OPERATION “VERITABLE”, XXX CORPS

REPORT ON 34 ARMOURED BRIGADE OPERATIONS

The Reichswald Forest Phase, 8 to 17 February 1945

After ten days fighting in the Reichswald the Commander of 34 Armoured Brigade, Brigadier W.S. Clarke, decided to review the conduct of the battle, and to record the experiences and conclusions of the senior officers of the Brigade. He asked the Commanding Officer of 9 RTR, Lt-Col P.N. Veale, MC, to prepare an initial report which was to be studied and then discussed by the group of senior officers. The lessons learnt were thus to be made available to armoured units who might have to fight in forests in the future.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Preamble and notes on planning

2. Operational plan, 34 Armoured Brigade

3. Narrative account of fighting

4. 9 RTR Report on aspects of forest fighting

5. Minutes of a Conference held to examine lessons learnt

Appendices

A. Topographical Report

B. 9 RTR and 147 RAC Operational Instructions

C. Claims, casualties, and notes on difficulties in keeping tanks battle-worthy

PREAMBLE, and NOTES ON PLANNING

Operation Veritable, the elimination of German troops west of the River Rhine, was completely disrupted by the German attack in the Ardennes on 16 December 1944, which developed into the Battle of the Bulge. When the German thrusts had been held and thrown back, the plan for Veritable was re-activated.

By 24 January 1945 34 Armoured Brigade was concentrated in the area Eindhoven, thus leaving more than two weeks to prepare and move forward for Operation Veritable.

On 26 January the Corps Commander opened a briefing conference for commanders and staff officers to brigade level by illustrating how the scope and importance of the operation had increased during the month’s postponement, both by reason of the Russian successes in the East and Rundstedt’s costly expenditure of his strategic reserve in the West.

First Canadian Army was to control the offensive, using XXX British and II Canadian Corps. The initial phases were to be carried out by XXX Corps, which had the task of breaking through the Siegfried Line in the area of the Reichswald Forest, then exploiting to the line Geldern – Wesel. XXX Corps, consisting of six infantry divisions, one armoured division, resources of 79 Armoured Division and three armoured brigades, would be supported by five Army Groups Royal Artillery (AGsRA), and the entire air resources of 21 Army Group.

The tactics of the offensive had changed little from the plan of December. The attack, timed for 1030 hrs 8 February, would be preceded by five hours intensive artillery bombardment. Five infantry divisions, with tank, flail, crocodile, and AVRE support, were to attack a sector held by little more than one enemy division.

From the right, i.e. from south to north, those divisions were: 51 Highland, 53 Welsh, 15 Scottish, 2 Canadian, 3 Canadian. The two Canadian divisions were to revert to the command of II Canadian Corps after the first phase.

The first objectives for 51, 53, and 15 Divisions were to be taken by first light on D+1. Exploitation was to be done by 43 Wessex Division and the Guards Armoured Division, the former driving on Goch from the north with the Guards pushing through Udem towards the line Geldern – Wesel.

For the Operation 34 Armoured Brigade, less 107 RAC, was put under command 53 Div, and 107 RAC was put under command 51 Div. The following units were placed under 34 Armoured Brigade:

Under command:

Westminster Dragoons less one squadron (flails)

A Squadron 141 RAC (Crocodiles)

82 Assault Squadron RE

In support

19 Canadian Field Regiment (Self-propelled 25-pounders)

PLANNING

Note on security: An exceptionally high standard of security was demanded and maintained. This prohibited even the area of attack being made known to troop leaders until a few days before the attack, and consequently some time was lost to them for planning and study of air photographs etc. Great benefit was, however, derived from the Brigade’s early move (night of 3/4 February) to the assembly area; the troop and tank commanders, now briefed, were able to observe and study the actual ground despite the poor visibility prevailing at the time.

Major concerns in planning

GOC 53 Div laid down primarily that armour would predominate in the attack over the open ground from the start line to the forest, and would put the infantry into the Reichswald. After this point it was not known what the going would be like.

A good supply of defence overprints and excellent air photographs was available, and a Planning Room was established at Brigade HQ. A number of Brigade conferences were held to determine means of overcoming the several problems presented by the circumstances of the attack. The main points causing concern were:

1. State of ground west of the forest

At the time of planning there was a severe frost and the ‘going’ was hard, but it was obvious that should there be a sudden thaw the low-lying ground would rapidly become a morass of mud. Planning had thus to allow for either contingency.

a. Frost conditions: great difficulty and much labour had been occasioned in the Ardennes by the lack of ice-bar tracks, but a supply was made available in Eindhoven and the fitting of them was put on high priority. Unfortunately, they were delivered without pins and the resultant improvisation caused a delay, which in turn restricted the amount of training done with the infantry. Tests showed the ice-bars to be very satisfactory, and anxiety regarding the mobility of the Churchills was allayed.

The flail problem remained, however. Lt-Col Blair Oliphant, 30 Armoured Brigade representative, considered that on favourable ground seven troops would be needed to clear the number of lanes required by the Divisional plan. As only six troops had been allotted it would necessary to use at least one troop for two tasks.

This situation was liable to be aggravated because on a frost-hardened surface flail chains are effective for 400 yards only, and from close study of the defence overprints enemy mines were shown to a depth of 1,000 to 1,200 yards. Although each flail tank carries one spare set of chains it was apparent that flail resources would have to be carefully husbanded. Brigadier Clarke therefore decided to accept tank casualties by leading with Churchills until a definite minefield was established, and by resuming the lead whenever there appeared to be unmined gaps of any size.

b. Thaw conditions: Serious consideration was given to the possibility of a general thaw. Track and cross-country movement would obviously be difficult even for Churchill tanks if rain should accompany a thaw.

With this in mind two special routes from the assembly area to battle assembly areas were reconnoitred, one for each regiment, and engineer assistance was obtained to improve them where it was considered necessary. These routes had to avoid roads to be used later as main supply routes.

The flails and AVsRE presented a still more serious problem. The minefield and anti-tank ditch were located between Groesbeek and the Reichswald in low-lying ground with peat sub-soil that a thaw would reduce to a quagmire. Tracks were forbidden to use the main divisional axis, but Brigadier Clarke obtained permission from General Ross to flail and use this axis if flails should be incapable of operating across country; it was to be used by armour only as a last resort.

If flails should prove completely incapable Brigadier Clarke determined to expend one squadron of Churchills in an endeavour to get through the mud and mines before giving up the attempt to lead the infantry onto their first objective.

2. Minefields

Ground condition was the main anxiety in regard to the gapping of the minefields, and this, with action decided upon, has already been outlined in paragraph 1.

3. Anti-tank ditch bridging

The ground condition was again the pertinent factor. It was required to make six crossings, and the leading squadron of 147 RAC was to take forward four fascine AVsRE and two Churchill bridgelayers. To get these forward it was felt that it might be necessary to build a causeway with rubble and bricks to be taken from the houses built along the main axis.

4. Entry into the Reichswald

From maps and air photos it was not possible to decide whether tanks would be able to get into the forest without engineer assistance. GOC 53 Div therefore decided that the attack should be based on armour only to the forest, and that the tanks would then stand back and support the infantry in. One troop was to remain on immediate call to each forward battalion should tanks be needed to help the infantry to reach their first objectives within the forest.

5. Close support to infantry in the Reichswald

General Ross decided that to fulfil the Corps plan, i.e. to traverse the whole length of the northern edge of the Reichswald in the first 24 hours, he must have close tank support to the infantry inside the forest, both by day and night.

In the Ardennes 53 Div had formed a high regard for the capacity of tanks to demoralise the enemy by crashing through trees by night. It was realised that little or no observed fire would be possible, but it was felt that the tanks would be amply justified merely by their presence and speculative fire.

9 RTR, whose task lay solely in the forest, did intensive training with 160 Infantry Brigade in woods in the Eindhoven area. As a result of this training Lt-Col Veale was full of confidence in his ability to remain with the infantry throughout the advance.

Maintenance of direction by night was the problem that caused Lt-Col Veale most deliberation. Eventually the Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) agreed to shine two vertical pilot lights. These were to be set about 3,000 yards apart, and to make it easier to recognize them one was to flash the letter ‘O’ and the other the letter ‘H’ throughout the night. It was hoped that tank commanders would be able to check their position by taking readings on the lights with hand compasses. It was ensured that spotlights were fitted to tanks for these night operations.

6. Training with infantry

Training was restricted by availability of tanks. In addition to the fitting of ice-bar tracks, a great deal of maintenance was needed after the Brigade’s arduous journeyings in the Ardennes. Training concentrated on:

a. Close support to infantry through woods

b. Teamwork in liquidating pillboxes

As indicated in paragraph 3 it was found that the Churchill could push through trees, and the results of the training were most heartening.

For training pillbox teams it was necessary to find a place where live ammunition could be fired, and this was not easy in the populated Eindhoven – Helmond area. A suitable wood was eventually found, and 53 Div Engineers built canvas bunkers to the same scale as those found in the Siegfried Line.

The principle was to flush the enemy from the shelter of the pillbox into the open where they could be dealt with by our infantry. It was assumed that an infantry battalion would be supported by one squadron of tanks and one troop of AVsRE, and that the battalion would advance on a two-company front, each with two platoons forward. It was decided that each forward platoon should be supported by one troop of tanks, but that the AVsRE should be held centrally. The following is a description of an attack carried out during this training.

The troop of tanks advance in line ahead, led by the troop leader and protected on each flank by the infantry. The first information was normally brought back by infantry scouts. The platoon and troop commanders then made their plan, and decided whether it was necessary to use smoke as protection against support pillboxes.

The tanks then advanced and heavily engaged the pillbox frontally with all types of ammunition, aiming particularly at the weapon slits to keep the enemy subdued. Meanwhile a bren gun team worked round to the rear of the pillbox. When this team had been allowed time to get into position the remainder of the platoon and the troop demonstrated frontally, with the idea of flushing out the enemy. On occasions the tanks, by shooting at one mark, first broke the concrete and then switched to HE. This encouraged the enemy to withdraw from the pillbox, whereupon they were met by the bren team.

When the position was cleared the pillbox was blown by sappers to prevent the enemy infiltrating and re-occupying.

It was decided that it would be preferable to hold the troop of AVsRE at Battalion HQ rather than keep one AVRE forward with each team. Should AVRE assistance be needed to break a hole in the concrete they could easily be called forward if they were on the tank squadron commander’s frequency.

7. Roads available for maintenance

The divisional front, at the start line little more than 1,000 yards wide, contained only one road running parallel to the attack. Even this road was only 14 feet wide with very little metalling, and as the whole impetus of the advance was to depend on it, all rearward movement was forbidden.

Refilling had therefore to be done forward, but it was felt that wheeled columns could not be relied on to reach the tanks. To overcome these maintenance problems Brigade applied for 20 gutted carriers and 10 sledges. The carriers were not forthcoming, but 10 sledges were obtained on D minus 1.

These were loaded with petrol and ammunition, and to avoid embarrassment to 147 RAC during the first phase of the attack 9 RTR was detailed to tow all sledges forward. A percentage were to be jettisoned in the Plak area west of the forest for 147 RAC. Stuart tanks were to be filled with petrol, each tank capable of carrying approximately 160 gallons. 147 RAC also had two turretless Churchills which Lt-Col Blain stocked with ammunition.

OPERATIONAL PLAN

34 Armoured Brigade (less 107 RAC)

INFORMATION

1. Enemy

(a) Order of Battle

The sector between the Rhine and the Maas is known to be under the control of 84 Division, with under command Kampfgruppe Katzmann and III Battalion 2 Para Regiment, and is divided into eight battalion localities. The only immediate tactical res available to 84 Div are 2-3 battalions. The enemy is unlikely to leave that vital sector so weakly defended and the presence of a reserve infantry div in the Cleve-Goch area must be accepted.

In spite of move Eastwards, the enemy by virtue of his withdrawal to the Siegfried Line in the Ardennes and his abandoning of the offensive and subsequent withdrawals in Alsace, has some fifteen divisions out of contact on the Allied Front, in the proportion of two Panzer type to one infantry. Some of these could be made available to reinforce his troops in the “Reichswald Plug”.

(b) Defences

The enemy has constructed three main lines of defence on the Reichswald front: a forward line, the Siegfried Line and the Hochwald “lay-back” line.

The present enemy positions are in the nature of strong outposts to the main Siegfried defences and are being manned in strength. These outposts are organized in two lines. In the first, depth from outposts to rear companies is about 2000 yards and an average battalion front is 1500 yards. Behind this is a second line running north from the R. Maas at 7648 along the western edge of the Reichswald and then to Kranenburg.

Further west is an elaborate trench system and an A/tank ditch forming an advance position in front of the Nutterden area; this is the Siegfried Line. This trench system continues through the Forest to Hekkens 8347 and then in a SE direction.

The Hochwald “lay-back” line is a recently constructed defence line which runs from Rees 0752 to 0446, where it continues south past the Hochwald forest towards Geldern 0125.

Concrete defences appear on the Nutterden feature. West of this none are visible except for some possible concrete shelters around AA sites.

2. Own Troops

(a) 53 (W) Division is attacking to capture the Brandenberg features 8053, advance along and clear the high ground which runs through the Northern part of the Reichswald, capture the Stoppelberg features 8553, and finally concentrate in mobile reserve ready for future operations.

(b) Tps Under Comd

HQ 34 Armoured Brigade: with under command 9 R Tanks

147 RAC

W Dgns less A Squadron (Flails)

A Squadron 141 RAC (Crocs)

82 Assault Sqn RE (AvsRE)

with in support 19 Canadian Field Regiment (SP)

INTENTION

3. 34 Armd Bde will support 53 (W) Div in all phases of the operation.

Method

4. General Outline

53 (W) Div is attacking on a one brigade front with 71 Infantry Brigade leading. 71 Infantry Brigade is securing the Brandenberg features and 160 Infantry Brigade is passing through 71 Infantry Brigade and securing the Stoppelberg features. 158 Infantry Brigade is establishing itself in the area of the enemy defences 8252 and mopping up those defences within the inter-divisional boundaries. Should 160 Infantry Brigade meet with very heavy opposition 158 Infantry Brigade may pass through and capture the Stoppelberg features.

5. Grouping Infantry Brigades and elements 34 Armoured Brigade Group

	71 Infantry Bde	158 Infantry Bde	160 Infantry Bde
Under command	Coy 147 Fd Amb	Coy 202 Fd Amb	1 E Lan R Coy 212 Fd Amb
In Support RAC Tanks	147 RAC	147 RAC	9 R Tanks and A Sqn 147 RAC (+) for sp of 1E Lan R
Flails	W Dgns (less 1 Sqn)	1 sqn W Dgns (+)	1 Sqn W Dgns (+)
Crocs	½ Sqn 141 RAC	½ A Sqn 141 RAC (+)	½ A Sqn 141 RAC
ARE	1 ½ Tps 82 Aslt Sqn RE	1 ½ Tps 82 Aslt Sqn RE (+)	1 ½ Tps 82 Aslt Sqn RE
RA A/Tk:	279 A Tank Battery	Two tps 336 (SP) A Tank Battery	56 (SP) Cdn A Tank Battery
RE	244 Fwd Coy	555 Field Coy (Less 2 platoons)	282 Field Coy & 1 pl. 555 Field Coy
MG	A Coy 1 MANCH
Mor	D Coy 1 MANCH		D Coy 1 MANCH (+)
Med	147 Field Amb (less 1 Coy)	202 Field Amb (less 1 Coy)	212 Field Amb (less 1 Coy)
Assu	One Tentacle

6. Notes Elements 30 Armoured Brigade under command tank regimental Cos.

(+) = Taken over from 71 Infantry Brigade.

7. Tasks

(a) 71 Infantry Brigade with 147 RAC

71 Infantry Brigade group is advancing and securing the Brandenberg feature, exploiting to the line of the track running southwest from edge of the wood at 821530.

(b) 160 Infantry brigade with 9 R Tanks

(i) 160 Infantry Brigade group is moving in rear of 71 Infantry brigade Group, beginning to move on orders 53 (W) Division.

(ii) Once launched 160 Infantry Brigade Group is keeping in close contact with 71 Infantry Brigade Group, passing through 71 Brigade Group and breaking through the Siegfried Line in the area 8252.

(iii) One battalion (from 158 Brigade) and A Squadron 147 RAC are occupying a position in the area 825522 for right flank protection.

(iv) Having successfully broken through the enemy defences the Brigade is advancing and securing the Stoppelberg features.

8. 158 Infantry Brigade with 147 RAC

(a) 158 Infantry Brigade is at one hour’s notice from 081600 A.

(b) The Brigade Group is passing through 71 Infantry Brigade, mopping up within Division boundaries and occupying positions astride the enemy trench systems in the area 8252. The battalion temporarily under command 160 Infantry Brigade is reverting to 158 Infantry Brigade on the arrival of the Brigade in that area.

(c) Should 160 Infantry Brigade meet with very heavy opposition while breaking through the Siegfried Line defences, 158 Infantry Brigade may advance through 160 Infantry Brigade and secure the Stoppelberg features.

9. 34 Armoured Brigade

(a) 147 RAC in support 71 Infantry Brigade until Brandenberg feature has been secured when one squadron will go in support 160 Infantry Brigade for the support of the 158 Infantry brigade battalion under command 160 Infantry Brigade.

(b) 9 R Tanks in support 160 Infantry Brigade.

(c) 147 RAC in support 158 Infantry Brigade, joining that Brigade when it passes through 71 Infantry Brigade. The squadron of 147 RAC which moved in support 160 Infantry Brigade will remain with the 158 Infantry Brigade battalion, rejoining 147 RAC in support 158 Infantry Brigade.

10 Time Factor

(a) 71 Infantry Brigade Group is securing the line of the track running southwest from edge of wood at 821530 by 1600 hours D Day.

(b) 160 Infantry Brigade is securing the Stoppelberg feature by 0800 hrs

D + 1.

11. Concentrations

On completion of tasks all Brigade Groups are preparing to concentrate and move forward to carry out further operations.

12 R.A.

(a) Pre-Zero Bombardment

On D-Day 30 Corps Artillery is firing pre-zero bombardment on localities and enemy HQ (west of Reichswald), enemy batteries and movements from 0500-0920 hours (except between 0740 and 0750 hours).

(b) Barraage, Timed Concentrations and Pre-arranged Concentrations at call

Between 0920 – 1030 hours artillery preparation is being made for a barrage which will be fired by five forward regiments and four medium regiments on divisional front. The barrage has a depth of 500 yards and lifts 300 yards every 12 minutes; the first lift is at H Hour. It pauses between 1154 hours and 1227 hours and advances at the same rate to final line where it remains between 1315 and 1345 hours.

During this barrage, timed concentrations will be by pre-arranged concentrations at call.

(c) Allotment of FOOs

(i) 9 R Tanks two FOOS - 19 Cdn. Field Regiment (SP)

one FOO - 72 Med. Regiment

(ii) 147 RAC two FOOs - 19 Cdn Field Regiment (SP)

one FOO - 72 Med. Regiment

(d) Pilot Searchlights (SLs)

One sec 557 SL battery is providing “marker beacons” (flashing vertical beams) throughout the night D/D + 1 at 751545 (letter “H”) and 750577 (letter “O”).

13. Assault Regiment Royal Engineers (and Churchill bridge-layers)

(a) Two “Churchill” bridge-layers and fascine bridge-layers under command 147 RAC.

(b) Laying of assault bridges (each duplicated immediately alongside with fascine crossings suitable for light tracks and wheels) at approximate sites as follows:-

(i) Churchill bridge-layer 783535

Churchill bridge-layer 784539

(ii) SBG Assault bridge 786543

SBG Assault bridge 789544 (Not on main axis)

intercomMUnICATION

14. HQ Main HQ 30 Corps Hatert 679583

Main HQ 53 (W) Div. 717537

Main HQ 34 Armd. Brigade 700556

Tac HQ 34 Armd Brigade 752545

15. Wireless Wireless silence until 0700 hours D Day.

16. Liaison (a) Brigade LO to Main HQ 30 Corps.

(b) Brigade LO initially with 71 Infantry Brigade – later to 160 Infantry brigade.

17. H Hour and D Day 1030 hours 8 February

NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF OPERATIONS, 8 to 17 February

FINAL PREPARATIONS

A general thaw set in at the end of January, and the hard snow quickly disappeared to reveal extensive damage done to minor roads by the frost. When the Brigade moved to its assembly area south of Nijmegen on the night of 3/4 February, the tank column was routed on the main road via Nijmegen to avoid further damage to partially metalled roads. The move went exactly to time, and by first light all vehicles were as well camouflaged as netting and natural cover permitted. A total distance of 53 miles was covered by the column of 120 tanks in 9 hours.

The next few days were spent in tying up finally for the attack. Opportunity was taken to study the ground from the windmill at Groesbeek. From this vantage-point an excellent view of the enemy Forward Defence Localities and the western edge of the Reichswald could be obtained when visibility was good enough.

The fears for the effect of a thaw on the ‘going’, entertained in the earlier planning days, proved to be only too well founded. The weather had definitely broken and periodic rain made unmetalled roads almost impassable. The tank routes to the battle assembly area, previously improved by Canadian Engineers, worsened rapidly, and on D-1 the CRE of 53 Div, in response to an urgent request from Brigade, produced engineers and bulldozers to work on the worst places. Also on D-1 147 RAC sent three RHQ Churchills and one flail forward to prove the route. These tanks did valuable work in forcing fresh tracks through the forest. The route chosen for 9 RTR was in better shape, and a Churchill tank commander, sent with his tank to prove the route, reported it passable.

A Brigade co-ordinating conference, attended by the COs of 9 RTR, 147 RAC, and Westminster Dragoons, was held at 1730 hrs on 7 February. The Brigade Commander expressed his opinion that flails would be unable to operate over the ground conditions then obtaining, and repeated to 147 RAC that he was determined, if necessary, to expend a complete squadron before giving up the attempt to lead the infantry to the edge of the Reichswald. All preparations had been made.

D-DAY, 8 February

More than 1,000 guns taking part in the artillery preparation programme opened fire at 0500 hrs on 8 February. At 0630 147 RAC Group moved out of Malden and advanced to the Forward Assembly Area in the woods west of Groesbeek where squadrons married up with their infantry. By 0800 TAC 34 Armoured Brigade was established near TAC 71 Brigade on the high ground immediately west of Groesbeek. 9 RTR Group moved from Malden at 0815 to concentrate in the Forward Assembly Area at 7355 by 1030 hrs.

H hour

147 RAC

Capture of 71 Infantry Brigade first objective (line of houses north and south through 781544)

A Squadron – 4 RWF

A Squadron 147 RAC, co-operating with 4 RWF to capture the first objective had one squadron Flails under command. To assist in mopping up the line of houses along the Divisional axis as far as the objective, 4 RWF had under command one troop Flails and ½ squadron Crocs. The Squadron crossed the Start Line at 1010 hours and deployed for the attack. The leading troops moved close to the opening barrage line and halted, thus allowing 4 RWF to position themselves behind the tanks.

The advance began at 1030 hours but the ground was in a parlous state and “Flails” and “Crocs” could make no headway, the area of the Start Line was soon jammed with bogged vehicles. Ordinary Churchills however made steady, if slow, progress across the heavy fields. No opposition was met in the first 1,000 yards, but speculative Besa fire was freely used to the front and flanks. The first enemy were encountered at 775544 but they were quickly mopped up and 30 prisoners of war were taken.

All the flails were still bogged down near the Start Line but happily the defence overprints had grossly exaggerated the extent of the minefield and the tanks continued to advance. By 1155 hours, tanks and infantry, keeping well up to the barrage, were on the objective and another 30 to 40 prisoners of war had been taken.

Breaching of Anti-tank obstacle

B Squadron – 1 HLI C Squadron – 1 OXF BUCKS

As A Squadron and 4 RWF advanced to the first objective B and C Squadrons followed as closely as possible in order to make maximum use of the timed barrage. On the right B Squadron, co-operating with 1 HLI succeeded in getting all their tanks, including the two Churchill bridge-layers, to the start line at 78053. On the left, C Squadron, co-operating with 1 OXF BUCKS, moved up via the railway track but had considerable difficulty with wire.

The angle of the barrage across the obstacle permitted B Squadron to attack first and, meeting no mines, they quickly got a Churchill bridge-layer forward and established a crossing at 783535. Two troops of tanks went over at once and took up fire positions in the buildings at 786532, but the approach to the bridge worsened so quickly that the third troop was unable to cross. Some shelling and SA fire was experienced but the second bridge was also laid – unfortunately the ground at this point was too bad to permit its use. The ditch proved to be much narrower than it appeared on the air photos and certain places were found where it was possible for tanks to get across unaided, provided tanks did not attempt to move in the tracks of a previous tank. The remainder of the Squadron got across in this manner.

On the left C Squadron had to attack without flail support, relatively unimportant in view of the apparent absence of mines; and, much more serious, without their fascine AvsRE, all four having failed to get through to the Start Line. The Squadron Commander’s only hope therefore was to seize intact the bridge on the main axis, and this was accomplished by one company of infantry supported by one troop of tanks.

1 HLI and 1 OXF BUCKS having formed up east of the ditch were supported into the Forest by B and C Squadrons. Opposition was slight and objectives were taken by the infantry without great difficulty.

147 RAC less A Squadron, no longer required by 71 Infantry brigade, rallied in area Plak west of the Reichswald and restocked from Stuarts and the turretless Churchillls, and subsequently from sledges pulled up by tanks of 9 R Tanks.

Capture of Siegfried defence belt in the Reichswald

9 R Tanks

By 1540 hours 71 Infantry Brigade had reported the consolidation of their final objectives, the brandenberg features. During the morning and afternoon 9 R Tanks Group had remained in the forward assembly area but at 1645 hours C Squadron, followed by the remainder of the Group, moved forward to marry-up with 160 Infantry Brigade for the next phase of the operations. Occasional rain during the day had further worsened the ground and Lt.-Col. Veale had to walk ahead of his party to pick out the best “going”. Two tanks were put out of action by mines at 761547 and all the Stuart tanks were hopelessly bogged, as tank movement was stringently forbidden on the only road, and no flail could operate even if any could have been unbogged.

By 1815 hours C Squadron had entered the Forest and were moving up to their Start Line (track 818532 to 816526). Heavy shelling was encountered on two occasions but no casualties were sustained. The tanks avoided the tracks and broke their way through the trees, troops in line ahead and each troop leader preceding his tanks on foot. The move took a long time as it was now very dark, raining again, and frequent detours had to be made to avoid infantry who were digging in, but eventually the Squadron reached the Start Line and tied up with 6 RWF.

A Squadron 147 RAC, due to support E Lan R, were less successful – moving over the anti-tank ditch six tanks were bogged and had to be left. Owing to the tremendous traffic congestion on the one axis the infantry and tanks did not link up until 1915 hours. The Group then moved forward and the infantry passed into the wood but C Squadron were held up by the mass of vehicles jammed along the road and could not get into the forest here by any other route.

Meanwhile 1 E LAN R had reached the start line, with 6 RWF and C squadron 9 R Tanks ready on their left. It was apparent that A Squadron would be unable to get through to the Start Line to support the operation. So the attack went in at 2300 hours with only 6 RWF support by armour. C squadron advanced with all four troops in line, meeting little opposition on the right but mopping up some spandau teams on the left. Opposition was not great and the objectives were secured by 0005 hours. 9 R Tanks less C Squadron at this time moved forward to the Forest to join C Squadron.

General

The Divisional plan was behind schedule but this could not have been otherwise in view of the appalling conditions – in the circumstances the advance had progressed at a remarkable rate. Previous to the attack it was feared that the enemy may have divined our intentions and false-fronted us by pulling back to his second defence line, but his dispositions showed that this was not the case – 84 Infantry Division had been hit squarely in the localities anticipated. The enemy, stunned by the weight of the artillery bombardment to which he had been subjected, gave in quite easily when tanks and infantry appeared on the tail of the barrage. This day’s operations put 53 (W) Division across the open defended zone of 4,000 yards and into the Reichswald.

9 February

9 R Tanks

Through the Siegfried Forest Belt

RHQ, A and B Squadrons 9 R Tanks, having entered the Forest just after midnight, moved forward throughout the night. Progress was slow by reason of difficult conditions and traffic congestion, but at first light A Squadron and 4 WELCH passed through C Squadron. The group kept to the Northern edge of the Forest and met slight opposition only – by 0915 hours the objective at 8454 had been secured, an advance of some 2,000 yards.

Stoppelberg

B Squadron – 2 Mon

B Squadron, moving up with 2 MON to continue the attack, came under fire from two forward guns at 842544. These were engaged with 95mm at an approximate range of 2200 yards, hits were observed and the guns silenced.

This Squadron with infantry passed through A Squadron at 1015 hours, and, meeting no opposition, had secured the objective 8553 by 1100 hours.

C Squadron – 6 RWF

C Squadron had remained in their overnight position astride the Siegfried defences until 1200 hours when, with 6 RWF, they were relieved by 158 Infantry Brigade. They then moved forward along the routes forced through the trees by the preceding squadrons and crossed the Start Line (track 853544 to 851541) at 1200 hours. Opposition was slight and two hours later the objective, area 864543 to 865538 on the north-eastern edge of the Forest, had been captured and secured. Sorties were made into the thick plantations in front of the position and a total of 52 prisoners of war taken. Enemy transport and personnel in the area 8853 were engaged with good effect; this harassing of the enemy continued intermittently all day and four MGs at 870543, which were holding up elements of 15 (S) Division, were KO’d by an artillery concentration directed by C Squadron command.

147 RAC

Expansion from Siegfried Belt

A Squadron – 1 E LAN R

While 9 R Tanks were supporting 160 Infantry Brigade forward to the Stoppelberg feature, 147 RAC were assisting 158 Infantry brigade to expand and clean up the area of the Siegfried Belt. A Squadron, now reduced to 8 tanks, moved forward at first light and joined 1 E LAN R in the area 8151. A plan was made to clean up the general area 818518 – this was successful and resulted in the capture of 30 to 40 prisoners of war with an equivalent number killed. Many bazookas and four 10.5 cm guns were captured intact without a casualty to tanks.

C Squadron – 1/5 Welch

Throughout the morning C Squadron endeavoured to get into the forest north of the axis but the ground conditions had further deteriorated and despite extensive recce all attempts failed. At 1500 hours the Squadron entered the Forest via the axis and married up with 1/5 WELCH in area 834524. A successful attack on two enemy strongpoints was made without loss. Three 6-inch guns were destroyed and more than 70 prisoners of war taken.

B Squadron – 7 RWF

B Squadron collected itself, reorganised, repaired and as far as possible maintained its tanks until ordered forward at 1730 hours to support 7 RWF. This move, to an area near the road at 823526, was completed at 2200 hours for the loss of one tank bogged.

General

By evening a total of 2,580 prisoners of war had been taken on the “Veritable” front, and the ground conditions were still handicapping the advance more than the enemy. Movement on the divisonal axis was strictly controlled and it was necessary to close it completely from time to time in an effort to improve it. By evening 9 February, Brigade succeeded in establishing an AP and PP at Frasselt by running a column up the axis.

10 February

Road Cleves – Hekkens

Maintenance

The morning was well spent in getting “lame ducks” repaired as far as poss