9th ROYAL TANK REGIMENT
WAR DIARY JUNE 1944 to JUNE 1945
Function of a War Diary
The War Diary of an
army unit records details of its activities while in a theatre of war. It is
primarily an historical record, and can later be used to trace what happened in
an action or campaign. The Diary may be supplemented by Intelligence Summaries,
kept either together with the Diary or as a separate set of documents.
Information to be recorded includes, but is not limited to:
·
Changes in assignment: some units, and 9 RTR
was one, came under command of different formations at various times during the
campaign. The Diary should show the time, date, and place of such transfers,
giving map references of the significant places.
·
Changes in command, establishment, equipment,
or organization. These changes should also show time, date, and place. From
time to time the Diary should list the names of key personnel in the unit.
·
Before an action, the Diary should record: the
intention of the action; any information that could assist the unit commander
to achieve his part of the plan, eg strength and disposition of enemy forces
and own troops, including support forces such as Air Force, ground and weather
conditions etc; plan to achieve the intention, which will include the plan of the
unit’s parent formation, and the plan for the unit itself; the unit’s plan will
be the basis for issuing orders to subunits; logistical arrangements.
·
At the end of the day’s activities, which could
include movement, training, preparation for activities, combat etc: summary of
activities during the day, including that of subunits down to appropriate
level; preparation of defensive works, including laying of mines; weather and ground conditions, where they
were of significance.
·
Changes to the state of men and equipment,
which can include: casualties, including prisoners-of-war taken by the enemy;
this will be in summary only, the details being recorded by the Orderly Room;
changes to weapons could include loss by enemy action or mechanical failure, or
gain by repair or replenishment.
·
Information on the effect of the operations on
the enemy: casualties inflicted, prisoners taken, damage to equipment;
identification of formations in immediate opposition; any other information
gained likely to be of value.
·
If appropriate, care should be taken to provide
relevant copies of maps, aerial photographs, and of radio logs if maintained.
Each month, or at the
end of a significant operation, the unit commander should write a brief
analytical summary based on what has been recorded. Comments by the commander
should include the reasons for success or failure, the lessons learned, and
what can be done to improve future operations.
War Diary of 9 RTR
The person with direct
responsibility for the War Diary in 9 RTR was the Intelligence Officer (IO). He
had many other duties, including the collection, analysis, and onward
transmission of intelligence, particularly as it could help the CO in making
decisions. The IO was also responsible for the provision of appropriate maps to
all subordinate commanders, ensuring where possible that the maps had defence
overprints.
In action he was the commander of one of the four RHQ tanks. Thus at the
times when the items of greatest significance for the Diary were happening, the
IO was subject to the hazards of battle and the jolting rides of cross-country
movement. The IO in June 1944 was Lt Frank Haydon. He was promoted to captain
and the command of the Recce Troop in September 1944, and Lt Laurie Le Brun,
always known as Bruno and previously 13 Troop Leader, was appointed IO.
The War Diary as it appears here was transcribed from the copy of the
Diary in possession of the war-time Adjutant, Capt AEW (John) Hodges. There are
some differences between that copy of the Diary and what follows. The main
differences are:
1. The text has been edited by spelling out in full many of the words
recorded as abbreviations, and by some minor re-writing to make the sense
clearer.
2. The original war-time maps with their grids are no longer available.
Most, but not all, of the map references have therefore been deleted. The maps
provided show most of the locations referred to in the text.
3. Some illustrations are included to show people, places, and equipment.
It must be stressed that although most of the entries in the Diary are
factual and correct, there are occasions when what is recorded is contradicted
by other records or personal recollections. If any reader wants to use entries
in the Diary for research or other purposes, it is strongly recommended that
they cross-check the information with other sources.
Battalion or Regiment?
In talking or writing about the British Army there can be confusion
between the words ‘battalion’ and ‘regiment’. A battalion of either infantry or
armour is a unit of some 700 soldiers, generally consisting of a Unit HQ, from
where all activities of the unit are controlled and co-ordinated, an
Administrative or Headquarters sub-unit, and three combat or front-line
sub-units. The sub-units are companies in the infantry, batteries in the
artillery, and squadrons in the tanks.
The term ‘regiment’ formally stands for an administrative rather than a
tactical grouping. For example, the Dorsetshire Regiment comprised several
battalions, of which the 4th and 5th were in 43 Infantry
Division. Their abbreviated titles were 4 DORSETS and 5 DORSETS respectively.
The Royal Tank Regiment during World War II consisted of eight regular
battalions, four wartime only battalions, and
twelve Territorial battalions. In the deception operation ‘Fortitude’
there were also seven dummy RTR battalions. The 9th was
one of the wartime only battalions.
The history of nomenclature of what started in 1917 as the Tank Corps,
became the Royal Tank Corps in 1923, and then became the Royal Tank Regiment as
part of the Royal Armoured Corps when that was created shortly before World War
II, is
a bit more complicated.
There were battalions in the Tank Corps and the Royal Tank Corps, and
they remained battalions in the Royal Tank Regiment. On 1 January 1945 the
battalions of the RTR were renamed as regiments, becoming for example: 1st
Royal Tank Regiment, 9th Royal Regiment, 48th Royal Tank
Regiment. Thus the 9th is referred to in the War Diary as sometimes
a battalion
and sometimes as a regiment; abbreviations used include: 9th
R Tanks, 9th RTR, and 9 RTR.
3. Epsom 1
4. Epsom 2
5. Epsom 3
8. Breakout
9. Bridges
10. To Le Havre
11.
Le
Havre
12.
To
Holland
13. Raids in Holland
14. Clarkeforce
15.
Roosendaal
1
16.
Roosendaal
2
17. Movements
Nov 44 to Mar 45
18. Geilenkirchen
19. Reichswald plan
21. After Reichswald
22. Broedersbosch
WAR DIARY
11
June to 23 June 1944
Refer Map 1
On June 11, the Advance Party left Aldershot for
France and the following day the battalion moved by train and road to the
Marshalling Area near Gosport.
After the first week, when
everyone had been busy sealing, and the tanks undergoing wading trials, life at
Aldershot had been leisurely only to be distributed with excitement as the odd
assortment of kit, which included a pamphlet on France and a number of French
phrases, “Not to be shown in public”, were distributed.
The Marshalling Area provided less excitement but
more entertainment for the final stage of sealing was completed within a few
hours of arrival, and departure delayed by heavy seas in the Channel. During
the period waiting, every available penny was raked together but, owing to the
tax on beer, was soon again in the hands of the Government.
By 18 June the weather was
considered sufficiently settled to allow further embarkation, and Battalion
Headquarters, A Squadron and part of B Squadron were loaded on L.C.T’s. There
were not, however, sufficient of these craft for the whole Battalion, due to
the number smashed on the Normandy coast by the rough seas, and the remainder
of the Battalion were allotted L.S.T’s, one of which was American – those who
were lucky enough to cross on this ship not only had a pleasant journey across,
lasting four days, but also enjoyed the pleasant experience of American food.
The Channel, however, had not calmed to the extent presumed by the embarkation
authorities and neither craft nor ship was able to land until June 21, except
for the Echelons which got ashore on June 19. Each craft had a different
experience to tell; anchors and kedges had been lost; tanks had broken from
their chains and bulged the sides of the craft, causing certain alarm; balloons
had broken loose and torn away rigging; and a high percentage of the Battalion
experienced the agony of being sea-sick.
The whole Battalion
nevertheless had disembarked on Juno Beach by June 22 and concentrated in the
area St. Gabriel .
The enemy had remained exceedingly quiet – no
aircraft were seen nor did shelling disturb the quiet of those hot summer days.
On the coast, except for the broken and damaged craft on the beach, there were
none of the ravages of war that later controlled every landscape.
Under the command of viii Corps, the Battalion awaited orders for the first
action.
BAPTISM AT
CHEUX
24 June to 2
July 1944
June 24 On the night of 24 June, the Battalion did a road march
to area Secqueville en Bessin and there spent the day resting and preparing for
battle. The following night the Battalion left for the forming up point, line
of railway 9171 – 9271, and arrived
there at 0200 hrs.
Using the Caen-Bayeux railway as a start
line, the intention was to attack with two Infantry Brigades up supported by a
Tank Brigade, and having made a hole in the enemy defences, to pass elements of
an Armoured Division through and thus establish a break-out from the original
bridgehead.
9
RTR were under command 15 (S) Division.
The
general plan was as follows:-
Phase I:
Right – 7 RTR (less 1 Squadron) in support one
Brigade, to cut Tilley-Caen Road and secure high ground Haut du Bosq.
Left
– 9 RTR (less C Squadron) to attack St. Manvieu – La Gaule.
Phase II:
With
Left flank secured by 15 Recce (1) C Squadron supporting Gordons to capture
Colleville and Montrainville, and if possible secure bridgehead over River Orne;
(2) one Squadron 7 RTR with one Battalion 227 Bde to capture Grainville sur
Odon .
Elements
of 11 Armoured Division to pass through, seize bridges and then occupy high
ground pt 112 and pt 113. RAF support and artillery barrage of about 600 field
and heavy guns was to precede the attack.
June 26 The battalion attacking with A and B Squadrons, crossed
the start line at 0730 hours, following closely behind the barrage. By 0815
hours the River Mue had been crossed. No strong opposition had yet been met but
the infantry found it difficult to clear the enemy from the high crops which
provided cover for snipers who were also in the trees. At 0940 hours,
house-clearing on the objectives had begun. Armour had been reported in the
area South of Cheux, but by 1125 hours objectives were clear, except for one
strongpoint in St. Manvieu, which was finally destroyed by CROCS. The infantry
dug in and the tanks remained in support to assist in beating off
counter-attacks which were made on a small scale south of La Gaule and East of
St. Manvieu. No heavy anti-tank guns had been encountered but one tank
commander had been killed during the barrage and three tanks damaged. It was
estimated that at least two companies of enemy had been killed.
At 1515 hours, a regiment of 11 Armoured
Division with Recce elements passed through and established themselves on the
high ground north of Cheux. The threat of an armoured counter-attack had not
yet developed.
At 1915 hours, without
artillery support and the expected air attack on Grainville and Colleville, C
Squadron began their advance in heavy rain. They pushed across the Tilly-Caen
Road and had great difficulty in getting through the sunken narrow roads of
Cheux. They eventually got on to the 100 ring contour South of Cheux and moved
forward down the slope to support the infantry into Colleville, through the
high corn. Heavy anti-tank fire, which included S.P. 88mm’s and Panthers, was
encountered on the left flank (supposed to be held by 15 Recce) and to the
front.
Continual rain made it
difficult to locate the targets and gradually one tank after the other became a
casualty. By splitting the Squadron so that half engaged the enemy tanks and
SPs, while the remainder pushed on to help the infantry, who were in trouble
with mortars and snipers at the approaches to Colleville, there were further
casualties. The Gordons actually got to Colleville but not in sufficient strength
to hold it and were forced to withdraw under persistent mortar fire.
Some Shermans later moved on to the ridge, but as
they never fired a shot it is presumed that they never located a target or
conversely were a display of strength for morale purposes only.
By last night, only 6 tanks of C Squadron were still
engaged and under cover of darkness these tanks moved forward in an effort to
collect the remainder of the infantry still pinned to the ground – not more
than a company was found. In the darkness the tanks moved back into Cheux and
spent the few remaining hours of the night in a farmyard.
For his determination to achieve his objective
despite heavy opposition, Major R.E. Holden, O.C “C” Squadron, was later
awarded the M.C.
Neither A nor B Squadrons were relieved until dark
and they leaguered on their respective objectives.
The casualties of C Squadron’s action were not as
heavy as anticipated. The Churchill proved that it could take a lot of
punishment and that it was slow to burn. Three ORs were killed and about ten
wounded. Complete write-offs in tanks later proved to be five.
At first light, C Squadron moved to the battalion
area north of Cheux.
June 27 A & B Squadrons carried out mopping-up operations
south of Cheux in the area Grainville and Colleville. Here again the fighting
was fierce with Panthers infiltrating from a flank after an area had been
clear, or remaining well camouflaged in an orchard or behind a hedgerow opening
up only at point-blank range. Ten Panthers were located in this area and two of
our tanks were lost. Lieutenant Mott was severely wounded, having his legs
amputated below the knee.
By
dusk, infantry had been supported into Grainville and Colleville and were
firmly established. The tanks leagured north of the Railway.
June 28 By 0950 hours A and B Squadrons had put the Cameronians
on the X- roads but the opposition was strong with enemy tanks resisting and
counter-attacks being frequently made from the directions of Noyers and Haut de
Forges NW to Grainville and Le Valtru. Three Panthers had been destroyed,
however, during the day.
June 29 At first light, C Squadron relieved A and B Squadrons and
took up a position South of railway crossing at Colleville.
Elements
of 11 Armoured Division had now crossed River Odon and were in position on Hill
112.
C
Squadron were shelled and mortared during the day, standing at immediate notice
to support infantry should further counter-attacks develop on Grainville.
At
1800 hours a strong infantry and tank counter-attack developed; two Panthers
had infiltrated into Grainville and German infantry were attacking Le Valtru. C
Squadron deployed north-west of X-roads and gave all support possible, and it
was estimated that 600 enemy dead were left on the ground as a result. Captain
K.A. Kidd, R.O., during the action worked magnificently to maintain
co-operation between tanks and infantry, and was later awarded the M.C.
Following
this abortive attack, an armoured counter-attack was made south of Haut du Bosq
but this was also later repulsed.
C
Squadron remained in position till dark – the only casualties being through
mortaring, which had damaged two tanks; five OR’s being wounded.
June 30 11 Armoured Division withdrew during the night, as C
Squadron stood by at 0430 hours under the threat of another counter-attack, but
nothing developed till the afternoon when 60 tanks of 9 S.S. Panzer attempted
to cut off all troops south of Cheux by again attacking Haut Du Bosq – this was
also beaten off.
C
Squadron were relieved by 7 R Tanks and joined the Battalion north of Cheux in
time to watch RAF bombing enemy tank concentrations in Villers Bocage area.
This was the first time that the RAF had been seen in action and morale rose
considerably.
July 1-2 The Battalion stood by to repulse further counter-attacks
in conjunction with 43 Division. The plans made were never put into effect –
continuous failure had apparently made the Germans accept the inevitable.
3 July to 25
July
July 2-3 The general intention of the Higher Command appeared
to be the capture of Caen and the clearing of ground to the south-west between
the rivers Odon and Orne. Carpiquet 9769 had been reported clear by the
Canadians, and Verson 9665 held by 43 Division. Eterville 9864 was, however, held
by the enemy. The Battalion was still concentrated north of Cheux and a recce
was ordered in conjunction with 130 Brigade (43 Division) of the area Verson –
Eterville – Maltot.
July 10 At 0300 hours Battalion moved to Forming up Point
area Fontaine Etoupefour 9664. The move was covered by Artillery and no
difficulties were encountered.
Battalion
Headquarters was established at 944653.
At
0500, B Squadron advanced with 5 Dorsets and in fifteen minutes Les Daims
968640 had been taken and only machine gun fire had been encountered.
It
was known that elements of 10 SS Pz Division threatened left flank and 12
Panthers were reported roaming in the
area of Eterville.
A
troop of 17-pounder S.P. took up positions to guard against this threat while B
Squadron pushed on to the Chateau. Resistance was still confined to machine gun
fire and snipers, and soon 6, 7 and 8 Troops captured their objective, but one
tank had been lost on the left flank, due to anti-tank fire later discovered to
be 75/55mm.
At 0614
hours, the objective was reported secure with the infantry firmly established
on the line of the road Fontaine-Etoupefour – Maltot.
About 30 prisoners had been taken, a number killed,
and at least 6 gun positions destroyed.
By 0625, C Squadron were advancing and with Besa
fire tearing the corn, the Germans came forward with their hands up. Those that
were not killed were taken prisoner and later identified as belonging to 1 and
2 Battalions 22 PGR. As the 4 Dorsets neared Eterville, B Squadron moved up and
gave added support from the right flank, destroying 2 unidentified anti-tank
guns.
The threat from the left still remained, but a
further troop of 17-pounder S.P. and 11 Troop of C Squadron were in good
positions waiting for the first sign of enemy tanks.
By 0735 hours, Eterville had been taken and B
Squadron rallied north of Les Daims. Heavy enemy mortar fire was, however,
concentrated on Eterville while A Squadron began their advance at 0815 hours
supported by B Squadron from right flank.
Up to now, the whole attack had gone perfectly, but
at 0835 hours A Squadron was severely worried by anti-tank fire from 4 S.P’s in
the area 985629, but as soon as an artillery concentration was brought down in
this area, 3 Troop reported than ANT was firing from 970622 and that two tanks
had been knocked out.
At 0933 hours, a strong
enemy counter-attack was made on Hill 112 and 7 RTR suffered a number of
casualties, including CO and 2IC. The right flank was thretened and anti-tank
fire was also reported from the high ground dominating Maltot to west of River
Orne. The impetus of the attack was failing – 2 Tigers were in Maltot making
the advance of the infantry extremely difficult and A squadron’s movement was
hampered by a troop of Tigers dug-in on the reverse slope of Hill 112, firing
north-east.
At 1156 hours A Squadron were still struggling to
support the infantry in Maltot who were now confronted with another Tiger.
The German infantry were now counter-attacking and
only 9 tanks of A Squadron were left. Major Ballantine, OC A Squadron,
dismounted in an attempt to make contact with the Infantry Commander, but was
severely wounded by mortar fire and subsequently died.
By 1200 hours, 2i/c A Squadron (Capt. Mockford)
reported that he only had four tanks capable of fighting and further reports
stated that counter-attacks were being made with tanks and infantry from
north-east and south-west of Maltot.
The Battalion was disposed as follows:-
B Squadron and elements of A
squadron in hull-down positions on spur 975628 – 992638 with infantry and anti-tank guns dug in.
C Squadron had joined
Battalion Headquarters in forward rally after release by 4 Dorsets. Battalion
Headquarters had been mortared and shelled periodically causing severe
casualties among the wounded that had been brought in.
From 1330-1600 hours, there was a stalemate – the
enemy making no attempt to push their counter-attack any further. A new plan
was devised whereby one Squadron 7 R Tanks were to put WORCS on Hill 112 and C
Squadron to put 4 Dorsets into Maltot. B Squadron were to give support from the
right in the opening phase. 4 Armoured Brigade was waiting to go through.
The advance began at 1640 hours and, despite
anti-tank gunfire from south-west of Maltot, C Squadron had put the infantry
into the village by 1700 hours; but 10 minutes later C Squadron were being shot
at from the rear, for once again enemy tanks had infiltrated under cover of the
spur north-east of Hill 112. 8 Tigers were also moving in on the left flank,
and the infantry were pulling out of Maltot under pressure.
At 1935 hours, C Squadron was also forced to
withdraw under the cover of supporting fire from B Squadron. Mortaring and
shelling was almost continuous and at 2030 hours all tanks rallied at the
Forming up Point, and later joined A Echelon at 946659 to replenish and collect reinforcements.
Casualties suffered were:-
Major Ballantine;
2/Lt. Hendrie and 4 other ranks killed.
Capt. Kirby, Lt. Douglas, Lt. Drew, Lt. Chapman and
28 OR’s wounded; 29 OR’s missing.
16 tanks had been destroyed; 6 of which were
recoverable.
One Tiger and 1 SP had been completely destroyed and
others probably damaged. Enemy infantry casualties, including killed, wounded
and prisoners exceeded 200.
This rather costly action taught many lessons. Lack
of bedding etc. in enemy defence positions proved that at night defence
positions were held only by light patrols, and that the main force withdrew to
avoid the discomforts of continual shelling; therefore, an infantry attack at
night co-ordinated so that tanks would be available at first light would have a
greater chance of immediate success.
Enemy tanks, however, proved the greatest difficulty
– dug-in, camouflaged in orchards and usually positioned on a flank they had
every advantage including that of tank-tank fire power. To pin-point their
location in battle for use by the artillery was also difficult and, under
shellfire, enemy tanks moved to alternative positions that commanded as good a
field of fire as before. To make a direct attack on these positions would
necessitate the ignoring of the original objective and probably lead to further
engagements. For their flank positions, smoke was the only answer, but weather
conditions do not always permit a prolonged smoke screen.
Enemy counter-attacks made by infantry and tanks
were generally successful, because having released supporting tanks our own
infantry did not prepare adequate anti-tank defence – mines were never used;
PIATs, though effective, were not popular, and there was usually too great a
delay in bringing up 17-pounders, the crews of which were unfortunately very
exposed to mortar fire. 17-Pounder SP’s were not used in the counter-attack
role for they too were vulnerable to mortar and shell fire. Tanks having fought
their way to the objective rarely had sufficient ammunition to remain as
permanent anti-tank guns, a role hardly suitable for the Churchill.
July 11-12 Battalion remained in same location,
obtaining reinforcements and replacements which included 10 Mk VII’s, at the
same time standing by to assist 7 R Tanks who were still in the area Hill 112,
in a counter-attacking role.
July 13-16 Battalion moved to 901705 in order to rest and on the
night of July 16 moved to relieve 7 R Tanks in counter-attack on Chateau de
Fontaine and Hill 112. The supporting Infantry Brigade were 129 Brigade.
Battalion moved into position 952644 last light, and all crews began digging
deep holes in which to sleep.
Just
after 2300 hours, following mortar and shell fire, the harbour area was
attacked by about 6 Ju 88s, who straffed and bombed. Lt- Col. Sir Nugent
Everard Bart was wounded in the head and back, together with 7 O.Rs. 1 OR was
killed. 2 Stuarts and 2 scout-cars were also damaged. Major Warren took over
command. Shelling and mortaring continued throughout the night.
July 17 At first light, HQ, B & C Squadrons moved out
to area 955636, Squadrons deployed with 2 troops up. Mortaring continued
throughout the day and in retaliation a shoot was carried out by all 75 and
95mm guns, resulting in the silencing of an MG that had been worrying the
infantry. An SP was forced to disclose its position and infantry reported a
Panther set on fire – no confirmation available. At 1930, a further shoot was
made on the centre of St. Martin 9760, which drew heavy retaliation from enemy
mortars, resulting in 3 minor casulties.
July 18-19 Very similar to July 17 – intervals of mortar and shell
fire. Recces and plans made for counter-attack roles. Shoot carried out on Wood
9661 reported to harbour 3 Tigers. Lt. Col. P.N. Veale, M.C., assumed command
of the Battalion.
July 21 At 1430 hours, an enemy counter-attack threatened
and B Squadron moved up to crest to give moral support to infantry. Heavy
mortaring resulted in Major Warren and 2 ORs being wounded – no counter-attack
developed, but a party towed away a number of dead cows whose stench did more
to lower morale than the persistent mortaring and shelling.
7 R
Tanks brought up into area to attack Maltot to correspond with Canadian attack
on Etavaux 0062. Following the attack but corresponding with Canadian attack on
St. Andre sur Orne 0161, 9 R Tanks were ordered to be prepared to attack
Feuguerolles sur Orne 9961 and St. Martin 9760.
July 22 1815 hours. Support given to 7 R Tanks attack on
Maltot with 75 and 95mm fire aimed at Nebelwerfers in area 70 ring contour
9860, 9861. First shoot drew heavy mortaring but there was no reply to the
second shoot. During this time, Major Holden got mixed up with his Slidex and
reported “Dead”. Persisting in this report, he was advised to call skeleton “O”
Groups.
July 23-25 The intensity of mortaring and shelling decreased and a
further shoot was carried out on 88 located at 956614, but no further orders
were received concerning attack on Feuguerolles and St. Martin. On 25 July,
after watching rocket-firing Typhoons brassing up enemy positions south of
Caen, the Battalion received orders to move to Fontenay Le Pesnil 8867.
After
nine days of air attack at night and shelling and mortaring at all times during
the day and night, no-one was sorry to leave.
The
attack on Feuguerolles and St. Martin, which was to have been done down a
valley dominated on both sides by enemy positions, had not promised to be the
best of adventures either.
MINES AND THE BOCAGE
26
July to 12 August
July 26 After a night march, the
battalion concentrated at Fontenay Le Pesnil 966669, and here came under
command 59 Division. The Battalion had the task of supporting 176 Brigade in
counter-attack roles on three positions – Haut du Bosq 9066; Rauray 8865; Pt
126 and Brettevillette 8864. The country in this area had been heavily mined by
the enemy; it consisted of small fields bounded by thick hedgerows and ditches,
and was undoubtedly the most difficult tank country that the battalion had yet
encountered. The field of vision was generally less than 100 yards and in any
deployed movement there could not be any visual contact between troops; large
tree stumps, torn and gashed by shellfire, together with the deep ditches provided natural tank obstacles. It was
essential that each area was very carefully reconnoitered so that, should an
emergency arise, each tank commander would know beforehand the exact line of
advance of each tank. These areas were under constant shell and mortar fire,
which added to the difficulties, and at 1800 hours B Squadron suffered a most
unfortunate disaster. The troop leaders of this Squadron went forward for a
rendezvous with Major Reynell, who was then making his plan just north of
Brettevillette 8864. Dismounting from the track, an “S” mine was exploded,
resulting in the deaths of Lt. Wolskel, Lt. Smart and Sgt. Nichols. Lt. Beale
and Lt. Cargill were wounded and the latter died a few days later.
July 31 The
reconnaissance and forming of plans for these three counter-attack roles lasted
a couple of days, and finally, on 31 July, a demonstration was given by two
troops of “C” Squadron with a company of 7 Norfolks in the method that had been
adopted in clearing this type of country. Each hedgerow was to be considered as
an objective and artillery fire would be brought down on this line until raised
by the infantry command to the ground. Simultaneously with artillery targets I,
Targets II and III would be engaged. For the first phase, tanks would sit at
the starting line and engage hedgerows on flanks, keeping fire in front of
infantry who would advance along these hedgerows.
Phase I would be complete
when infantry reached the corner of the field and tanks would then concentrate
their fire to hedge immediately to their front which had previously been
engaged only by hull MGs.
The infantry would now use
LMGs from positions in corner of field to engage next hedge to their front and,
following a verey signal, tanks would move as fast as possible to the opposite
hedgerow and the clearing would advance a further stage.
It is necessary to point
out that as soon as artillery fire was lifted from target I it would move to
target II.
In the case of the attack
being made with 2 companies and 2 troops (which was most likely) it was
essential that closest co-operation be maintained so that no advance moved
faster than the other, otherwise casualties would be inflicted by own fire.
To ensure this
co-operation, all troops of each Squadron practiced this method with their respective
infantry; 26 Squadron Assault Regiment Royal Engineers also helped by using
petards and bulldozers to make gaps in the hedgerows.
An experiment was made with
artificial moonlight or movement light from searchlights, so that infantry
might attack at night, and having secured their objective have tanks in
position at first light to repulse any possible counter-attack. This too was
quite successful, the light provided being adequate for movement.
August 1 An
experiment was carried out to test the effectiveness of the Projectile Infantry
Anti-Tank (PIAT) against the glacis plate of a Panther; complete penetration
was not obtained and it was discovered that the cement veneer covering the Panther
did much to nullify the effect of the PIAT bomb; the substance crumbled and
prevented firm contact being made before the bomb itself exploded.
A 75mm hollow charge shell
used by the 75mm Gun, carried by Airborne troops, was also obtained and by
inserting this into the case of the 75mm tank gun, it was also possible to try
its effect on the glacis plate of the Panther. Complete penetration was not
obtained but in all cases the tank would have been knocked out.
Since 29 July 1944, 197
Brigade (59 Division) had been patrolling in strength, sometimes assisted by
tanks of 7 R Tanks, and the general impression gained from prisoners of war was
that the enemy were withdrawing under pressure of concentrated artillery fire,
together with lack of food, sleep and at times ammunition.
1700
Orders were received that 59 Division with 31 Tank Brigade in support
would capture Pt 213 on Villers Bocage – Caen Road, one mile north-east of
Villers Bocage.
Phase I: 197 Brigade with 2 Squadrons 7 R Tanks in support and 2 troops C
squadron 22 Dragoons under command, to feel forward and contact enemy.
Phase II: On contact, attack to be
made with 2 Brigades up:-
Right – 176 Brigade with 9 R
Tanks in support.
Left – 177 Brigade with one
Squadron 7 R Tanks in support.
26 Squadron ARE; 2 troops 22
Dgns, and 304 Anti-tank SPRA under
command Division Boundary: Right – Main Road Villy Bocage 0259 – Les Fains 6361
– Juvigny 8466.
Left – line of 87 Easting.
9 R Tanks plan was as
follows:-
To attack with 2 squadrons
up supporting 2 Battalions.
Right – C Squadron in
support 7 Norfolks with Flail and AVRE support.
Left – A Squadron in support
7 S. Staffs with Flail and AVRE support.
B Squadron with 6 N. Staffs
to give right flank protection while one Squadron 7 R Tanks secured the left
flank by attacking the area Pt. 142.
Boundaries:
Right – Main road Villy
Bocage – Les Fains.
Left – Road-rail crossing
849590 – X- roads Monts 8561 – road-track junction 864639.
Probable start line – Rd
835625 – Monts 8561.
2/3 August During
August 2 and 3, 197 Brigade continued to patrol forward, meeting little
opposition but encountering large quantities of mines, both anti-tank and “S”.
At 1700 hours August 3, pt. 142 and Villy Bocage had been secured and leading
infantry were held up 500 yards short of pt. 213.
1900
Battalion less B Squadron move to forward assembly area, 851646 where
they were joined by B Squadron the following morning. No specific orders to
attack had yet been received, though the C.O. went to attend an “O” Group at
0100 hours only to find it had been cancelled without him being informed.
4 August By 1200
hours, 197 Brigade reported that they had crossed Villers Bocage – Caen Road
and that no firm contact had been made with the enemy. Two hours later, 176
Brigade and 9 R Tanks were informed that they were now at 30 minutes notice to
move, and at an “O” held at 835588, the following orders were given:-
9 R Tanks supporting 176
Brigade were to secure high ground formed by pts 158 (852562), 185 (861548) and
192 (817556).
Method: A Squadron with 7 S. Staffs to pt 158.
C Squadron
with 7 N. Staffs to pt 185.
B Squadron
with 6 N. Staffs to pt 192.
Battalion Headquarters to
be established at Le Mesnil Hervieu 9455 and 176 Headquarters Epinay sur Odon.
1500
Battalion begins to move. Orders were received from a divisional source
that main road could be used only as far as Les Fains owing to mines and that
from then on a cross-country route, which had been beaten by FLAILS, would be
used. The main road was, however, subsequently cleared and the Squadrons
ferrying their infantry as far as Villers Bocage, pushed onto their objectives,
which they reached by nightfall.
This being the first
occasion on which it had been possible to make any substantial advance, the
road became blocked with traffic, so Headquarters moved along the cross-country
route and waited at 837591 to allow Villers Bocage which was a veritable
“bottle-neck” to clear.
Here, further orders were
given by Commander 176 Brigade for the following day. The intention of the
Brigade was to make a thrust to contact, and, if possible, gain a bridgehead
across River Orne. An advance was to be made on two-thrust lines:-
Right – C Squadron with 7
Norfolks.
Route:- pt 200 – Courvadon – Nidalos – Montigny – La Canie Goupil
