, especially along the high ground running parallel to the northwest end and through its centre from about 8250 to 8849.

5. In general, growth is close throughout the forest. Patrols have reported pine trees at 780522 about 4 inches to 8 inches thick and 3 feet to 7 feet apart. There is little undergrowth and the lower branches of trees are 4 ft – 8 ft from the ground at this part.

6. A woodsman who knows the forest well has reported that a forest fire in 1941 did not spread far. It is suggested that any artificial fire lit by us would probably spread among the younger, close growing pine trees, and that the rides between forest blocks would prevent wide-spread burning.

Going

7. The forest is methodically divided up by rides into blocks measuring 800 yards by 400 yards. Those rides are normally used for hauling timber, but are generally only about 8 feet wide, and unmetalled. They become muddy in wet weather.

8. In general the ground in the forest is limestone and is stony. It is not known whether draining ditches run along the edge of the rides.

9. Because of the closeness of the trees in the wooded parts proper, vehicle movement is impossible. In some of the cleared areas, the stumps remaining constitute an obstacle to all vehicles.

10. Three good roads fit for two-way traffic pass through the forest from north to south but not from west to east. The two rides running southeast from 782524 and 773517 have metalled surfaces and are wide enough for one-way traffic. However, they are narrow and probably unfit for traffic shortly after crossing the centre one of the three north-south roads, though it would be possible to turn north and take one of the next three rides south-east.

11. The road from 770518 eastwards is reported by three sources to have been put in order and extensively used by the Germans as a through route. A second road recently metalled by the enemy runs from Wolfsberg 8454 southwards.

Approaches from northwest

12. Just to the north and west of the forest is a strip of ground made up of open arable fields, with hedges and trees except immediately around the many houses.

13. While there are certain ditches in this area, it is thought that none of them constitute an anti-tank obstacle which could NOT be quickly bulldozed over.

14. One soft patch is reported at 778524, otherwise going is good.

15. Keekberg hills from 7451 – 7650 overlook northwest approaches and give excellent cover for anti-tank guns.

16. The following are principal obstacles to movement in this area:-

(a) From 790550 northeast to the main road is a patch of poorly drained pastures which is liable to become waterlogged.

(b) The Leigraaf stream which flows from Bruuk 7752 to Kranenburg 8056 is an anti-tank obstacle and is also lined with water meadows. These are narrowest just north of Grosse – Drull 799549.

(c) The road from 817546 south to the forest is a partial obstacle as it is lined almost continually by houses and gardens.

(d) A tank ditch from 827533 north to the marsh. This is sited on the eastern slope of a ridge approximately 100 feet high.

(e) In wet weather the low lying ground along the stream from 835533 north to 827553 may be an effective anti-tank obstacle. The easiest crossing place would probably be at 829547.

(f) Chain of woods between the northern extremity of the Reichwald and Donsbruggen 8657. Movement is limited to rides and the gap of 858557.

Approaches from the south

17. South of the forest there is another strip of open arable country similar though slightly wider than the strip to the north. Principal obstacles in this area:-

(a) Marshy ground along the south edge of the forest from 7650 to 7950.

(b) Drainage ditch 12 feet wide from 784503 south to 773477.

(c) Anti-tank ditches from 795472 to 801467 and from the forest at 828485 to the River Niers at 843457.

(d) The River Niers which is canalised and is mostly 50 feet wide at water level.

APPENDIX B1: 147 REGIMENT RAC OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 1 FOR SUPPORT OF 71 INFANTRY BRIGADE

(Confirmatory notes on orders by CO, 147 RAC, 31 JAN 1945)

Ref Maps: 1/25,000: 12 NW/3, 12 NW/6, 4204/1

INTENTION

1. To put 71 Infantry Brigade into forward edge of wood (intermediate objective) and support them in their advance to Brandenberg features.

Method

2. Outline Plan

(a) Phase I A Squadron advances to first objective

(b) Phase II Breaching operations over anti-tank ditch and passage of squadrons through

(c) Phase III Covering infantry into wood (intermediate objective) and subsequent support by B and C Squadrons of their respective battalions.

3. Grouping

(a) A Squadron, with in support:- 4 RWF and one squadron W Dgns.

(b) B Squadron

HLI

(c) C Squadron

Oxford Bucks

4. Forming Up Point

Woods West of Groesbeek

5. Start Line

Road north and south through Groesbeek from railway crossing 756549 to Orchard south of Windmill 756543.

6. Phase I

(a) A Squadron will advance on two routes, with one troop W Dgns on each route.

(b) HQ A Squadron will move on southern route.

(c) HQ W Dgns and other two troops will move on southern route.

(d) On arrival at first objective, A Squadron will move into fire positions.

Particular attention will be paid to flank protection. They will be responsible for north flank protection until 15 (S) Division forms up on north flank.

7. Phase II

(a) Four breaches will be made in anti-tank ditch, operating under control CO W Dgns.

(b) On arrival at ditch C Squadron W Dgns pass out support A Squadron 147 RAC to B Squadron 147 RAC, on arrival of the latter.

(c) B Squadron W Dgns less one troop in support C Squadron 147 RAC start breaching operating as soon as artillery programme permits.

APPENDIX B2: 9 RTR ORDERS FOR SUPPORT OF

160 INFANTRY BRIGADE

INTENTION

1. 9 R Tanks will support 160 Infantry Brigade Group in seizing and holding area X-Tracks 862545 – Pt. 81.5 864537 – X-tracks 859533 – X-tracks 843539 – track junction 851544.

Method

2. General

160 Infantry Brigade Group is advancing behind 71 Infantry Brigade Group and is then passing through and attacking in four phases. Phase 1 to break through the trench system astride the 83 Northing; Phases 2, 3 and 4 will be successive penetrations.

3. Grouping and Assembly

(a) Phase 1

6 RWF (plus 1½ platoons 282 Field Company RE, detachment 212 Field Ambulance, one D7 bulldozer) with in support C Squadron (with under command one troop Crocs, four AVsRE)

(b) Phase 2

4 WELCH (plus one troop 56 (Canadian) Anti-tank battery, one platoon 282 Field Company, detachment 212 Field Ambulance) with in support A Squadron (with under command one troop Crocs, four AVsRE).

(c) Phase 3

2 MON (plus 56 (Canadian) Anti-tank battery less one troop, ½ platoon 282 Field Company RE, detachment 212 Field Ambulance), with in support B Squadron (with under command one troop Crocs, two AVsRE).

(d) Phase 4

6 RWF (plus ½ platoon 282 Field Company RE, detachment 212 Field Ambulance with in support C Squadron (with under command one troop Crocs, four AVsRE)

4. Phase 1

(a) Forming Up Point North of road and track junction 822528

(b) Objective Track junction 833525 – 834531 – 832531

(c) Start Line Track from road and track junction 819531 –track junction 814524.

(d) Axis Parallel to north edge of the forest.

(e) Method of Advance All troops UP with troops in line ahead

(f) Action on Objective Support infantry in consolidation of bridgehead across anti-tank ditches.

5. Phase 2

(a) Task A Squadron will support 4 WELCH group in seizing track junction 851544 – X-tracks 851540 – 848536 – track junction 844535.

(b) Start Line Track from X-tracks 835527 to X-tracks 832521.

(c) Axis Parallel to northern edge of forest

(d) Method of Advance All troops UP with troops in line ahead

(e) Action on Objective Support infantry in consolidation and cover approaches from northwest

6. Phase 3

(a) Task B Squadron will support 2 MON Group in advance 500 yards behind 4 WELCH Group and in passing through and seizing area of clearings 855536 – 857533 – 853534.

(b) Start Line Line of track 853544 – 849537

(c) Axis Track junction 849537 – track junction 859533.

(d) Method of Advance All troops UP with troops in line ahead

(e) Action on Objective Support infantry in consolidation and block track approaches from the south

7. Phase 4

(a) Task C Squadron will support 6 RWF Group to seize area X-tracks 861544 – 864543 – Pt. 81.5 864538 – X-tracks 862536 – 858542.

(b) Start Line Track 853544 to 851541.

(c) Axis Track 850540 – 864543.

(d) Method of advance All troops UP with troops in line ahead

(e) Action on objective To remain in support infantry with special ref to open east flank

8. Timings

According to battle developments.

APPENDIX C: 9 R TANKS AND 147 RAC

Claims and Vehicle & Personnel Casualties

8 February – 17 February

Claims

1. The claims given below refer only to AFVs and guns and includes neither PW, bazookas nor MGs.

(a) Destroyed Captured Intact

9 R Tanks 1 Jagdpanther

8 x 105mm guns

(b) 147 RAC 1 Jagdpanther 4 x 105mm guns

1 Long 75mm on Mk IV chassis

3 x 6-in guns

3 x 75mm Anti-tank guns

(c) The Brigade claim therefore is:-

3 SP guns

12 x 105mm guns

3 x 6-in guns

3 x 75mm anti-tank guns

Tank Casualties, own troops

2. (a) By Enemy Action By Other Causes

Mines 5 Turret Segments 13

HE 5 Mech. Failure 20

Bazookas 3 Clutches

AP 2 (total failure) 3

__ Bogged 32

15 68

i.e. A total casualty for two regiments of – 83

Note: It is estimated that only 7% of the tanks in the forest were bogged at any one time.

(b) It will be seen that, although casualties through enemy action were low, the overall wastage was extremely high. This was due in part to the absence of fitters but chiefly by reason of the abnormal ground and weather conditions and the rough usage unavoidable in forest fighting, especially by night.

3. Main Concerns

(a) Turret Segments

There were two reasons for the damage to segments. These were:-

(i) Turret or gun being struck by trees. While every care was taken by tank commanders in this respect it was impossible, when fighting, to avoid it at all times.

(ii) Mud, undergrowth and small branches packing between skid rails and lifting the track to a point where the turret is heaved from its ring. Despite mud ploughs and stripper bars this happens in certain conditions of going and the result is exactly similar to ice trouble already well known.

(b) Mechanical failure

Many of the tanks that failed mechanically were very old and were in any case due to be back-loaded for rework. During the period under review the tank crews had neither time nor the facilities to carry out the constant maintenance required by these old tanks. It is considered unnecessary to enumerate the various causes of failure.

(c) Clutches

The clay sub-soil, sometimes under water, together with the general forest conditions, put a severe strain on clutches. Attempts to get forward when bogged were perhaps the greatest single factor causing failure. While 3 was the number of total failures a great many more gave considerable trouble.

(d) Bogging

This was inevitable and it is considered that only a Churchill tank could have operated over the ground encountered in certain places during the advance. The prohibition of the axis to all tanks made difficult the recovery of tanks bogged – eventually all but two, which required workshop assistance, were recovered by units.

(e) Electrical Systems

Complete failure of the system was prevalent in tanks with damaged turrets. The connections in the junction box were broken by the wrench as the turret was lifted by packed mud.

Personnel Casualties

4. Killed Wounded

(a) 9 R Tanks Officers 1 0

OR 1 5

(b) 147 RAC Officers 0 5

OR 1 15

(c) Total Bde Officers 1 5

OR 2 20