Broad picture
As the Americans poured through the western end of the
bridgehead, Hitler saw on the maps he was studying that all supplies and
reinforcements for the American advance had to squeeze through a corridor only
12 miles wide, with its main road junction at Avranches. He forced his
reluctant commanders and troops to gather all the armour they could muster for
a push westward from Mortain to close the corridor. They pushed on 6 August,
but the Americans defended stoutly and the allied airforces had clear skies.
The result was that the German position became completely out of balance, and
they lost tanks desperately needed to give them a chance of a fighting
withdrawal to the east.
On 7 August the 1st Canadian Army, formed on 1 August
and commanded by General Harry Crerar, attacked from their positions south of
Caen in the direction of Falaise. This was called Operation Totalize. The first
stage was an advance at night with tanks and armoured personnel carriers
(APC's). APC's were used to ferry infantry forward with substantial protection
against shelling, mortaring, and small arms fire. They were largely the idea of
Lt-Gen. Guy Simonds, commander of II Canadian Corps. They were created by
taking the armament out of 105mm self propelled field guns. The code-name for
these vehicles was "Priest", and the APC's were intially called
Unfrocked Priests or Holy Rollers; later they were called Kangaroos. The first
stage was completely successful. The second stage, a daylight attack by the 4th
Canadian Armoured Division and the Polish Armoured Division (both in action for
the first time) was not nearly so successful, and ground to a halt 8 miles
short of Falaise.
The Canadians next operation was
"Tractable", starting on 14 Aug. This was to take Falaise, and did.
The Americans were coming north towards Chambois, the Canadians and Poles south
east to Trun and St. Lambert-sur-Dives, where they met on 19 Aug. The Falaise
pocket was tenuously closed, although determined bodies of Germans fought their
way back to the east. By this time the allies were themselves advancing to the
east, the Canadians along the channel coast, the Americans towards Paris, and
the British to the River Seine.
31 Tank Brigade fought with 59 Div at the beginning of
the break out, and 1 Canadian Army at the end. This change meant a long and
slow switch from one part of the front to another.
The War Diary
Aug 6
Now under command 1 Canadian
Army the Battalion arrived after a long and dusty march in 1 Corps area, and
when darkness had fallen at 2230 hrs moved to the Forward Assembly Area to
support 70 Brigade of 49 Div in a counter-attack role.
Note: 1 Canadian Army
consisted at this time of 2 Canadian Corps and 1 British Corps. One of the
divisions in 1 Corps was the 49 (West Riding) British Infantry Division.
Aug 7
These defensive areas were
reconnoitred by squadron leaders, each to be a strong point supported by a
Battalion of infantry. The areas were:
La Prieure
Cagny
Lepoirier Frenouville
These defensive areas were
linked with Operation Totalize which had as its objective the capture of
Falaise. They were designed to give protection to the lines of communication of
2 Canadian Corps from left flank attack as well as to form a strong defensive
base should Op Totalize not go according to plan.
1800 hrs: A warning order was received that 31 Tank
Brigade with 146 Infantry Brigade (49 Div) may be required for further flank
protection roles during Totalize.
Aug 8
1130: 9 RTR ordered to close
gap on left flank from Frenouville to Bellengreville to allow 153 Brigade of 51
(Highland) Division to attack wooded area northwest of Secqueville la Campagne.
C Squadron now moved to area Four and A Squadron to area Bourgebus. B Squadron
was in reserve with BHQ.
There was spasmodic shelling
and mortaring during the day, some of our medium 5.5 inch shells falling in B
Squadron's area, but there were no casualties.
1915: Battalion moved to rear
rally area Grentheville and at a conference with the Commander of 146 Brigade
Operation Egg was outlined.
Aug 9
Orders received as follows:
31 Tank Brigade supporting 49
Div to secure left flank area Bellengreville Vimont Chicheboville
7 RTR to support 147 Brigade
from Frenouville south east to Vimont
9 RTR to support 146 Brigade
from wooded area near La Hogue to Vimont
At the time this plan was
made the situation was very fluid and obscure; the enemy were fighting local
actions, but there was a general belief that they were withdrawing.
Operation Egg was never given
a definite H-hour, and was to be put into operation only if a definite defence
centre round Vimont was encountered. Consequently various phases of Operation
Egg were completed by troops other than those given the task and there appeared
to be no co-ordination at all.
1700 hrs: reports issued as
follows:
1 Leics (147 Brigade) in Star
Wood
147 Brigade to send patrols
to Vimont and 4 Lincs were to take over from 1 Leics
1905 hrs: Battalion moved
from Grentheville to area of crossroads north of La Hogue and almost
immediately two troops of C Squadron were asked to support the Hallams who were
making for Chicheboville. The support was given and no serious enemy opposition
was encountered; the Hallams dug in on the outskirts of Chicheboville and the
two troops of C Squadron rejoined the Battalion, having destroyed snipers and
mortar positions.
Aug 10
At first light A Squadron
moved to area Star Wood with the intention of linking up with the 1st/4th Kings
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (1/4 KOYLI) and supporting them to Bellengreville.
They remained in that area all day, however, as the infantry walked into their
objective and decided to go no further. C Squadron first supported the Hallams
with two troops in consolidating Chicheboville and later, as resistance
stiffened, with the whole squadron in an attempt to clear wood to the east of
Chicheboville. At 1040 hrs this wood was clear but heavy mortaring forced the
Hallams to draw back to Chicheboville at midday.
49 Recce met no serious
opposition during its patrols that required the support of tanks, so B Squadron
remained with BHQ where shelling caused several casualties (see below).
C Squadron stayed with
Hallams till 2000 hrs and then joined the Battalion, claiming the destruction
of three spandaus and several mortar positions. Shelling was persistent in the
battalion area and more casualties were incurred. On this day Sergeants Frank
Holding (A), Bill Turner (HQ) and Tom Phillips (C) were killed, as was Trooper
Tom Park; Sergeant Bill Basham, Lance Corporals Brown and Telford, and Troopers
Bowen, Gunn and Reynolds were wounded.
Aug 12
A plan to capture Benauville
(Operation Tempest) was made, but the attack did not develop. The battalion
left the area to join 2 Canadian Corps for Operation Tractable.
Aug 13
At 1700 hrs the CO was called
to Brigade HQ and Commander 31 Tank Brigade outlined the plan for Tractable.
The Brigade was made Corps reserve, and 9 RTR were to take up a position at
Estrιes la Campagne to prevent any attempt to cut 2 Can Corps lines of communication
during their attack on Falaise.
1900 hrs: Battalion left harbour area and at 2105 hrs
concentrated in the area of Urville 0750; there was no shelling or mortaring in
this new area, which was a welcome change.
Aug 14
CO and Squadron Leaders were
informed of the defence areas which had been allocated to them.
1200 hrs: the squadrons had
moved to their areas and were also on the edge of the safety line for the heavy
bombing that was to be administered by the RAF at 1400 hrs. For the first hour
the bombing seemed to be very accurate, and the wood that the battalion was
watching was ripped and battered on its northern edges. But heavy explosions
and huge columns of smoke to the rear proved that one wave of bombers had lost
their target and were dropping bombs on the area of Hautmesnil where it was
known that the field artillery and the Polish Armoured Division were
concentrated.
This exhibition lasted for
about half an hour, and the morale of the battalion and its opinion of the RAF
dropped considerably. The last half hour of bombing was fortunately directed on
to the correct targets.
As the last bomber flew away
A Squadron reported suspected enemy tanks firing in their direction; one tank
was hit, but the shot did not penetrate.
1640 hrs: Two Shermans
belonging to a Canadian Armoured Brigade HQ came into the Battalion area with
casualties. The CO of a Royal Artillery formation said that these two vehicles
were the only survivors of the Brigade HQ, and that the other wounded were
unattended. Capt the Rev Patrick McMahon and the RA Colonel took out a
half-track ambulance but within ten minutes it was seen to be in flames, hit by
an unlocated anti-tank gun. A party sent out later on foot returned with the
news that the Rev. McMahon had been killed and almost unrecognizably burnt.
Aug 15
Recce Troop, patrolling
south, captured a prisoner of the 1054 Grenadier Regiment, 85 Division. All POW
confirmed that their forces were withdrawing, and that 85 Div had been rushed
into the line after a three-day forced march with vague orders to defend
Falaise.
The original plan of 2 Can
Corps was now changed and the Battalion was ordered to support 4 Can Infantry
Brigade (2 Can Inf. Div) in a thrust on Falaise with the main road as the
centre-line. The first order was that the Battalion was to give support in
establishing a firm base in the area Potigny, Ussy, Bons-Tassily.
1400 hrs Battalion leaves
present area. Reports indicate that the Germans were withdrawing as quickly as
possible and orders were no more than "Keep bashing on (KBO)" to
Falaise.
To comply with this terse and
elegant order B Squadron was to support the Essex Scottish to form a vanguard.
A Squadron was allotted to the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI) and C
Squadron to the Royal Regiment of Canada (RRC) should these battalions require
tank support.
2000 hrs. B Squadron start
with Essex Scottish at Torps with the first objective of Villers Canivet. One
mile south of Torps light infantry opposition and machine-gun fire was met but
quickly cleared. A series of short sharp actions were fought, one resulting in
the capture of an 88mm anti-tank gun. Heavier opposition was met in the area
Bois du Roi, but this was effectively dealt with. Failing light resulted in the
infantry taking the lead with two companies up.
2330 hrs. The high ground
north-west of Falaise had been reached and B Squadron spent the night in close
laager, enduring heavy shelling and mortaring but suffering no casualties. The
squadron had advanced 3½ miles and captured 100 prisoners. Commander 4 Can Inf.
Brigade gave orders that the Battalion was to remain in its present location
for the night, but was to join B Squadron at first light.
Aug 16
0830 hrs. Battalion was
deployed right A Squadron left C Squadron in support of B Squadron. No further
orders had been received, and no further information was available. The Bois du
Roi to the rear was being shelled by our own artillery as well as being
mortared by the enemy, and now and again it produced machine-gun fire.
Following a request for
information, each of the three infantry brigades had no clear idea as to the
intention of the other, or for that matter of their respective dispositions.
Orders were finally received that 6 Cdn Brigade would clear Falaise and that 9
RTR should form a firm base with 4 Cdn Brigade in their present location.
1400 hrs. Orders were
received for the battalion to move across country to harbour in the area of
Chicheboville. C Squadron moved first and the shelling and mortaring increased.
Later one B Squadron tank was hit and set on fire by 88mm, but there were no
casualties.
Everyone regretted not being
able to enter Falaise, but appreciated the rest the following day having
covered more than 40 miles in 30 hours.
Personal recollections, 6 -
16 Aug
In these few days the British and Canadians
experienced for the first time rapid movement against the enemy. The battle
became very fluid, and at times it was very difficult to say where the allied
troops were and where the Germans were. This was quite different to how it had
been in the bridgehead, where positions of both sides were clearly known and
advances were painfully slow. It took a while to get used to the changed
circumstances, and the combination of all factors led to one overwhelming
impression of this period of the campaign confusion. Also in people's
memories stand out the assaults by mosquitoes, the terrible destruction of the
areas east and south of Caen, the mortaring and shelling, and the bombing that
went in the wrong place.
John Hodges writes on 8 Aug:
"The past week has been employed in moving right
around Caen to the east of the Bridgehead for an attack with the Canadians due
south to Falaise. The bombing was a wonderful sight at night and we saw one
bomber completely disintegrate in the air. We were about 1000 yards from the
nearest bomb and the blast was something tremendous. The whole of this area is
infested with mosquitos, making it impossible to get any sleep. Everyone is
covered with a mass of bites. The weather is very hot and the countryside very,
very dusty. Dead animals everywhere and movement involving any quantity of dust
brings down shells".
Trevor Greenwood and his troop leader Seymour Francis
had been left out of battle (LOB), and were back with the support vehicles in B
echelon (the tanks constituted the fighting or F echelon). Tank crews were left
out of battle periodically, both to allow them to rest and recuperate from the
strain of fighting, and also to ensure that there was always a reserve of
experienced tank crews. Trevor and Seymour were LOB just before the move round
to First Canadian Army, but as Trevor records it didn't do them much good.
"6.8.44: with B echelon at Cristot.
Went to bed 10.30 last night...having spent some time
organising a comfortable spot of earth: had a bad time night before with lumpy
ground. Was dozing off about 11.00 when I heard my name mentioned close by.
Soon learned the horrible truth. Mr. Francis and I had to return to F echelon
immediately: transport would pick us up in 15 minutes! I felt slightly amazed!
So did Mr. Francis. Mr. Boden and Sgt. Debenham had turned up to take our
places on B echelon. Damned cheek. We hadn't even been LOB no battle had been
fought! Crawled out of bed: Debenham seemed to take a delight in re-laying his bed in my warm spot.
About an hour elapsed before we found all kit etc in
the darkness. Departed in a jeep..."F" were harboured beyond Villers
Bocage and the surrounding country was lousy with mines and booby traps: two of
our B vehicles were shattered day before by touching grass verges: one driver
killed. About 5 miles south we entered newly won territory. It felt weird and
unnatural...very quiet very still very smelly very deserted.
Roads were quite narrow...and we knew all grass verges
were still heavily mined...the engineers having had no time to attend to them.
Passing oncoming traffic...especially large lorries was a nightmare. Their drivers knew about the mines and
so did we...but ours was only a jeep! We always had to veer over to the
verge...and I just hung on and waited for the bang! Fortunately, it was a
moonlight night, and we managed to survive...but I don't recommend such
journeys...especially for nervous cases.
All buildings and houses (barns, farms, cottages etc)
along the route were railed off with white tapes indicating forbidden area:
practically all of them are booby trapped by jerry after he has looted them.
One curious soul entered one of the cottages...or tried to. The roof
immediately went sky high...and four walls partly collapsed. The place was a
shambles when I saw it. A neat white cross now records the whereabouts of the
"curious impertinent". The entire countryside in this newly captured
area is similarly mined. Jerry "sappers" seem to spend their lives
devising new and devilish methods of slaughter. Even trees and bushes carry
booby traps...an egg shaped grenade suspended inconspicuously. It explodes upon
the slightest touch. A new device is attached to a horizontal wire about 10 ft
above the road. Detonation takes place when the vertical aerial rods of vehicle
touch the horizontal wire. I have heard too that he is leaving booby traps
beneath the bodies of his dead. This was done by Italians in Libya, but have my
doubts about Jerry stooping to this. Anyhow, the mere existence of these deadly
traps doesn't help ones nerves... especially on night rides...in a jeep!
Reached the tanks 1.30a.m: all crews asleep. Spread my
own bedding on ground...and dozed off. Awakened 4.30a.m.: felt lousy: We
managed some breakfast...tea and tinned bacon and departed 6.00a.m. for area E
of Caen...about thirty mile run: A new sector for us. Most of journey over
field tracks: dust appalling. Went via Cheux, Marcelet...and skirted Caen to N.
Reached assembly area 1.00pm7 hours for 34 miles. Tank in shocking state...dust
about an inch deep everywhere: guns hopeless. Spent about three hours tidying
up".
Jock Cordiner remembers the mosquitoes:
"Mosquitoes in parts of Normandy more than bothered me. Was it by the
river Orne or the Odon? We were stopped on the bank while another formation
passed through. Most of us sat on the river bed all night, water up to our
chins, to avoid the mossies".
Trevor evidently wasn't quite so close to the river on
the night of 7 Aug, but still had a rotten night:
"Reveille 5.15a.m. "Stand to" 5.30 -
6.0 a.m. No cooking of any sort until after 6.30a.m. Spent about four hours in
"bed" last night...and what a night! We discovered a new secret
weapon....mosquitoes! The bloody things almost ate us alive. Half the squadron
have blistered faces this morning. Very few seem to have had much sleep. The
major is in a bad way. No sleep at all last night, in spite of three almost
sleepless nights previously. Believe the M.O. is trying to do something for us.
Wasps and flies not so bad here...yet! But prefer them to mosquitoes. Feel sure
many nights like last will drive us all mad. Maybe the Orne (about 2 miles
away) accounts for the mosquitoes".
On 10 Aug the 9th made one of their many moves around
this time, as John Hodges records:
"Moved to La Hogue and Secqueville which were
bombed yesterday. Complete and utter devastation everywhere and a horrible
smell of burning and rubble. Lots of mines about and plenty of odd shells fall.
While harboured up on a hill were heavily shelled. Two men in A Squadron killed
by shell which fell just behind the half track and four wounded. About 6pm Headquarters
must have been spotted for the shells began to land a few feet away. The half
track was hit in the radiator and the aerials blown away. Decided it was
getting more than a joke and moved Headquarters about half a mile away. Found
out later had been riding my bike over a minefield most of the morning".
Although the village of La Hogue had been very heavily
bombed, there was still life, as Cyril Smith remembers: "We moved back
round Caen and entered La Hogue after it had been erased by a heavy bomber
raid. At that time I was the wireless-op in Impulse, the troop sergeant's tank
in 9 Troop B Squadron. Out of the rubble came a distressed tiny black and white
kitten. We took it on board, to be attended to later. After bivouacking down
for the night we examined it and found it to be a tom. He was too young to take
any solid food, and had to be given liquid through a rubber tube. Consequently
he was named Titti la Hogue, and signed on as spare crew.
This little cat became a great inspiration to us in
the art of survival. He would never leave the vicinity of the tank. He may have
lost his hearing, because noise never bothered him. Titti went through many
escapades with us. His place was sitting on the tool box behind the driver or
in the co-driver's pannier bin. Only once did he get too near the clutch pedal,
but fortunately squawked a warning in time.
One morning in a flax field in Belgium Titti was
missing. We decided he had been taken prisoner by either friend or foe. We
found him later, but didn't put him on a charge. Instead he had a double ration
of sardines and machonochy's soup with a good rollicking.
Unfortunately some weeks later it became Titti's turn
to enter the green fields. His eyes became badly affected with some type of
liquid, possibly acid, giving him great pain. We had to administer an overdose
of chloroform, and buried him at the side of a canal in Holland. It gave us
great sadness, knowing that we had lost a faithful crew member. His ninth life
ended as a tankie".
Titti was not the only kitten found and rescued in
this area. Ginger Gadd was in 5 Troop of A Squadron, a crew member in the tank
of the troop leader Gerry "The Gaffer" Wells.
"It was about the time of the Falaise Gap. We
were stretched out along the road waiting to move forward, and everywhere there
were signs "Achtung Minen" and "Keep off the verges".
Suddenly this little bundle of fur appeared, black as night and so cute and
lovely that I couldn't bear to think of it getting blown into the next world
before its time. We tried all ways to get the kitten off the verge and at long
last succeeded. The question then was what are we going to call it? After much
deliberation we decided that because she had had such a timely escape from
explosives we would call her "Nitro". She used to sleep alright
whether the guns were firing or not".
The destruction that was seen was not confined to
buildings. Ronnie Holden had to move C Squadron to a point between Caen and
Star Ridge: "Squadrons of the 9th were given positions to take over in
this area vacated by the Guards Armoured Division. On arrival at their position
C Squadron found a complete squadron of Shermans, all knocked out, burnt out
and smashed, presumably from a line of 88's on Star Ridge. It was doubtful if
any crews had survived. A terrible sight to behold".
The second stage of the Canadian attack on Falaise was
Operation Tractable. This began on 14 Aug with a preliminary bombardment by the
RAF and four AGRA's (Army Groups Royal Artillery). As the War Diary described,
the first and last parts of the RAF bombardment were on target, but the middle
part was not. It felt to many people as though they were being bracketed by the
bombs, and it would be only a matter of time before the 9th was bombed as well.
John Hodges on 14 Aug:
"Moved to Gouvix and to Estrees-La-Campagne in
preparation for the big Canadian break through towards Falaise. Something went
wrong with the RAF bombing attack. We were about 1000 yards from the nearest
positions that were to be bombed. The first wave dropped their bombs plumb on
the target but the succeeding waves dropped them well behind us amongst the
Canadians and the Poles. It was most unpleasant and one felt pretty hopeless.
Gradually the bombs crept closer to where we were and we threw out yellow smoke
and waved. Fortunately none landed amongst us but it was a terrifying two
hours. Later Headquarters Canadian Armoured Division was shot up in front of us
and the Rev. McMahon went forward in an ambulance to try and pick up survivors.
An 88mm shell went straight through the ambulance killing the Padre and a
stretcher bearer (the latter had been one of my clerks). The driver got back
with scratches and severe burns. McMahon was a great little man and it was a
great blow to us all".
Cyril Smith remembers the death of the Rev. Patrick
McMahon, the RAF bombing, and a particularly close call with an anti-tank gun.
"After joining the Canadians we were in the area
of Quesnay in a hull-down position watching the wood. Two Shermans were knocked
out, to our front. Smoke was belching from one of them.
A half track with a Red Cross flag flying came through
from the rear, obviously with the task of dealing with survivors. Bang! No
respect for the Red Cross sign. It was knocked out. We were informed that the
R.C. Padre Capt. McMahon was on board. He was found later in the corn, where he
had died of his wounds.
Later on there was a huge bombing raid to our front by
the R.A.F. We had to use yellow smoke as the bombs were creeping closer and
closer. At least they destroyed the area where the "88" fire was
coming from.
We then moved out to a point on the Caen-Falaise road
during late afternoon. It was then "Tank Commanders Wireless Ops to O.C's
tank for briefing". The outcome was a night op to close the Falaise Gap,
supporting the Canadian infantry. "B" Squadron were leading with 9
Troop up.
God, this meant me in the leading tank (if blood's
brown I'm wounded), because I was Troop Officer's wireless op. This is how it
turned out.
We set off during the evening, with infantry up front.
When it became dusk we heard a bang bang on the side of the tank. It was an
infantry man with his rifle butt. "Advance very slowly", he said.
"We believe there is an "88" anti-tank gun somewhere up
front".
Five minutes later, "Flash - bang" I was
looking through my periscope. I swear to this day that the projectile travelled
between the gun barrel and the drivers hatch. "Smoke, driver reverse"
shouted my Troop Officer, David Scott. I squeezed the two-inch mortar trigger.
I always had "one up the spout" set on minimum range, which was only
a few feet in front of the tank. I fired two more bombs as "Inspire"
rolled backwards. We could only reverse a short distance, because of our troop
sergeant's tank.
"Flash bang" the second shot was about 20
feet in front. He was firing blind as it was almost dark, and we were on a
sunken road. He was in a field 90Ί to our right. We were now stationary,
covered by our own smoke, and unable to do anything except cringe in dreaded
anticipation. "Will it be now?" "Where is the third shot?"
"Will he miss again?" "Has our luck finally run out?"
The third shot never arrived. After what seemed like
eternity, an infantry officer jumped on board with "OK boys "88
silenced". After that we could never be grateful enough for the infantry.
We saw the gun later. It was a 'dual purpose' 88mm on
a high mounting, and its barrel was splayed out like a small palm tree. They
had silenced it alright.
During the night we reached the high ground
overlooking Falaise. We were mortared and sniped at during the following day.
Many prisoners were taken, and they were interrogated by our gunner, a German
Jew Len Lennard (born in Berlin).
There was a Tiger dug in covering the approach to our
location. All day long he fired at everything that tried to reach us. He had a
wide field of fire.
At 1600 hours we had orders to all start up at the
same time and make a dash to the low ground to our left. We lost one tank in
this move; the engine armour was penetrated, but the crew were all safe.
Not so for the three Shermans of the Polish Armoured
Division who crossed on the high ground to our right front; heading for our
last location, they were promptly knocked out.
We heard later that the R.A.F. dealt with the Tiger
with their Typhoons."
Trevor knew that the bombing attack was due to take
place:
"Left harbour 12 noon: moved 2 or 3 miles E to
defensive position. Our "briefing" included details of Bombing
programme for today. Three or four woods immediately S and E of our position
were to be blasted from 2pm until 4pm.
Reached our area at 2.00pm, just as RAF four engined
bombers commenced bombing wood 2000 yds to our front. What a sight! Horrible:
terrifying...and yet fascinating. The whole earth trembled: trees rocketed
sky-high...enormous fountains of earth shot upwards: smoke fire death. God
help the Germans in that wood! Hundreds of bombs rained down in the first few
minutes. We were thrilled by the RAF. This was direct support for us with a
vengeance. Every one of us felt more cheerful. Knowing too that our very heavy
attack had commenced at 12.0 noon and that the end of this campaign may not be
far off.
It was about 2.30pm. Many waves of bombers had
unloaded their bombs where we wanted them...but suddenly, a stick of bombs fell
on a point about a mile to our rear.
Was it Jerry? No! There were 2 or 3 dozen Lancasters over the spot: one of them
must have dropped his bombs accidentally over our own lines...the damned fool!
Hard luck on our lads, but an accident can't be helped.
More waves of bombers appeared, and most of these too
dropped their bombs over our lines. The awful truth dawned: They were bombing
the smoke laden area indicated by that first stick...even though it was 2 miles
N of their most northerly target.
Why couldn't they be stopped? We endured hell, even
though we were fairly safe from the bombs. What a contrast with our former
jubilation! Half an hour later, more bombers dropped their loads over another
area...slightly west, in our lines. The destruction behind us was now becoming
greater than ahead. And so it went on...with our own bombs murdering our own
men...and dropping nearer to us as the afternoon wore on. We put out yellow
smoke flares in a frantic effort to save ourselves. I saw bomb doors opening as
the planes approached...and expected to be blown to hell any moment. They were
quite low...about 3 or 4 thousand feet. I saw "verey" lights being
fired from the ground as signals to stop the bombing. I heard machine gunning
in the air...and was afterwards told that Spitfires had been trying to divert
the bombers. I heard later too that a little Auster went up to try and stop
this ghastly blunder. But it went on. I didn't know then that there was no
liaison between our ground forces and the bombers. I could only wonder, at the
time, and my heart wept. So much depended upon todays action: the war even may
be shortened by its success. It had been planned carefully and secretly...We
had almost looked forward to it. And now....this thing".
This "little Auster" was piloted by Lieut.
Eversley Belfield, who was then Air Observation Post Pilot with the Canadian
Army. His prime purpose was to observe from his Auster the fall of shots from
the AGRA's so that they could make corrections as necessary. He saw from the ground
the first wave of bombs fall perfectly on Quesnay Wood. The second wave's
bombs, however, fell well to the north in areas occupied by allied troops. He
rushed to his plane, started it up and climbed at full throttle firing Verey
cartridges as he went. Just below a large formation he twisted and turned to
attract their attention, and felt confident that all further bombardments fell
on their intended targets.
The day after the bombing debacle was the day of KBO
to Falaise. Ronnie Holden recounts how it seemed to him:
"We then moved off onto the main road and went
down to a number of small villages where the German army were taking breakfast
and had not realized that enemy tanks were among them. Just before we got to
Falaise we had the order to form a regimental laager which we did in a very
large circle next to the Brettvillette wood where we could hear German
Nebelwerfers being fired off back to positions we had been in. Our laager was a
massive one with guns pointing in all directions of the compass and under
cover, we sent out raiding parties to try and stop the Nebelwerfers from firing
back, but as they were all mounted in vehicles we were never in time to get
them in their firing positions. The result of our laager was to stop all
traffic, particularly the enemy tanks and other vehicles moving back into
Falaise, for at the time Falaise was being attacked by British forces supported
by RAF fighter bombers and were being hit very hard indeed. We remained in the
laager for the whole day and nothing of course could get past us although from
the west the enemy tanks were taking pot shots at us but without effect."
5.3 The Battles of the bridges 17 - 26 Aug
The broad picture
The battle of the Falaise pocket was not really
complete until the end of two bloody actions fought by the Canadians at St.
Lambert-sur-Dives and the Poles at Point 262. But while these final actions
took place, the allies were beginning to sweep to the east.
On 20 Aug Montgomery's orders were for the complete
destruction of the enemy forces in north west France, and then to advance north
and east to destroy all enemy forces in north east France. This demanded that
21 Army Group, once all Germans in the pocket had been eliminated, should
advance to the Seine with all speed. The 2 British Army were to cross between
Mantes and Louviers, and the 1 Canadian Army in the neighbourhood of Rouen.
Once across the Seine the Second Army would drive north to the Somme between
Amiens and the sea. From Rouen the Canadian Army was to wheel left and quickly
seize the whole of the Le Havre peninsula.
Meanwhile Bradley's 12 Army Group was to assemble to
the west and south west of Paris, ready to advance on the line Orleans-Amiens.
From there Bradley would be poised to move north east towards Aachen and
Brussels or east to the Saar.
The Canadian advance to the Seine on the left flank of
21 Army Group involved the crossing of several rivers, which were the Dives,
Vie, Doigt, Touques, Calonne, and Risle. These rivers had to be crossed;
consequently the battles of the bridges were undertaken.
War Diary: Battle of the
bridges; 17 - 26 Aug
Aug 17
1600: Orders were received
that 9 R Tks were again under comd 49 Div and that Bn should move to just west
of Mezidon and take over from 7 R Tks by 0600 hrs on 18 Aug.
It was known that the 10 DLI
had a small bridgehead over the R. Dives at Mezidon, and that enemy were
holding pt 66 in some strength all other bridges had been blown. The task
given to the Regt was to support 49 Div in widening and strengthening the
bridgehead when RE's had built bridges over the River Dives.
Aug 18
1115: At a conference held at
49 Div HQ, the Div Comd stated that the opposition on east of R. Dives was not
sufficient to justify the use of tanks in support of infantry, and to ease
traffic problems across bridge at Mezidon the only one complete no tanks
should move across that bridge. 9 R Tks should carry out a recce to see whether
it was possible to use the 'Jumbo' Churchill at possible crossings of the River
Vie so that it could be crossed quickly when it became necessary. RHQ, B &
C Sqns were allotted to support 146 Bde and A Sqn to support 70 Bde.
1400: Maj Holden and Capt.
Kidd (C Sqn) carrying out recce for bridge crossing over the River Vie had
their scout car destroyed by 50mm A/Tk fire. They brought back information that
a Jumbo bridge would not span river at this point.
Aug 19
0708: At 0630 hrs, Bn passed
through Mezidon and concentrated short of the River Vie. Capt. Brewer,
reconnoitring another possible bridge site over the River Vie was badly wounded
in the stomach by Spandau fire, but brought back information that tanks could
not be used at that point either.
0740: 49 Div issued orders
that as no effective infantry crossing had been made across R. Vie tanks would
not yet be required. During the day information was received that the first
bridge over the River Vie available for 49 Div forward elements would probably
be that built by 51 Highland Division and that 9RTR should be prepared to cross
there with A Sqn supporting 49 Div Recce, B Sqn supporting 147 Bde and C Sqn
146 Bde.
Aug 20
0830: A Sqn move forward to
be on call to support 49 Div Recce forward in bounds.
1130: B Sqn cross bridge and
assemble in area of Crevecoeur to support 147 Bde.
1325: C Sqn leave harbour
area in order to contact Hallams (146 Bde) north of Crevecoeur to support them
to high ground near St. Laurent du Mont.
1430: B Sqn prepare to attack
supporting RSF and thence to the line of the River Doigt. B Sqn pushed on in
front, clearing the way for infantry and had reached their first objective by
1515 hrs.
At 1600 hrs, RSF began taking
over and at 1725 B Sqn pushed on again. No serious resistance was encountered;
light A/Tk gun fire and MG fire was met but quickly dealt with so that by 1912
hrs they dominated the area of the bridge, and the infantry arrived half an
hour later to begin securing the position covered by the tanks.
C Sqn met with many delays in
their effort to contact the Hallams. In avoiding mines and keeping clear of the
main roads, an occasional tank became temporarily ditched, and the leading
troop hit mines in a defile which caused further difficulties. But by 1710 hrs
contact with the Hallams had been made and a plan was made to attack St. Pair
du Mont, the attack to start at 1830 hrs. Civilians reported that main enemy
forces had already retreated north to high ground.
C Sqn attack started at 1630
hrs but the advance was slow due to difficult going which included the pushing
down of houses to get through. At 1915 hrs the tanks began climbing the high
ground which had an incline of about 1 in 4 with a field of view at times
limited to less than 50 yds, due to foliage. Nevertheless, the tanks were on
their objective at 1940, ahead of the infantry, and had destroyed 1/75mm A/Tk
gun and 1/50mm Fd gun.
One tank had been knocked out
resulting in the death of Trooper Taffy Bridgeman and the wounding of Lieut.
Arthur "Dinty" Moore. Tpr. Fred Barker, Tpr. Johnny "Tiger"
Boland, Cpl. Bill Geary and Tpr. Tommy Latham were also wounded by mortar fire
and three tanks were ditched.
B Sqn suffered no casualties
at all.
A Sqn was never required to
support 49 Div Recce but Capt. P.M. Myatt was accidentally shot in the leg.
Aug 21
The tasks for the day were as
follows:-
C Sqn to support KOYLI in an
attack on St. Laurent du Mont and then to secure the road through Carrefour St.
Jean.
B Sqn were to move to
Crevecoeur-en-Auge and then NE to Cambremer.
The nature of the ground,
hilly and wooded, made it quite impossible for the tanks to attack in a
deployed formation. So it was decided, as enemy opposition was expected to be
light, that the infantry would attack in an orthodox manner, but that the tanks
would move behind along roads when possible and either take over the ground
from the infantry or be brought up to destroy any strong point encountered.
The KOYLI had little
difficulty in securing their objectives and by 1200 hrs C Sqn had assembled in
area Carrefour St. Jean. B Sqn were at Crevecoeur with the DWR exploiting to
Cambremer. By 1350 hrs it was realised that this type of attack against a
retreating enemy was no good at all and far too slow, so it was decided to
advance on two-thrust lines so that contact is maintained with the enemy and
allowed no respite.
C Squadron in support of 146
Brigade were to advance through Carrefour St. Jean, Bonnebosq and Le Torquesne
to the River Touques. B Squadron in support of 147 Brigade were to advance on a
more southerly axis through Le Cadran and La Roque-Baignard to the River Touques.
1830: C Sqn were approaching
Bonnebosq which was offering resistance and it was apparent that an attack
would have to be put in to clear it. The Sqn deployed to cover the village and
sealed the exits while KOYLI attacked.
2015: Bonnebosq clear and
infantry established themselves for the night. By 2100 hrs B Squadron had
reached La Roque-Baignard. They had been held up by poor roads, mines and A/Tk
fire. One 75mm A/Tk gun had been captured. During the afternoon the Recce Troop
had been patrolling bridges and roads and at 2230 hrs killed 30 German infantry
in woods to the west of the River Touques.
Aug 22
The advance on thrust lines
continued but A Sqn replaced C Sqn and joined up with 4 Lincs, while B Sqn
continued on their route with RSF.
Little opposition was met. A
Sqn reached the River Touques at 1400 and B Sqn reached the river an hour and a
half later. Both bridges had been blown, but RSF found a footbridge which they
crossed, supported by tanks. Heavy mortaring resulted in Tpr. Wilf Woodfine
being killed and 12 people being wounded.
Capt. F. Drew of A Sqn was
also wounded in the head as a result of mortaring.
As the tanks had no field of
fire in the low ground by the river and no alternative positions were possible,
B Sqn joined HQ. C Sqn joined HQ at 2030 hrs.
Aug 24
It was not till about 0900
hrs that class 40 bridges had been made across R. Touques but two-thrust lines
had been planned to converge on Cormeilles.
Owing to the short time
available for maintenance and the little rest that the tank crews were getting,
144 RAC came under command 49 Div and were allotted the southern route. A Sqn
supporting 56 Bde were to advance on the northern route. Steady progress was
made throughout the day and at 2115 hrs A Sqn was supporting 2 Essex into
Cormeilles. Only pockets of machine gun fire and small number of tank obstacles
and mines had been encountered.
Bn HQ established itself
during the day to the west of Cormeilles where it was joined by C Sqn at 2015
hrs. B Sqn remained at its old location.
Aug 25
The advance was delayed
awaiting completion of class 40 bridge at Cormeilles but at 0830 C Sqn crossed
R. Calonne supporting 2 Glos as the leading formation of the brigade group. The
axis of advance was to be through Epaignes and thence north-east to the River
Risle in the area of Pont Audemer.
Enemy defences were soon
found to be centred round Epaignes, La Houssaye and, La Heberdiere. C Sqn
quickly surrounded Epaignes but the infantry insisted on putting in a number of
small attacks which were all abortive.
Later, however, it dawned
upon the infantry commander that a co-ordinated attack had to be made in some
strength. This was put in at 2100 hrs and Epaignes fell within an hour.
C Sqn during the day had
destroyed 2/75mm A/Tk guns; killed about 100 inf and captured Adjt of Bn
SCHLEUE (346 Div). One tank had been hit by a faustapatrone which penetrated
the turret and killed Trooper Ken Button of 14 Troop. It seemed that Epaignes had
been the centre of resistance guarding Pont Audemer and if the infantry had not
delayed so long it might have been possible to have got to Pont Audemer before
dark, which would no doubt have resulted in the capture of a considerable
amount of equipment and personnel.
A Sqn had remained in reserve
at Cormeilles. Much to the delight of the inhabitants, Major Mockford took the
salute in the Square during a march past of the FFI and placed a wreath on the
cenotaph. Later, there was a celebration with champagne in the Town Hall and
the whole Sqn had been promised sheets and beds in the village.
But at about 1800 hrs
Cormeilles was heavily shelled and one tank was put out of action by a 150mm
shell. This put an end to the celebrations and A Sqn joined BHQ. There were,
however, no casualties as a result of the shelling.
The Brigadier, 56 Bde,
expected a further advance to Pont Audemer to be strongly opposed and decided
that a thrust should be made on two lines with an infantry battalion and a tank
squadron on each.
On the northern thrust line
the 2nd South Wales Borderers were supported by B Squadron from Epaignes to
point 128 north-west of St. Symphorien; on the southern thrust line the 2nd
Essex were supported by A Squadron from Epaignes to St. Symphorien.
Aug 26
0815 A & B Sqns crossed the start line at Epaignes and by 0950 the
objectives had been reached - no opposition had been encountered at all.
1130
Bridges across R. Risle at
Pont Audemer were blown and the unit again became static, moving across the
river the following day when the whole area South of the Seine except for the
Foret de Bretonne had been cleared.
56 Bde were finally given the
job of clearing the forest but did not require tank support.
The Bn remained concentrated
at Fourmetot having covered 60 miles in the last nine days. Flowers, cheers,
hand-clapping and waves from civilians were a pleasant change, after the grim
days of breaking out of bridgehead, even if whenever the impetus to advance had
been gained it had been already cheated by yet another blown bridge.
Personal recollections, 17 -
26 Aug
We last heard of Sgt. Dickie Hall when he was injured
near Grainville during Operation Epsom, and was about to be shipped back to
England on an empty Tank Landing Craft, its deck covered with stretchers. He
records what happened to him until he rejoined C Squadron just at the beginning
of the battles of the bridges:
"At Southampton we were put on a hospital train
and taken to Ascot, where among other things we were able to dictate a telegram
to our people. (I never asked my Mother what were her thoughts when the
telegraph boy delivered it at home).
After a day we went again by hospital train to
Preston, Lancs, where part of the local Psychiatric Hospital had been taken
over by the Army. My bed was in a "padded cell".
My wound healed well and I was given a few days leave.
My parents had known a General Woods for many years before the War, and while I
was at home for those few days General Woods came to see my Father, and it was
a great surprise for me to discover that he was C.O. of the 9th RTR in the 1914
War, when the Regiment was decorated by the French Fusiliers with whom they had
fought - with the Croix-de-Guerre. The General was decorated with the Legion of
Honour, and it is the Fusiliers cap badge that we all wore with pride on our
left sleeve.
I had to report to Catterick Camp (Yorkshire) where we
were given new equipment, and again, after a few days, went south and crossed
over to Normandy in an old Troopship called "Neuralia", and landed at
Mulberry Harbour. From there we marched to a unit for sending replacement crews
and tanks forward. I had a scratch crew and we had an uneventful journey, until
I was glad to find that the 9th was nearby and "C" Squadron was in a
nearby orchard. I found all the crew well, plus the relief sergeant who was
willing for me to take over again, and Squadron H.Q. gave permission".
The changed atmosphere from the grimness of the early
battles might have accounted for some carelessness in the advance between the
Dives and the Seine, as Jack Woods suggests:
"My next recollections were of the advance to the
River Seine, crawling along in the column and receiving the hospitality of the
local population (especially the women), the wine and the flowers, so much so
that when held up by a blown bridge we pulled off the road into a field where
we duly brewed up. We weren't long before we were receiving the attentions of
the rearguard that the enemy had left on the other side of the river, we
casually watched ourselves being bracketed and were caught in the open when a
salvo landed amongst us. The result, the inevitable casualties including one
fatality Trooper Wilf Woodfine who was buried there and whose grave the locals
vowed to look after forever (I wonder if it is still there)".
John Hodges' recollections of this period are brief:
"20 Aug: Geoff Brewer
shot through the stomach on a recce. Heard later that he will be O.K. Advancing
slowly".
22 Aug: Reached river north of Lisieux. B
Squadron heavily shelled and about 15 casualties resulted. Frank Drew shot
through the head. Heard later that he will lose an eye.
24 Aug: Crossed the river at Lisieux and
advanced nearly to the next one at Cormeilles. Little resistance met. Plenty of
movement but little sleep. No casualties these last two days. A Squadron had a
tank knocked out from a 15 inch shell from Le Havre batteries. A fluke shot
right into the middle of the Town Square. Local fire brigade attended a most
comic effort.
25 Aug: Crossed the river and advanced to Pont
Audemer where we camped on an aerodrome which had been used as a large flying
bomb site".
The B Squadron casualties referred to by John were the
same as those mentioned by Jack Woods, and the casualty list has the place of
this occurrence as Coquanvilliers. The river, from the other side of which they
were shelled, was the Touques. The other major group of casualties in the
battles of the bridges were suffered in the area of St. Laurent-du-Mont, as
Cyril Rees and Trevor Greenwood both remember. Cyril first:
"St. Laurent-du-Mont:
A small skirmish, scarcely worth recording in a
Battalion History, let alone a regimental history, I hear you say. But all
skirmishes involve people, sometimes fatally. This minor event does just that.
The chateau was the highest point on the densely
wooded estate, with parkland below. It was believed to be an observation and
information centre for the German Forces in the area. 13 Troop was part of a
force which was to isolate the chateau and cut off escape routes. We were
working with part of an infantry company.
Experienced though I was in many actions as a tank
crew member, I felt quite isolated and on my own, just Don Foster and I moving
slowly forward at tick-over speed in 1st gear. Not an infantry man to be seen,
just the back of the Troop Leader's tank about 10 yards ahead.
The road we were on was narrow about 15 feet wide,
steep banks dropping to a ditch on either side. A very high hedge separated
this road from the park. On the right was also a high hedge plus additional
thick shrubbery. Just ahead the road curved to the right. The leading tank
started to drive round this bend, hugging the right hand verge. I watched the
rear plate as it began to move out of my view, then come back into view as we
also moved into the bend. A great pall of smoke and a loud bang ahead and the
Troop Leader's tank stopped with a jerk. Some of the crew began to bale out.
On this narrow road there was no possibility of us
being able to move forward so I began to reverse slowly, trying to gauge how
much I needed to apply the steering levers to retrace our forward movement.
When I felt the right rear began to drop away I stopped at once and drove
forward to straighten up on the road, but too late to prevent some of the L.H.
track begin to ride up on to the points of the front sprocket. Tom Tomney had
been busy on the A set, and wasn't able to stop this happening. However, it was
all hands to the pump, and getting out the tools we had the track back in
position in a very short time. It was a great help to have Ginger Kirk, one of
the squadron strong men, on our crew.
Just as we were finished, there was a loud clatter as
a rifle was thrown on to the road. A dishevelled figure, with his hands up,
appeared suddenly from the shrubbery on the right. He said he was a Russian,
conscripted into the German Army. Tom ordered Don Foster to cover him with his
pistol and hand him over to the infantry, a hundred yards behind us.
Meanwhile, out of our sight, in the park to our left,
Alf Beale and his crew had moved up through the park and had straddled the road
up to the chateau. It would seem that they had all dismounted and were for some
reason or other about to do a recce on foot. Just then, a German staff car came
down the hill at great speed, saw Alf's tank across the road, quickly turned
round, and returned like the clappers up the hill. By the time Alf's crew had
hurled themselves back on board and organised all systems as go, it was too
late.
In the event the objectives were achieved. The
subsequent comments and explanations between Ronnie Holden and Alf Beale have,
as far as I know never been put on record.
Postscript
The Troop Leader's tank had been hit by an 88mm field
gun at short range. Moving round the bend, the hull gun and mounting came first
into the 88's sights and here, sadly, Taffy Bridgeman lost out".
Trevor recorded his experiences in this action the day
after it took place:
"D + 76 Monday 21.8.44
I have yesterdays story to finish. Our move commenced
about 2.00pm roughly to the east after the retreating enemy. Over La Vie river,
across R.E. bridge. This bridge had caused the infantry much trouble the
previous day. From the bridge we went N. making for St. Pair du Mont...still in
enemy hands. At a stop en route, several civilians paid their respects, shaking
hands with all and sundry. The usual greeting "bon jour, mes amis".
Drinks were provided...and we parted with a fair amount of tinned food.
This halt occurred a mile or two from St. Pair du
Mont. Suddenly we received orders to move...with all guns prepared for action.
The enemy had been reported leaving the village, but in fair strength on a
fairly high hill just N. of the village: heavily wooded on top. We had to clear
the wood and help the infantry occupy it.
Our start point an orchard: the darned place was a
mass of small orchards...and immediately ahead lay that hill...rising steeply
for 3 or 4 hundred feet: quite a landmark...and a strong defensive position:
but not a suitable attack for our vehicles.
Our troubles started almost immediately after the
advance commenced. Firstly, it was impossible to fire our H.E. from the
orchards, as contact with the trees would have exploded the shells our own men.
Also, each little orchard was surrounded by a deep ditch, making progress very
difficult. In the first few minutes a few tanks were having track
trouble...mine included. I managed to "limp" towards a hedgerow, and
took what cover I could. On inspection, I found the job would take at least 2
or 3 hours...providing we could borrow suitable tools. That put me out of action,
less than half an hour after it commenced.
While inspecting my vehicle, I noticed another about
100 yds left burning: it must have been hit! Meanwhile, the rest of the
squadron were advancing painfully slowly up the hill. Immediately in front of
me, a house was blazing fiercely: we had blasted it with H.E: a terrible din,
and uncomfortably close to me.
We had to make some attempt to repair my vehicle, so I
ordered the crew to dismount and get busy...hoping we were sufficiently
screened by the orchard in front to make the job possible. There was some enemy
M.G. fire to our left, but we had to take the risk.
After working 10 minutes or so, an enemy HE exploded 6
yards to our right. We had no warning whatever. Immediately, we all rushed
around the left of the vehicle...not one of us had been hit by that first
shell, altho' the blast shook us. At the rear of the vehicle, two of the crew
had scrambled beneath, when another shell exploded ahead of its predecessor.
Again I felt the awful hot blast, and wondered why I hadn't been hit: it was
only a few feet away. Beneath the tank, Geary said he had been hit...in the
arm. He had been just in front of me, and climbing beneath the vehicle when the
second explosion occurred.
He was bleeding profusely. I clambered out again to
get the first aid kit from inside the tank. Fortunately, there was no third
shot. By the time I found the kit, Geary had scrambled out, and was standing
beside the vehicle, blood pouring from his left fore-arm. Nearby, there were
infantry ambulance men taking cover in a house. I took him across, ignoring our
own dressings, and left the other three members of the crew beneath the
vehicle.
He was bandaged up, and a tourniquet applied, but
already his colour was ashen, and I felt sure he was losing too much blood. The
nearest ambulance, a jeep, was a quarter of a mile away in the village. He said
he could walk alright and was already speaking of rejoining the crew! An
ambulance man accompanied us to the village: en-route we had one
"rest" to take cover from mortar fire.
After saying good-bye to Bill (he was still conscious,
but looked very sick) I had a few words with the ambulance men.
My next job was to return to my vehicle...and I
reached it without harm...altho' that darned Spandau M.G. seemed to be
uncomfortably close. To my amazement, my driver, Johnny Boland, now reported
that he too had been hit by shrapnel...he had made the discovery in my absence
with Geary! He seemed inclined to ignore the matter, as it was a very small
wound on his shoulder blade...but I had to insist upon him having attention.
And so, once again I returned to the village, via the orchards etc. We heard
the crack of a rifle en route...and I knew a sniper was busy in the
vicinity...A few seconds later we found Gilmore had been hit through the hand
by this sniper, whose presence made things a little more unpleasant. Gilmore
and Boland were both handed over to the ambulance men...and I haven't seen
either of them since.
It was whilst making my second journey back from the
village that I experienced what were probably my worse moments since coming
over here. I had reached the first orchard...and a few feet to my rear was one
of our vehicles apparently in trouble. Some infantrymen had appeared and I was
talking to one of them when a H.E. shell exploded without warning a few feet
away. We all dropped to the ground instinctively and I and two of the infantry
fellows crawled towards a log nearby for cover. I don't know how long I lay
huddled up by that log. It was probably only for one or two minutes...but I
will never forget them. The first explosion was the prelude to a
"stonk" aimed perhaps at the tank. It was followed by 20 or 30
others...all within a few feet of us. Very soon, I heard a groan beside
me...and one of the infantry lads said "I've had it". Soon there were
more groans and the other infantry lad was hit. Meanwhile the shells came down
relentlessly. I could feel the hot blast from each one: the air became thick
with the acrid fumes of cordite. I knew I should have been blown to smithereens
by all the laws of explosives...but all the time I remained conscious of being
alive. At one period, I realised that all the shells were landing on my side of
the log, and wondered about changing to the other side...but there was
insufficient pause between each explosion. So I just lay huddled up as small as
possible....and hoped....and hoped.
I must have become partly stupified because I remained
on the ground for some time after the last round...until I heard some voices,
in fact, and found the group of infantrymen helping their two wounded
colleagues over the log. There had only been the three of us on my side of the
log...and I alone had escaped uninjured. I cannot explain this... Those on the
other side of the log had been protected and were all safe. I made my way to a
barn, collecting a "Piat" dropped by the infantry on the way. There I
found the two wounded lads receiving attention. They seemed in a bad way.
But I had a vehicle...and I had to get back. I felt
afraid of returning: being more conscious of death now...And that Spandau was
about...and a sniper.
I took all possible precautions traversing the
orchard...crouching by hedges etc...and eventually reached my vehicle and
clambered inside. At last I felt reasonably safe. The two remaining members of
my crew had wondered about my long absence...and had feared the worse after
that "Stonk" which they had seen. The tank that appeared to have
attracted the enemy fire was un-hit. Its crew were inside with closed hatches.
They knew I was outside in the midst of the shell-fire and one of them seems to
regard me as the luckiest man in the British army. Perhaps he is right.
Well, the three of us, Pestell, Pedder and self stayed
in my vehicle for some time. The repair job seemed unimportant under the
circumstances. We had water and dry biscuits for our lunch/tea meal, and just
waited...and talked. Meanwhile, the squadron were carrying out their job of
scaling that crazy hill. By evening they had finished, successfully and I heard
the major over the wireless giving orders to return to a point near my own
position. They appeared at dusk, and I then made contact with my troop officer
and reported the wounding of two members of my crew. I needed other assistance
to repair my vehicle but it could not be provided...so I borrowed some tools
from other vehicles to attempt the job myself...with the major's blessing. Mr.
Francis also "loaned" me a member of his crew Dawes a remarkable
worker. I was asked to try and make my way to harbour, about 1 mile S. of the
village, if I finished the job.
The squadron departed. It was almost dark: there was a
burning house 70 yards in front: a burning Churchill enclosing a mutilated
human body 100 yds to my right: to the left, a Spandau...if he hadn't been
killed...and maybe a sniper or two. I was afraid.
We set to work in this no man's land. The silence was
awful...punctuated by crackling from the burning house...and occasional
"cracks" from the burning tank: the small arms ammo. was exploding.
We worked until 11.30pm: no more could be done as we
needed more tools and it was now pitch dark. I decided to spend the night in
my vehicle, with my three colleagues, taking turns at guard in pairs. Too many
Jerries in the neighbourhood to take risks. We informed H.Q. of this
arrangement over the air, and settled down for our nights vigil. And now it
started to rain, ...like hell. Pedder and I in the turret, observing through
the open hatches, were soon wet to the skin. I seemed hungry too...and tired,
hellishly so. In between turns we slept, somehow...and then came the dawn...to
my unutterable relief. Once again we radioed H.Q. for further assistance and we
were informed that help was already on the way: this was at 6.30am.
At 7.0a.m, no help had arrived...but suddenly there
was a vicious "swish" outside, followed by a heavy explosion. God!
What did it mean? We had wondered whether the enemy had really been driven far
back...and now it seemed that he was shelling us...the usual prelude to a
counter-attack. We closed all hatches...and waited...and wondered. ...Very soon
came another heavy bang...and we heard shrapnel slapping the side of the
vehicle. Would we be hit? or captured? Was it the end of everything? These were
unspoken thoughts...but looks were enough.
Personally, I felt pretty secure in the
vehicle...after my experience in the open the previous afternoon. H.E. does not
penetrate a Churchill but a direct hit could cause severe injuries. The
shelling continued for half an hour. Each shot announced itself by a momentary
"swish"...and then the explosion. Sometimes the vehicle
shuddered...sometimes the shrapnel clanged on something...but we remained
un-hit. After a time, I knew that we couldn't have been under observation. It
was indirect shooting, otherwise we would have been hit. But every shot seemed
dangerously close and it was only a matter of time....But the worst did not
happen.
After half an hour, there came a pause...and our
nerves gradually slackened off: fear-haunted eyes became more normal...But what
about the repair job? We couldn't carry on under such conditions. We attempted
to radio H.Q. again to have the promised assistance withdrawn...but we
couldn't get a reply.
I decided to "bailout" and try and find our
way back to the unit. It seemed a more sensible plan than being shelled to
death or taken prisoner. We removed breech blocks and strikers from the guns,
and then hopped out...and bolted for the comparative shelter of a nearby
orchard. Very soon I saw some figures on a roadway...and they were wearing khaki...not
the grey-green of the enemy. Thank goodness for that: the village was obviously
still in our hands. A little further on, we came to a roadway and there was one
of our scout cars: and the driver had time to run us back to our
squadron...what blessed relief! It was still pouring with rain, but that little
journey, perched perilously on the top of that tiny vehicle, was one of the
pleasantest I have ever known.
We found the rest of the unit parked in an orchard,
and the men sheltering in various barns and sheds. Mr. Francis and his crew
were having a meal...and we needed no persuading to join them. How good was the
taste of that hot sweet! The first I had had since breakfast the day before.
We were soaked and tired...but there was a remarkably cheerful atmosphere as we
swopped yarns and discussed the previous day...in that crazy little barn with
its mud walls and musty smell...and general atmosphere of decay.
After our brief respite, news came through that the
squadron had to depart immediately for another attack...and so our colleagues
left us for their vehicles...and we returned to ours...with more tools to
finish the job.
Meanwhile, our infantry were attacking, and so our
position was now much safer. This infantry attack had been preceded by heavy
shelling from our own artillery...and it occurred to us that our ordeal a
couple of hours before may have been due to our own guns.
We walked back to our vehicle...still in the
rain...and now had time to inspect the shell holes around our tank. There were
dozens of them in a radius of 30 yards, some of them adjoining the tank, but
not one direct hit. From rather
obvious signs on the ground, we had to accept the sad truth...our own guns had
shelled us! Perhaps we were too near the enemy! We carried on with the repairs
and completed the job by lunch time without further interruption. But the
driving sprocket had been badly damaged and I felt sure a new one would have to
be fitted before we went into action again. We returned to the squadron
harbour...and there the Battalion Technical Officer confirmed that a new
sprocket would have to be fitted by Brigade. We had to remain where we were
until further orders.
Spent the night in the harbour...beneath the vehicle.
Meanwhile, the squadron were miles away to the North East...chasing the
retreating enemy".
Ronnie Holden's account of this same occurrence and
he was commanding C Squadron in which both Cyril and Trevor had served was
very brief in terms of fighting, but had more information in respect of logistics:
" C Squadron were on the left and involved in fighting a stronghold
consisting of an old castellated building on top of the hill from which the
enemy were subsequently driven off. We then descended to a place called
Bonnebosq. Here we successfully covered the advance of infantry into the
village of Le Torquesne. Here we found a great pile of folding bicycles which
appeared to have arrived from nowhere as there was no sign whatsoever of other
equipment, tracks of vehicles or anything. Therefore it was reasonable to
suppose that they were there for use by anybody who came across them. From then
on each tank, at least of C Sqn had one bicycle as well as a tank! They were
not used very often. By this time we were getting nearer and nearer to the
Seine and as we got to the river itself it was found that a German Tiger tank
that we had captured some while before was too big and heavy to cross the
Bailey Bridge which was provided for weight not more than two Churchill tanks
at a time so it was abandoned on the bank.
CHAPTER 6: THE CAPTURE OF LE HAVRE
Background to Le Havre
The plan for the Canadian Army to capture Le Havre was
described in the previous chapter. This was part of the wider plan to free the
channel ports and to overrun the V1 sites. In the early forward drive there
occurred two moving events. On 1 Sept 2 Canadian Division captured Dieppe. It
was here, on 19 Aug 1942, that the same division had lost 3000 men and, as we
recounted earlier, that the Churchill tank saw action for the first time.
The return was more than symbolic. Dieppe was taken
almost intact, and by the end of September it became the largest useable
Channel port, capable of handling nearly 7000 tons of cargo per day.
The second event was the capture on 2 Sept of St.
Valery-en-Caux by the 51st Highland Division. It was here that most of the
original division had been taken prisoner in June 1940.
The Canadians' tasks now included the freeing of the
rest of the Channel coast, but particularly the port of Le Havre.
Immediately before the war Le Havre was, after
Marseilles, the most important port in France. Until 1516 Le Havre was only a
fishing village possessing a chapel dedicated to Notre-Dame-de-Grβce, to which
it owes its name Le Havre (harbour) de Grβce, given to it by Francis I when he
began the construction of its harbour. Defenses and harbour works were
continued by Richelieu and completed by the genius of fortification, Vauban.
The English bombarded it in 1694, 1759, 1794, and 1795.
In 1939 there were 14 basins in the harbour, the
oldest of which dated back to 1669, with more than 8 miles of quays. The chief
docks were the Bassin Bellot and the Bassin de L'Eure. The Tancarville canal,
by which river boats unable to attempt the estuary of the Seine can make the
port direct, enters the harbour by the Bassin de L'Eure.
In 1944 the approaches to Le Havre were well
protected, on the western side by flooding and elsewhere by mines, anti-tank
ditches and huge concrete gun emplacements primarily designed for sea defences.
The garrison of over 11,000 was also strongly provided with artillery.
I British Corps, under the command of First Canadian
Army, was given the task of assaulting Le Havre. This operation was given the
code-name "Astonia". The Corps consisted of 49 West Riding Division
supported by 34 Armoured Brigade and 51 Highland Division supported by 33
Armoured Brigade. There had been some reorganization of the Armoured Brigades.
31 Tank Brigade was now in 79 Armoured Division, and consisted of Crocodile
battalions. 34 Armoured Brigade consisted of 107 RAC, 147 RAC, 7 RTR (who came
under command on 19 Aug), and 9 RTR (who came under command on 4 Sept).
The general plan was for 51 Div to attack from the
north, and 49 Div to attack from the east and north east. None of the
approaches looked very cheerful on the maps with their defence overprints.
The War Diary, 27 Aug - 12
Sept
The War Diary is not available for the period 27 Aug
to 9 Sept inclusive. This was mainly a time of travel, and extracts from John
Hodges' diary give a brief description of the 9th's movements.
29 Aug
Crossed the bridge over the
Risle at Pont Audemer and concentrated just south of the Seine. Stuck here for
a few days rounding up Germans. Much equipment left behind on fields and plenty
of prisoners brought in. Scene very beautiful as is the surrounding
countryside.
4 Sept
Crossed the Seine at Pont de
L'Arche (immediately south of Rouen) great moment. Unfortunately they
wouldn't let us bring our captured Tiger with us said it was too heavy for
the bridge! On this day we came under command 34 Bde.
5 Sept
Passed through Rouen on way
to Le Havre. Rouen completely smashed all along the waterfront. Crowds of
people out who all seemed quite cheerful. Harboured this night at Yvetot.
6 Sept
Arrived at Bolbec, about 8
miles from Le Havre. Bags of traffic and lots of mileage on the tanks. Rains
continuously for most of three days and nights until the whole harbour becomes
one vast sea of mud.
NOTE: No further entries in John's diary until 10
Sept, when the War Diary itself resumes.
Battle of Le Havre: Operation
Astonia, 10-12 Sept 1944
The official history of the
battle of Le Havre is a composite of three historical sources:
the story of 34 Armoured Brigade (34 Tank Brigade until 2
Feb 1945)
9 RTR War Diary
the log of radio communication between 9 RTR and 34 Tank
Brigade HQ
The plan of attack for 49
Division supported by 34 Tank Brigade was in three parts:
56 Infantry Brigade supported by 7
RTR was to break through the German defences between the Foret de Montgeon and
the River Lezarde
146 Infantry Brigade supported by 9
RTR was to clear all the enemy east of the River Lezarde up to Harfleur
147 Infantry Brigade supported by 107
RAC was to follow the through the gap made by 56 Brigade and the complete
Division and its supporting tanks were then to advance westwards to clear the
town and the dock area.
Le Havre appeared to be a
very difficult place to capture. It was covered to landward by belts of
minefields which proved in places to be 800 yards deep. It was fortified
through several years of German occupation with innumerable concrete redoubts
and deep shelters, and its Commandant, Col. Eberhard Wildemuth, had been
ordered to hold out until the end of the war. There was a garrison of 11,300,
plentiful ammunition for 115 guns, and sufficient food on hand for 14,000
soldiers for three months. The defences overprints were horrifying in their
menacing detail.
To soften up the defences the
RAF were to make a heavy bombing raid on the city's defences, including the
plateau between the Foret de Montgeon and the River Lezarde.
The plan for 146 Infantry
Brigade and 9 RTR was in three stages, each of which took place on the three
consecutive days, 10, 11 and 12 September 1944.
Day 1 (10 Sept) To
soften up and harass the defences of strongpoint OSCAR and those on the western
bank of the Lezarde valley
Day 2 (11 Sept) To
clear strongpoints OSCAR, OSWALD, and KIM; to force the crossing of the River
Lezarde at Harfleur, including the clearing of strongpoints RANDOLPH, RONALD
and ROBIN.
Day 3 (12 Sept) To
advance from the bridgehead over the Lezarde to the eastern end of the docks
and the city, all this area being south of the Foret de Montgeon and the
plateau.
Day 1 (10 Sept) from 9 RTR War Diary
1815 After the RAF bombardment of plateau C
Squadron deployed and engaged targets in the area of strongpoint OSWALD and on
western slopes of Lezarde valley. The high explosive and machine gun fire was
accurate, heavy, and well controlled, and did much to soften and harass the
defences for the attack on the following day.
Battle
for Le Havre: Rear Link Wireless log
As Adjutant of 9 RTR Capt. John Hodges was responsible
for communication with the formation commanding 9 RTR. This wireless
communication was called the "rear link". The rear link log shows the
sender or receiver of the message, the message itself, and the time when it
occurred.
The four stations to whom or from whom messages were
transmitted during the battle for Le Havre were:
34: 34 Armoured Brigade HQ
7: 7 RTR rear link
9: 9 RTR rear link
107: 107 RAC
rear link
Some terms used in the rear link wireless log are:
Infantry battalions of 146 Infantry Brigade, which
were:
1/4 KOYLI: 1st/4th Battalion of the King's Own
Yorkshire Light Infantry
4 LINCS: 4th Battalion of the Lincolnshire
Regiment
HALLAMS: The Halla