CHAPTER 10: FIGHTING IN THE FORESTS

The Broad Picture

Before Hitler pushed into the Ardennes there had been some indecision at Allied HQ as to the best strategy to adopt to defeat Germany. However, it was clear even at the end of November 1944 that the allies would have to close up to the Rhine prior to crossing it and advancing on the Ruhr. This operation had been code-named "Veritable", and was re-activated as soon as it was clear that the battle of the Ardennes was over.

This time it formed part of a broader strategy, which was spelled out in the plan prepared by Eisenhower on 30 January 1945. He stated:

"My plan is:

(a) To carry out a series of operations north of the Moselle with a view to destroying the enemy and closing to the Rhine north of Düsseldorf.

(b) To direct our efforts to eliminating other enemy forces west of the Rhine which still constitute an obstacle or potential threat to our subsequent Rhine crossing operations.

(c) To seize bridgeheads over the Rhine in the north and the south.

(d) To deploy east of the Rhine and north of the Ruhr the maximum number of divisions that can be maintained (estimated at 35). The initial task of this force will be to deny to the enemy the industries of the Ruhr.

(e) To deploy east of the Rhine, on the axis Frankfurt-Kassel, such forces as may be available after providing 35 divisions for the north and essential security elsewhere. The task of this force will be to draw enemy forces away from the north by capturing Frankfurt and advancing on Kassel".

The task outlined in paragraph (a) was to be carried out by 21 Army Group, using appropriate formations of the 1st Canadian, 2nd British, and 9th US Armies. The plan for this task was for a two-pronged attack: the northern prong would consist of XXX Corps under command 1 Canadian Army, and the southern prong would consist of formations of 9 US Army, attacking across the River Roer slightly later than the XXX Corps attack. The British 2nd Army was to hold the line of the River Maas from Cuyk to Roermond.

In the initial stages of its attack XXX Corps comprised the following formations:

• Guards Armoured Division

• 15, 43, 51, 53, 2 Canadian and 3 Canadian Infantry Divisions

• 6 Guards, 8, and 34 Armoured Brigades

• 3, 4, 5, 9 and 2 Canadian AGRA's (Army Groups Royal Artillery)

• Support formations including: 2 Searchlight batteries, 11 Regiments of 79 Armoured Division (specialized armour), 2 Assault Regiments Royal Engineers. The total strength of the Corps was just over 200,000 all ranks.

The XXX Corps plan of attack was to have five divisions, up and two in reserve. The line-up of the assault divisions, and their initial objectives, were:



Various plans were made for exploitation after the capture of the initial objectives, both for the assault and for the follow-up formations. The execution of these plans would be dependent on enemy reaction, weather, and casualties to the allied units. The units of 34 Armoured Brigade were allocated as follows: 9 RTR and 147 RAC to 53 Division; 107 RAC to 51 Highland Division.

10.1 The Reichswald

Training with 53 Division

The 9th fought with 53 Division throughout the Reichswald Battle, and trained with it beforehand. This section describes some of the training and other preparations that were made, but it is helpful before starting to know the order of battle of 53 Division and its tank support. The General Officer Commanding 53 Division was Major-General Ross. The division consisted of three brigades. The list below shows those brigades, their constituent units, and the initial attachment of tank units.




Supporting Tanks

71 Infantry Brigade 147 RAC

4 Bn Royal Welch Fusilliers 4 RWF

1 Bn Ox and Bucks Light Infantry 1 OBLI

1 Bn Highland Light Infantry 1 HLI

158 (Royal Welch) Infantry Brigade

7 Bn The Royal Welch Fusiliers 7 RWF

1 Bn The East Lancashire Regiment 1 E LAN R

1/5 Bn The Welch Regiment 1/5 WELCH

160 (South Wales) Infantry Brigade 9 RTR

6 Bn The Royal Welch Fusiliers 6 RWF C Sqn

4 Bn The Welch Regiment 4 WELCH A Sqn

2 Bn The Monmouthshire Regiment 2 MONS B Sqn

Machine Gun Battalion

1 Bn the Manchester Regiment 1 MANCH

General Ross decided that to fulfil the Corps plan, i.e. to traverse the whole length of the northern edge of the Reichswald in the first 24 hours, he had to have close tank support for the infantry inside the forest both day and night.

In the Ardennes 53 Division had formed a high regard for the capacity of tanks to demoralize the enemy by crashing through trees at night. It was realized that little or no observed fire would be possible, but it was felt that the tanks would be amply justified merely by their presence and speculative fire.

The 9th, whose task lay solely in the forest, did intensive training with 160 Infantry Brigade in the area of Helmond. This training was to check the ability of the Churchill tank to knock over various sorts of trees, and to develop skills in maintaining contact with the infantry when advancing through forests both day and night. As a result of this training Lt-Col Berry Veale was full of confidence in his ability to remain with the infantry throughout the advance.

Maintenance of direction by night was the problem that caused Lt-Col Veale most deliberation. Eventually the CRA (Commander, Royal Artillery) agreed to shine two vertical pilot lights. These were to be set approximately 3,000 yards apart, and to make it easier to recognise them one was to flash the letter 'O' and the other the letter 'H' throughout the night. It was hoped that tank commanders would be able to check their position by taking readings on the lights with hand compasses. It was ensured that spotlights were fitted to tanks for these night operations.

Expected opposition: enemy formations and defensive works

The enemy strength and dispositions were estimated in early February 1945 to be as follows:

(a) Order of Battle

The sector between the Rhine and the Maas is known to be under the control of 84 Division, with under command Battle Group Katzmann and III Battalion 2 Para Regiment, and is divided into eight battalion localities. The only immediate tactical reserves available to 84 Division are two or three battalions. The enemy is unlikely to leave that vital sector so weakly defended and the presence of a reserve infantry division in the Cleve - Goch area must be accepted.

In spite of the allied move eastwards, the enemy, by virtue of his withdrawal to the Siegfried Line in the Ardennes and his abandoning of the offensive and subsequent withdrawals in Alsace, has some fifteen divisions out of contact on the Allied front, in the proportion of two Panzer type to one infantry. Some of these could be made available to reinforce his troops in the "Reichswald Plug".

(b) Defences

The enemy has constructed three main lines of defence on the Reichswald front – a forward line, the Siegfried Line and the Hochwald "lay-back" line.

The present enemy positions are in the nature of strong outposts to the main Siegfried defences and are being manned in strength. These outposts are organized in two lines. In the first, depth from outposts to rear companies is about 2000 yards and an average battalion front is 1500 yards. Behind this is a second line running north from the River Maas along the western edge of the Reichswald and then to Kranenburg.

Further west is an elaborate trench system and an anti-tank ditch forming an advance position in front of the Nutterden area which is the Siegfried Line. This trench system continues through the forest to Hekkens and then in a south east direction.

The Hochwald "lay-back" line is a recently constructed defence line which runs from Rees south past the Hochwald forest towards Geldern.

Concrete defences appear on the Nutterden feature. West of this none are visible except for some possible concrete shelters around anti-aircraft sites.




53 Division Plans, Operational and Administrative

The plan for the initial assault by 53 Division was for 71 Infantry Brigade, supported by 147 RAC, to reach the north-western corner of the Reichswald and in particular to capture the Branden Berg feature.

160 Infantry Brigade, supported by 9 RTR, would then pass through 71 Brigade and advance to capture the Stoppelberg feature (height 91.4 metres). 158 Infantry Brigade were also to pass through 71 Brigade's position and mop up within divisional boundaries.

From there on the division and its supporting armour were to advance in a south easterly direction parallel with the edge of the forest; 160 Brigade and 9 RTR were on the left, closest to the edge of the forest, and 71 Brigade and 147 RAC on the right; at various stages 71 Brigade was replaced by 158 Brigade.

Provision of supplies

The divisional front, at the start line little more than 1000 yards wide, contained only one road running parallel to the attack. Even this road was only 14 feet wide with very little metalling and, as the whole impetus of the advance was to depend on it, all rearward movement was forbidden. Refilling had therefore to be done forward, but it was felt that wheeled columns could not be relied on to reach the tanks. To overcome those maintenance problems Brigade applied for 20 gutted carriers and 10 sledges. The carriers were not forthcoming in time but 10 sledges were obtained on D -1. Those were loaded with petrol and ammunition and to avoid embarrassment to 147 RAC during the first phase of the attack, 9 RTR tanks was detailed to tow all sledges forward. A percentage were to be jettisoned in the Plak area west of the forest for 147 RAC. Stuart tanks were to be filled with petrol, each tank capable of carrying approximately 160 gallons. 147 RAC also had two turretless Churchills which Lt-Col Blain stocked with ammunition.

The War Diary

This account of the Reichswald battle is taken from 34 Armoured Brigade sources, rather than the 9 RTR War Diary. This makes it possible to see the interaction between 147 RAC and 9 RTR on D-Day and D +1. From there on the account follows 9 RTR only, although some general comments about the battle are included on many days.

Final Preparations

A general thaw set in at the end of January and the hard snow quickly disappeared to reveal extensive damage done to minor roads by the frost. When the Brigade moved to its assembly area south of Nijmegen on the night 3/4 February the tank column was routed on the main road via Nijmegen to avoid further damage to partially metalled roads. The move went exactly to time and by first light all vehicles were as well camouflaged as netting and natural cover permitted. A total distance of 53 miles was covered by the column (120 tanks) in 9 hours.

The next few days were occupied in tieing -up finally for the attack. Opportunity was taken to study the ground from the Windmill at Groesbeek, from which vantage point an excellent view of the enemy forward offensive area and the western edge of the Reichswald could be obtained when visibility was good enough.

The fears for the effect of a thaw on the "going" entertained in the earlier planning days, proved to be only too well founded. The weather had definitely broken and periodic rain made unmetalled roads almost impassable. The tank routes from Malden to the battle assembly, previously improved by Canadian Engineers, worsened rapidly and on D -1 the CRE (Commander, Royal Engineers) of 53 Division, in response to an urgent request from Brigade, produced engineers and bulldozers to work on the worst places. Also on D -1, 147 RAC sent three RHQ Churchills and one flail forward to prove the route and these did valuable work in forcing fresh tracks through the forest. The route chosen by 9 RTR tanks was in better state and a Churchill tank commander, sent with his tank to prove the route, reported it passable.

A Brigade co-ordinating conference, attended by CO's 9 RTR, 147 RAC and Westminster Dragoons (flails) was held at 1730 hours, 7 Feb. The Brigade Commander expressed his opinion that flails would be unable to operate over the ground conditions then obtaining, and repeated to 147 RAC that he was determined, if necessary, to expend a complete squadron before giving up the attempt to lead the infantry to the edge of the Reichswald. All preparations had been made.

D-Day, 8 February 1945

More than 1,000 guns, taking part in the artillery preparation programme, opened fire at 0500 hours 8 Feb. At 0630 hours 147 RAC Group moved out of Malden and advanced to the forward assembly area in the woods West of Grosebeek where squadrons married up with their infantry. By 0800 hours Tactical HQ (Tac) 34 Armoured Brigade established near Tac 71 Infantry Brigade on the high ground immediately West of Groesbeek. 9 RTR Tanks Group moved from Malden at 0815 hours and concentrated in the forward assembly area in the woods between Malden and Groesbeek by 1030 hours.




H- Hour: A Squadron 147 RAC and 4 RWF

The advance began at 1030 hours but the ground was in a parlous state and "flails" and "Crocs" could make no headway, and the area of the start line was soon jammed with bogged vehicles. Ordinary Churchills however made steady if slow, progress across the heavy fields. No opposition was met in the first 1,000 yards but speculative Besa fire was freely used to the front and flanks. The first enemy were encountered but they were quickly mopped up and 30 prisoners of war were taken.

All the flails were still bogged down near the start line but happily the defence overprints had grossly exaggerated the extent of the minefield and the tanks continued to advance. By 1155 hours, tanks and infantry, keeping well up to the barrage, were on the objective and another 30 to 40 prisoners of war had been taken.

Breaching the anti-tank ditch: B Squadron 147 RAC and 1 HLI, C Squadron 147 RAC and 1 OBLI

As A Squadron and 4 RWF advanced to the first objective B and C Squadrons followed as closely as possible in order to make maximum use of the timed barrage. On the right B Squadron, co-operating with 1 HLI, succeeded in getting all their tanks including the two Churchill bridgelayers, to the start line. On the left C Squadron, co-operating with 1 OBLI moved up via the railway track but had considerable difficulty with wire.

The angle of the barrage across the obstacle permitted B Squadron to attack first and, noticing no mines, they quickly got a Churchill bridgelayer forward and established a crossing. Two troops of tanks went over at once and took up fire positions, but the approach to the bridge worsened so quickly that the third troop was unable to cross. Some shelling and small arms fire were experienced but the second bridge was also laid; unfortunately the ground at this point was too bad to permit of its use. The ditch proved to be much narrower than it appeared on the air photos and certain places were found where it was possible for tanks to get across unaided, provided they did not attempt to move in the tracks of a previous tank. The remainder of the Squadron got across in this manner.

On the left C Squadron had to attack without flail support, relatively unimportant in view of the apparent absence of mines; much more seriously without their fascine AVsRE, all four having failed to get through to the start line. The squadron Commanders only hope therefore was to seize intact the bridge on the axis, and this was accomplished by one company of infantry supported by one troop of tanks.

1 HLI and 1 OBLI having formed up east of the ditch were supported into the forest by B and C Squadrons. Opposition was slight and objectives were taken by the infantry without great difficulty.

147 RAC less A Squadron, no longer required by 71 Infantry Brigade, rallied in area Plak west of the Reichswald and restocked from Stuarts and the turretless Churchills, and subsequently from sledges pulled up by tanks of 9 RTR.

Capture of the Siegfried line in the Reichswald

By 1540 hours 71 Infantry Brigade had reported the consolidation of their final objectives, the Branden Berg features. During the morning and afternoon 9 RTR Tanks Group had remained in the forward assembly area but at 1645 hours C Squadron, followed by the remainder of the group, moved forward to marry-up with 160 Infantry Brigade for the next phase of the operations. Occasional rain during the day had further worsened the ground and Lt-Col Veale had to walk ahead of his party to pick out the best "going". Two tanks were put out of action by mines and all the Stuart tanks were hopelessly bogged, as tank movement was stringently forbidden on the only road, and no flails could operate even if any could have been unbogged.

By 1815 hours C Squadron had entered the forest and were moving up to their start line. Heavy shelling was encountered on two occasions but no casualties were sustained. The tanks avoided the tracks and broke their way through the trees, troops in line ahead and each troop leader preceding his tanks on foot. The move took a long time as it was now very dark, raining again, and frequent detours had to be made to avoid infantry who were digging in, but eventually the Squadron reached the start line and tied up with 6 RWF.

A Squadron 147 RAC, due to support 1 E LAN Regiment were less successful – moving over the anti-tank ditch six tanks were bogged and had to be left. Owing to the tremendous traffic congestion on the one axis the infantry and tanks did not link up until 1915 hours. The group then moved forward and the infantry passed into the wood.

Meanwhile I E LAN Regiment had reached the start line, with 6 RWF and C Squadron 9 RTR tanks ready on their left. It was apparent that A Squadron 147 RAC would be unable to get through to the start line to support the operation. So the attack went in at 2300 hours with only 6 RWF supported by armour. C Squadron advanced with all four troops in line, meeting little opposition on the right but mopping up some spandau teams on the left. Opposition was not great and the objectives were secured by 0005 hours. The remainder of 9 RTR moved forward into the forest to join C Squadron.

Veritable D-Day : 8 February 1945 general comments

The divisional plan was behind schedule but this could not have been otherwise in view of the appalling conditions – in the circumstances the advance had progressed at a remarkable rate. Previous to the attack it was feared that the enemy may have divined our intentions and false-fronted us by pulling back to his second defence line, but his dispositions showed that this was not the case – 84 Infantry Division had been hit squarely in the localities anticipated. The enemy, stunned by the weight of the artillery bombardment to which he had been subjected, gave in quite easily when tanks and infantry appeared on the tail of the barrage. This day's operations put 53 (W) Division across the open defended zone of 4,000 yards and into the Reichswald.




9th February 1945: Veritable D + 1 Through the Siegfried forest belt

to Stoppelberg and beyond

RHQ, A and B Squadrons 9 RTR tanks, having entered the forest just after midnight, moved forward throughout the night. Progress was slow by reason of difficult conditions and traffic congestion but at first light A Squadron and 4 WELCH passed through C Squadron. The group kept to the northern edge of the forest and met slight opposition only – by 0915 hours the objective on the north western edge of the forest had been secured, an advance of some 2,000 yards.

B Squadron, moving up with 2 MON to continue the attack, came under fire from two field-guns firing from just outside the northern boundary of the forest. These were engaged with 95mm at a range of 2,200 yards, hits were observed and the guns silenced.

B Squadron and their infantry passed through A Squadron at 1015 hours, and, meeting no opposition, had secured the Stoppelberg feature by 1100 hours.

C Squadron had remained in their overnight position astride the Siegfried defensives until 1200 hours when, with 6 RWF, they were relieved by 158 Infantry Brigade. They then moved forward along the routes forced through the trees by the preceding squadrons and crossed the start line at 1200 hours. Opposition was slight and two hours later the objective, at the edge of the forest to the east of Stoppelberg, had been captured and secured. Sorties were made into the thick plantation in front of the position and a total of 52 prisoners of war taken. Enemy transport and personnel in the area of Materborn were engaged with good effect; this harassing of the enemy continued intermittently all day and four machine guns which were holding up elements of 15 (S) Division were knocked out by an artillery concentration directed by C Squadron Commander.

General comments, Veritable D + 1

By evening a total of 2,580 prisoners of war had been taken on the 'Veritable' front and the ground conditions were still handicapping the advance more than the enemy. Movement on the divisional axis was strictly controlled and it was necessary to close it completely from time to time in an effort to improve it. By evening 9 February, Brigade succeeded in establishing an ammunition point and a petrol point at Frasselt by running a column up the axis.




10 February 1945: Veritable D + 2 : Moving on

During the afternoon 160 Infantry Brigade was ordered to advance southward along the edge of the forest in order to assist 43 Wessex Division in their advance south east of Materborn. Accordingly at 1800 hours A Squadron and 4 WELCH moved through the Stoppelberg position and by 2200 hours had secured a locality astride the main road Cleve - Hekkens.

The day was generally spent in expansion and consolidation within the divisional bdys against light opposition, though 6 RWF were involved in fierce fighting which resulted in 20 enemy dead and 2 prisoners of war. A Brigade RASC column had succeeded in getting through to regimental areas and 9 RTR tanks ferried the much needed petrol and ammunition round squadrons on RHQ tanks. 147 RAC were in a slightly better supply situation as they had been able to get some Stuart tanks forward and these had been kept busy ferrying supplies.

The advance had continued on the Corps front throughout the day despite the enemy's desperate efforts to stabilize his line by rushing up reinforcements. By evening 7 Para Division, a second regiment of 180 Division and elements of 6 Para, 15 Panzer Grenadier and 116 Panzer Divisions had been identified.

11 February 1945: Veritable D + 3

Owing to adjustments in the Corps plan 53 (W) Division now had the task of advancing south eastwards to clean up the Reichswald. The day saw impressive advances through the forest, despite the stiffer resistance. One squadron of 147 RAC fought forward more than 6½ miles. Almost every cross-track in the forest had its bazooka pits, although relatively few of the very large number of Panzerfaust found had been fired, for in most cases crews had not tarried long enough for even one shot.

While 147 RAC pushed through the heart of the Reichswald, 9 RTR and 160 Infantry Brigade advanced down the north-eastern edge of the forest.

As B Squadron and 2 MON passed their start line at 0900 hours they came under heavy mortar fire and soon afterwards machine guns and bazookas were encountered. There were several skirmishes during the advance and some prisoners of war were taken, but by 1000 hours the objective, just to the west of the farm Dammershof, had been captured. A Jagdpanther, which opened fire and advanced towards the positions, was engaged by M10's and forced to retire.

At 1100 hours C Squadron and 6 RWF crossed the Cleve-Hekkens road and destroyed some enemy machine-guns; by 1350 hours the tanks and infantry were firmly established on their objective level with B Squadron.

At 1500 hours A Squadron and 4 WELCH passed between B and C Squadrons and occupied the farm at Dammershof by 1640 hours. A Jagdpanther creeping about in the farmyard was KO'd by 75mm AP from 3 Troop at a range of approximately 400 yards, two shots breaking the track and damaging the suspension. The crew baled out and sought refuge in the farm but were subsequently rounded up there by Lieut Tom Fawcett.

During the night enemy patrols were active in C Squadron (9 RTR) area. Sgt. Michael Mead was shot through the head while on guard duty and his tank bazooka'd from a range of five yards, but the bomb struck the front plate and did no more than gouge it. This incident is typical of the general stiffening of opposition and from now on the enemy tried to infiltrate whenever possible by day and night.

The Germans had blown several Rhine dykes, causing floods over a wide area. The Kranenburg road was by this time under water and it was no longer possible to get supplies forward to the ammunition point and petrol point established at Frasselt. The divisional axis was still kept in a useable state only by continual and enormous engineer and prisoner of war labour. Tanks were still forbidden the use of all roads so that the Stuarts of 9 RTR, endeavouring to get forward with the urgently required replenishments, were frozen in Groesbeek where they had to remain until their unit was withdrawn from the forest.

9 RTR were having considerable difficulty in maintaining communications and were in urgent need of an instrument mechanic. That it was necessary to obtain a written permit from Divisional HQ to get him forward in a Jeep illustrates the stringency of the road discipline.

Permission was obtained, however, to take essential supplies forward and at 2100 hours the DAA and QMG left Malden with a supply column with which he established a new ammunition point and petrol point on the main road Cleve - Hekkens. This time he had to go on 51 (H) Division's route south of the forest as the 15 (S) Division axis, hitherto used to replenish the ammunition point at Frasselt, had been flooded.




12 February 1945 Veritable D + 4

During the day the enemy counter-attacked all forward tanks and infantry, but all these attacks were repulsed with heavy losses in killed to the enemy. Further rain caused tracks in the Reichswald to deteriorate even more and in many places a Weasel was the only vehicle capable of movement.

B Squadron and 2 MON resumed the advance at 0730 hours. Heavy opposition was overcome and a further 30 prisoners of war were captured before the objective was secured at 1130 hours. Major Michael Reynell, the Squadron Commander, was fatally wounded by mortar fire during this advance. 8 Troop was later sent to the eastern edge of the forest just south of Hau, cleaning up some machine guns and taking 7 prisoners of war en route. On reaching the objective a fierce action was fought in complete darkness and pouring rain, ending in the capture of another 40 prisoners of war. This was only a raid, and after remaining on the edge of the forest for an hour 8 Troop returned to the squadron laager at 2100 hours.

In the meantime A Squadron and 4 WELCH had advanced at 1130 hours and by 1415 hours were established on the eastern edge of the forest south from B Squadron. At 1500 hours there were signs of a counter-attack from the south-east and a party of 15 enemy who stumbled onto a troop promptly surrendered. By 1515 hours the situation was well in hand and the Squadron remained in the area.

By night 12 February both Regiments were very weak in tanks. Figures were:-

9 R Tanks: 14 battleworthy with a further 8 capable of support

to the infantry in the Forest

147 RAC 24 battleworthy - of which several were capable of

support to infantry in the forest only

The majority of tank casualties were caused by bogging and by conditions peculiar to forest fighting.

So far it had not been possible to get the fitters' half-tracks forward and a number of tanks off the road needed minor repairs only. Lack of spare batteries and almost constant usage of wireless had thrown a heavy strain on the electrical systems.

During the day the enemy opposition had increased sharply, particularly to the south of Cleve. The enemy encountered on the divisional front fought fiercely to retain their hold on the edge of the forest, doubtless to keep open the road Cleve - Goch.

The weather showed no sign of improving and the full weight of the divisional traffic, plus considerable traffic of other formations, afforded no opportunity to improve the tracks.

13 February 1945 Veritable D + 5

By noon 71 Infantry Brigade had drawn up level on the right of 160 Infantry Brigade, and the area was solidly held.

9 RTR RHQ moved to a clearing just west of Dammershof where it was joined at 1800 hours by B and C Squadrons. No squadron actions took place and opportunity to maintain the tanks was eagerly taken; many people were able to shave for the first time in several days.

During the first few days shortage of washing water had been a problem for the tank crews – this, however, had been remedied when the ammunition point and petrol point was established on the Cleve - Hekkens road, and since then all types of supplies had been readily available to regiments. To establish this water point it was necessary to scour the rear areas for water jerricans as two-wheel drive watertrucks were unable to get forward.

Owing to the state of tanks in the units special permission was obtained to move unit fitters and LADs forward during the night 13/14 February.

With the exception of one or two tracks, today saw the final clearance, after six days, of the Reichswald.

Nothing happened during the day to change the general enemy situation on the 'Veritable' front. Taking advantage of the Roer valley flooding, which secured him against a serious American thrust for at least a week, the enemy launched his two reserve armoured formations into a counter-attack for which they appeared unprepared, and which availed him no success.

14 February 1945 Veritable D + 6

A Squadron rallied with the remainder of the Battalion and at 1730 hours 9 RTR moved back to Groesbeek for rest and maintenance, leaving 147 RAC to support 53 Division.

In seven days' fighting 9 RTR and 147 RAC co-operated with 53 Division in clearing some seven-eighths of the Reichswald. Some significant observations on this battle were made in a 34 Armoured Brigade summary.

1. The numerous Brigade conferences held in the planning stage at Eindhoven were amply justified in the event. For instance if routes to the assembly area had not been prepared as insurance against a thaw, it is likely that the majority of tanks would have failed even to reach the start line. In particular, had not provision for maintenance been made by using sledges, Stuarts and turretless Churchills, it is certain that Regiments could not have been replenished in the first 36 hours of the battle. These are only two examples of the way in which the time and facilities available for planning were of benefit in practice.

2. The ability of the Churchill tank to give close up support to infantry through forests of the Reichswald type, both by day and night, was proven. It is believed that no other Allied tank now in service could have done as well, or even have reached the forest over the same country.

3. Personnel casualties were low but it was found that this type of fighting, with necessity for constant vigilance by every man, imposed a severe strain on tank crews. This was especially the case with squadron and regiment commanders whose nights were normally spent in visiting their commands or attending 'O" groups.

4. Although few tank casualties were caused by enemy action Regiments were, at times, sadly reduced in tank strength. In view of the severe weather and ground conditions it was inevitable that many tanks should become, at least temporarily, unbattleworthy. While tank casualties were undoubtedly considerable, they were expected, and the success obtained was worth the cost in loss of, and damage to equipment. Many tanks backloaded for complete overhaul and rebuilding were already old and due for backloading in the near future in any case.

Forest fighting facts

Mr. A. D. Bolland has written a book called "Team Spirit", the story of the administration of 53 Division in NW Europe. The Reichswald battle was one in which supply was of particular importance, and some of the facts recorded in Mr. Bolland's book relate to supplies of various sorts.

During this battle the Division received 78 officer and 2103 other Rank reinforcements. These were to replace casualties as shown below; 9 RTR casualties are shown for comparison.

	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Missing Rejoined	Total
53 Div
Officers	12	46	-	-	58
ORs	206	861	104	48	1219
Total	218	907	104	48	1277
9 RTR
Officers	1	-	-	-	1
ORs	1	6	-	-	7
Total	2	6	-	-	8

Another item of particular interest during this battle was the issue of rum. During the complete campaign in NW Europe 53 Division issued 2894 gallons of rum; in the seven days of the Reichswald 1228 gallons were consumed!




Personal recollections of the Reichswald

The common themes of people's recollections are mud, exhaustion, snow, and the strain of being vulnerable to stalking parties in the forest. However, there was the satisfaction of achievement and of a difficult job well done. John Hodges' diary resumes on 3rd February.

"3rd February

Night move to Malden via Nijmegen, 52 miles. Half-track broke down completely and was towed in at 0530 hours! Very cold, miserable journey and messy billets at the end.

8th February

Big attack starts. We are working with 160 Brigade of 53 (W) Division. Set off from Malden at 0800. Attack goes on through mud and rain to the Reichswald Forest. Luck is on our side as we ran across minefield but only lost 1 tank, the 3rd behind mine! Attacking by night through forest not much fun. Vehicles bogged everywhere.

9th February

First light still sees us pushing on. Have now spent 36 hours on wireless in my tank without relief. This combined with trying to find one's way is more than a handful.

10th February

6 hours sleep of sorts but a very noisy night with shells and bombs all around, but none on us! Move on again – now about half way through the forest. My driver shot through knee – bad luck, but he should be alright.

11th February

The Squadrons are still pushing on – thank God for a fine day – going is appalling. We are now due south of Cleve in the forest. This place is stiff with Siegfried line defences, but they are slowly being rolled up. First wash and shave today for four days. Supplies are most difficult and we have to save all water for drinking – no wheeled vehicles can reach us.

12th February

Moved up through forest after dark in most appalling conditions. Slithered about in the mud, rain and trees pushing vehicles which were stuck – took 3 hours to travel one mile and was wet through. Started to snow which didn't help much. Slept (?) in half track with CO in a space 4 x 2 – talk about rabbits. To cap things both wireless sets and all lighting in my tank packed up. Both A and B push on today, but opposition increases as we reach north east edge of forest. Mike Reynell got lump of shrapnel in his forehead when mortar hit his tank. Looked in pretty bad way. C Squadron attacked last night by panzerfaust crew who slipped through infantry, shot Sgt. Mead and fired panzerfaust at tank. It only made a slight dent! About five casualties today. We have only 50% tanks still running, all the rest are bogged and 'caput'. The chaps are all soaked to the skin as it has rained all day. Easily the most appalling conditions we've met so far, BUT we are giving the Boche HELL and the prisoners look a sorry lot.

13th February

Pushed on to our final objectives and everybody very pleased.

14th February

Spot of bother with an ME 262 which dropped a bomb amongst us. Saw Jagdpanther knocked out by A Squadron.

Flap move back to Groesbeek to refit, arrived about 1am after exhausting journey".

Jack Woods had drawn one of the early numbers for leave.

"I went on leave from Villers-aux-Tours having drawn No. 12 in the Battalion draw and when I returned the Battalion was back in Eindhoven prior to moving forward to take part in Operation Veritable. We moved up through Nijmegen to our assembly area early in February 1945 and were billetted in the barn of a farmhouse, which was filled with straw so it was quite cosy. In the mornings we had to wash under the pump in the yard (in February ?) the only consolation being that the farmer had six daughters and we had to queue up with them. On the day of the battle, February 8th, we had to wait amongst the guns all day for our turn to enter the forest which we did in the evening advancing steadily through the trees until we reached the other side five or six days later. Inspire IV opened fire on a target and the 75 barrel split like a Xmas lantern so we became Troop Corporal's tank under Corporal MacDonald. We didn't mind that because we still had two Besa's and a Bren Gun and could do a fair bit of damage with them if required. When we reached the edge of the forest we pulled back and parked in a clearing for a night and then next day moved back to Groesbeek. We were billetted in a house that had no furniture, so we laid the tank sheet on the floors, put all our bedding on that, pulled the engine sheet over us and slept, we were clapped out. Next day we were transported into Nijmegen to a mobile bath unit for a shower and clean clothes and away to pick up a replacement tank. Inspire IV had come all the way from the bridgehead and now she was done for, sad moment, but to our delight we collected a brand new Mk. VII, much better, Inspire V".

Peter Beale started to keep a diary on 1 January 1945. Most of the time it simply recorded the place where he had slept that night, but several of the entries have been expanded. At that time Peter was commanding 10 Troop, Jock Riddell was his troop sergeant and Len Holloway his troop corporal.

"24 Jan Liege (Ans). Billeted squadron with help of Belgian policeman.

25 Jan Eindhoven. Travelled up in cooks' wagon with Busty Nuttall and Peachy Harwood. Stopped at café in Helmond.

26 Jan - 1 Feb Eindhoven: on 29 Jan moved to new billet, Swakenberg's at 546 Boschdijk.

2 Feb Helmond. Stayed with Freddie Herbert and Bill Perkins of 2 Mons. Tomorrow we will be training with them in some woods nearby.

3 Feb Malden: In morning training in woods near Helmond with Freddie Herbert's company. We worked at various ways of communication between tanks and infantry and vice versa. The best way for infantry to talk to a tank commander was to use the handset in the box at the back of the tank. And the best way for a tank commander to talk to the infantry seemed to be getting out and finding them on the ground. One really good thing was getting to know Freddie and Bill and the platoon commanders.

We left there late afternoon and did a night march to our assembly area at Malden. It was a bit over 50 miles and took nine hours. Really tough going for the commanders and drivers – everyone else could go to sleep.

Sometimes the column came to a halt for good reason, other times because a driver and commander had gone to sleep. Went forward a few times and banged on the commander's hatch when the tank was stopped and nothing in front of it; the only worry then was whether the up route was sufficiently well signed for that commander not to lose his way.

4 Feb - 7 Feb Malden: troop living in a barn. The barn is warm and dry which is good because it is bloody cold. On the 5th we went to a windmill in Groesbeek to have a look at the ground for the first part of the advance. We have had to remove all cap badges and other identification such as flashes, Qui s'y frotte etc; security is very tight. Couldn't see too much from the windmill except that the ground up to the forest looks pretty waterlogged and the forest looks dark and unfriendly.

8 Feb Reichswald Forest. Immense barrage starting at 0400 hours; met Bill Clement of RWF on the edge of the forest. Attack began at 10.30, but we didn't move until some time after 1700 hours. Once we had started we moved on and off all night. Immense amount of noise, searchlights in the sky, shots seemed to be going in all directions. Once again drivers and commanders kept falling asleep and had to be thumped back into activity. We got into the forest just after midnight and went forward slowly.

9 Feb Reichswald Forest. At first light we managed to get some breakfast. Finally at 1015 hours we went through A Squadron and advanced to Stoppelberg, our objective, without any opposition. Going wasn't too bad and we went through the forest knocking down trees without too much difficulty at all. Went back a little way to laager and found they had decided to make a rum issue. Found a trench and some straw to make it comfortable. Sammy Joule and Titch Caldwell don't like rum so I had three servings! The trench was really comfortable and I got into it at 1800 hours and woke up at 0700 next morning, 13 hours much needed sleep!

10 Feb Reichswald Forest. Sat in clearing and watched 43 Division pass through. They are evidently to go north out of the forest towards Materborn.

11 Feb Reichswald Forest. Advanced with A Company; SP's and bazookas. On the start line we looked down a ride going south east and there was one of the Germans horse-drawn supply carts. The cart must have just got up to the front line as our attack started and the people in charge of it had disappeared. The poor wretched horse was standing between the shafts shaking and quivering in absolute terror. I don't know what happened to the horse because we took to the forest and drove steadily through the trees. My driver Sammy Joule drove really well. We got to our objective and could see Dammershof farm house across some open ground. I could see what looked to be a tank or an SP among the buildings. Our 75mm was out of action temporarily, but over to my left I could see a troop of M10 tank destroyers. So I went over and told the Canadian troop commander what was going on. He said he would do what he could from the left flank. When I asked him how he was going he said he had buried two and evacuated four of his crew that morning. Getting it tougher than us.

A few moments later A Squadron passed through us. Tommy Fawcett came to ask me what the situation was, so I explained and suggested he should do a fairly wide right flanking movement and I would support him from where I was in whatever way I could. It turned out to be a Jagdpanther, and Tommy and his 3 Troop knocked it out and captured the crew. Slept that night with Freddie Herbert and Bill Perkins of 2 Mons in a trench. It was snowing some of the time, but it wasn't too bad in the trench.

12 Feb Reichswald Forest. Advancing again. Mike seriously wounded by mortar landing on turret, hear later that he died in hospital. Roger (Long, the Squadron 2 i/c) takes over for the moment.

13 Feb Reichswald Forest. Moved back about a mile into a clearing. Able to do some maintenance on the tanks and get a bit cleaned up ourselves.

14 Feb Groesbeek. Moved back here out of the Reichswald for rest and maintenance, but it looks as though it may not be for very long. Had a bath in Nijmegen".

Ronnie Holden came back from leave in England around the middle of January in time to move back to Eindhoven from the Ardennes and then to lead C Squadron very successfully through the Reichswald. He describes the battle.

"We were now back in the Eindhoven area and we had to take the road from Best to Hertogenbosch and Grave to arrive at the Brigade Assembly Area. This was at a place called Malden where we were in some form of Monastery or Priest's house, so of course we had to behave ourselves! The journey from the Assembly Area to much nearer the start-line for the attack was a difficult one, but with the use of some tracks, roads and the odd railway line, we eventually got as near to the start-line as we could. Unfortunately the weather by this time had deteriorated and it was snowing which made the going rather more difficult than it needed to have been. As a result, many vehicles were already bogged down and, somewhat to our horror, they included flail tanks which were to proceed in front of us and eventually clear a way into the forest. The assembly of artillery in and around the forming up area was very considerable. It was not actually firing when we got there, but when it did start the noise was absolutely deafening. In fact, we were told that there were some 1000 guns concentrating on the western end of the Reichswald Forest. A somewhat amusing episode at this point was the fact that we all had to remove our cap badges; therefore you had swarms of British soldiers around the place giving no indication, or very little, of the regiment or corps they belonged to. This no doubt was due to the fact that we were practically, if not quite, in Germany and the local population were hardly affable or even agreeable to our presence. Eventually we moved up line ahead to our positions at the start-line for the attack. Perhaps one might stop a while and give some idea of the breadth of the frontage that was to move at H Hour. It was five divisions up, as in the front line of an old-fashioned football team, centre forwards inside and outside, rights and lefts, on top of which the people on the left flank were somewhat hindered because the enemy had flooded a vast area covering some 30-40 square miles of land. They had dammed the local rivers which made a very formidable pattern on the defence overprints because there was no doubt that here the weight of enemy obstacles and guns were considerable. The light was fading fast and there was no doubt about it that the start-time had been put back but had to come before it was actually dark. Having stated that, we did in fact start off in the dark into 9 miles of this great forest of the Reichswald.

Despite the fact that it was thick forest and that it was dark, we were assisted by what popularly became known as Monty's Moonlight – a series of searchlights that played on the clouds over the Reichswald Forest to give a moonlight effect throughout. It would have been difficult otherwise, despite compasses and suchlike, to be able to maintain the exact direction to bring us to our first bound. The bound, however, was reached and so far as C Squadron was concerned, a discussion was held with our infantry commanders and second in command in reasonable peace by which time of course the main barrage of guns had stopped. There were a few odds of high explosives coming over from the enemy side but nothing to speak of to cause us concern. Having stayed overnight we were able to try out for the first time self-igniting tins of hot soup which went down extremely well and were a great success. However, we never saw these rations ever again.

By D +1 and 2. C Squadron had reached their first objective and remained there for some 36 hours. One troop was placed on very high ground and overlooked and had a very good view of Cleves from some way away. The build-up of obstacles became greater as we moved further forward on D +3 by which time we came to a halt, hunting enemy tanks with Piats before going on to D +4 when we stood down as a squadron with a powerful guard of 2 tanks whilst the tracks and turrets and other mechanical features of the squadron were attended to. Unfortunately, an attack went in some 3 miles in front of us and one of our other sabre squadrons were calling for support. C Squadron having only 2 able tanks that could possibly be used, moved off to the front of our own infantry and was able to frighten the enemy off, or perhaps they were just trying us out to see if we were mobile. It would be unfair at this stage to say that the fighting or even the individuals were confused. It was purely and simply a state of affairs whereby the commanders of the whole were reorganising the troops they had on the ground. They came to us and to the rest of the 9th with an order that we were to move out of the forest to another position which was being threatened with a counter-attack from the enemy to get back into the Reichswald. It was during this period of time that Sgt. Michael Lawrence Mead of C Squadron was killed by a night patrol of German SS. Whether we were able to destroy them is not known but we had lost a most splendid sergeant. The next day B Squadron lost their Squadron Leader, Michael John Reynell".

Many people were sad at Sgt. Mead's death – he was, incidentally, always known as Reg, even though this was neither of his two names. Bill Thompson was in the same troop:

"From the 8th to 13th February the Squadron fought through the Reichswald Forest and 11 Troop suffered the loss of Reg Mead our well-loved Troop Sergeant, one of the nicest guys that ever walked this earth".

Dickie Hall also remembered Reg Mead's death, as well as many other things about the Reichswald.

"Before we had our expedition down to the Ardennes, we should have gone into the Reichswald Forest to attack the enemy there. So, on our return north from the Ardennes the advance was set in motion.

Our line of advance was to be from Groesbeek, through the northern half of the forest with 53 Division. Troops to the north of the forest were also to advance, and both lines would converge on the town of Goch.